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Abstract 
 
 In this dissertation I argue that while hedonism seems to be the correct theory of 
happiness, happiness does not seem to be the essence of welfare; after all, it appears that a person 
may be brainwashed over a given duration, may be happy over that same duration, but not also 
be well off over that duration, all things considered; this suggests that well-being consists of 
capacity-fulfillment.  
Hedonism about happiness (HH), maintains that you are happy to the extent that you 
have pleasure, unhappy to the extent that you have pain.  Besides hedonism about happiness, 
there are three popular theories of happiness: desire-satisfaction, life-satisfaction, and emotional 
state.  I judge these theories both by whether they accord with our commonsense intuitions and 
whether they have any internal problems.  All three conflict with some of our intuitions and have 
internal problems.  HH, however, accords with our intuitions and is not susceptible to the internal 
problems that the other theories are susceptible to.   
The relationship between happiness and well-being is a complex one.  Happiness does 
seem intrinsically good for the happy: whenever you experience an episode of happiness, you 
seem thereby better off.  By appealing to the case of brainwashing, however, I show that 
happiness seems neither necessary nor sufficient for welfare.  
Before introducing my own theory of welfare, I discuss five alternatives: desire-
satisfaction, life-satisfaction, self-fulfillment, perfectionism, and objective list.  The first four fail 
to accord with intuition in the case of brainwashing and the last three have internal problems.  
My own theory of welfare, capacity-fulfillment about welfare (CFW), maintains that you are 
well off to the extent that you successfully exercise your basic capacities.  We possess four basic 
capacities: affection, cognition, conation, and locomotion.  While CFW does not accord with 
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some of our intuitions, it accommodates the case of brainwashing and incorporates some of the 
strengths of the welfare theories I criticize while remaining immune to the internal problems they 
have.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Let us imagine a person, Sally, who over several months is thoroughly pleased.  Never 
has she felt so spiritually uplifted, so alive with power, so at ease with people, so confident of the 
truth of her convictions, and just so fulfilled.  Not only does she feel great: Sally also takes 
pleasure in feeling so great.  Indeed, she feels so pleasant and takes so much pleasure in feeling 
so pleasant that Sally has a higher surplus of pleasure than displeasure, the highest surplus she 
has ever had over a similar duration.  There is a hitch, however: Sally is a member of a 
destructive cult.1  Although she is satisfied and feels so good, Sally is being brainwashed.   
 Now, imagine that Sally is fortunate enough to have a family that decides to intercede on 
her behalf, hiring professionals to conduct an intervention.  Suppose that the intervention goes 
well, so well that Sally leaves the cult.  Over the next month or two Sally struggles to cope with 
the loss of leaving the cult.  She is often displeased: she feels spiritually deflated, alienated from 
others, unsure of what convictions to hold, let alone be confident of, and just so unfulfilled.  She 
realizes that she was manipulated by the cult and hence feels anxiety over not knowing whom 
she can trust.  This leaves Sally feeling downright miserable, so miserable that she has 
occasionally contemplates suicide.   
Sally begins seeing a therapist to help ease her struggles.  With the therapist’s help she is 
now beginning to do something she could not do while brainwashed: exercise her own critical 
                                                
1 By ‘cult’, I merely mean “a deviant […] organization with novel beliefs and practices. Deviance is departure from 
the norms of a culture in such a way as to incur the imposition of extraordinary costs from those who maintain the 
culture” (Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, A Theory of Religion [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1996], 124).  I removed ‘religious’ from Stark and Brainbridge’s definition; cults need not be 
religious, after all.  There are all sorts of cults: business, commercial, political, and so on.  Thus construed, ‘cult’ is a 
descriptive, not necessarily an evaluative, term: one may be part of a cult and not thereby be worse off.  The same is 
not true of ‘destructive cult’, since it is evaluative: if one is a member of a destructive cult, one is thereby made 
worse off.  This is because I use ‘destructive cult’ to refer to a cult that employs brainwashing on at least some of its 
members.  Once we examine the nature of brainwashing in chapter two it should be clear why brainwashing is 
harmful to the brainwashed and thus is an evaluative term.  
 
 2 
capacities, reflect over the life she wants to lead, consider what evidence she has for her beliefs, 
and so on.  Exercising her capacities in this manner feels good to Sally, and she takes pleasure 
from once again relying on her own thinking instead of relying on another’s.   
Fast-forward several years: Sally is still out of the cult.  And she no longer has difficulty 
coping, at least not nearly to the extent she once did.  More often than not Sally is pleased: she 
feels content, sure of her convictions, and just fulfilled.  Not only does she feel good, her feeling 
so good brings Sally pleasure.  She also continues to exercise her critical capacities; indeed, she 
is now a better critical thinker than she was prior to her brainwashing.  This state of affairs, too, 
brings her pleasure.  Sure, there are things she wishes that she had done otherwise; but for the 
most part, she is content: if given the choice to continue the brainwashed-free life she now leads 
or go back to the brainwashed life, Sally would choose to continue her current life.  That said, 
she did feel better and was more satisfied while brainwashed than she is now.  The amount, 
intensity, and duration of the pleasure she experienced while brainwashing far surpasses the 
pleasure she experiences several years after leaving the cult behind.  Now, during her 
brainwashing Sally did also experience some intense suffering: she lost some close friendships 
and distanced herself from her family.  Indeed, she suffered more as a cult member than she 
suffers several years after leaving it.  Sally just experienced so much more pleasure while 
brainwashed that the amount of pleasure minus suffering she had while brainwashed outweighs 
the net amount of pleasure she has years afterward. 
Let us refer to the several months that Sally was being brainwashed as case ‘A’, refer to 
the first couple of months after Sally leaves the brainwashing as case ‘B’, and refer to the several 
years after Sally leaves the brainwashing as case ‘C’.  It seems to me that we are justified in 
making at least three intuitive claims about A, B, and C.  For one, in A, even though Sally is 
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brainwashed, she seems happy, so happy that she seems happier in A than in B or C.  For 
another, Sally’s happiness does seem to make her pro tanto better off: she seems better off 
brainwashed and happy, other things equal, than brainwashed without as much happiness.  
Lastly, while Sally seems better off in A than in B, she seems better off in C than in A.  That is to 
say, even though Sally’s brainwashing seems to make her pro tanto worse off, it does not seem to 
make all-things-considered worse off: she seems better off in A than in B.  And even though 
Sally’s brainwashed happiness seems to make her pro tanto better off, it does not seem to make 
her all-things-considered better off: once we consider what the brainwashing does to Sally, she 
seems better off in C, years after she left the brainwashing.   
I appeal to this example throughout my dissertation.  I contend that the correct theories of 
happiness and welfare should accord with it.  While it is not so difficult for theories of happiness 
to accord with it, we shall see that it is difficult for theories of welfare to accord with it. 
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  The first three concern the nature of happiness; 
the fourth concerns the relationship between happiness and welfare; and the last two chapters 
concern the nature of welfare.  I begin the first chapter with a discussion of what I (and other 
scholars studying happiness) mean by the term ‘happiness’.  Once I discuss some other 
preliminaries I then offer what I intend to be are five uncontroversial commonsense examples of 
happiness—not just examples I find intuitive but examples I think we are prereflectively inclined 
to agree on non-inferential grounds are examples of happiness.   
In chapter two I explicate three popular theories of happiness: desire-satisfaction, life-
satisfaction, and psychic affirmation.  I judge the theories both by whether they accord with the 
five examples and whether they have any internal problems.  If I am correct, all three conflict 
with some of the cases.  Indeed, life-satisfaction conflicts with intuition in three of the five cases, 
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making it a wildly implausible theory of happiness.  While desire-satisfaction and psychic 
affirmation accord with intuition in four of the five cases, each has internal problems sufficient to 
make them implausible.  
In chapter three I discuss a theory of happiness that accords with intuition in all five cases 
and is free of the problems that plague the other theories: hedonism about happiness (hereafter 
also referred to as ‘HH’).  In a nutshell, it maintains that happiness is constituted by pleasure.  
HH is different from other hedonistic theories by remaining neutral about the essence of 
pleasure: rather than become engrossed in the debate over whether pleasure is a feeling or an 
attitude, HH just maintains whatever the essence of pleasure is, that, constitutes happiness.  My 
thesis for chapter three, then, is: happiness consists only of pleasure—whatever pleasure turns 
out to be.  Before concluding the chapter I defend HH against criticisms of the anti-hedonist 
Daniel Haybron, whose criticisms have yet to be fully addressed in the literature.   
In chapter four I consider the relationship between happiness and well-being, focusing on 
both whether a person need be happy in order to be well off and whether happiness is all that is 
required to be well off.  It turns out that the relationship between happiness and welfare is a 
complex one.  Happiness does seem intrinsically good for the happy: whenever you experience 
an episode of happiness, you seem thereby better off.  That said, happiness does not seem 
necessary for welfare in the sense that φ may benefit you without thereby increasing your 
happiness.  Moreover, happiness does not seem sufficient for well-being: it seems that you may 
enjoy a high level of happiness without also enjoying a correspondingly high level of welfare. 
The case of Sally is a prime example.  She seems better off years after she leaves the cult than 
she does while brainwashed even though she is less happy.  My theory of brainwashing is a 
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modification of the sociologist Benjamin Zablocki’s theory.  If I am right, brainwashing is the set 
of transactions whereby one person transforms the other into her deployable agent.   
I conclude chapter four with a discussion of authentic happiness.  Someone who believes 
that welfare is happiness may appeal to the notion of authenticity, arguing that authentic 
happiness is the essence of welfare, or that it is at least more prudentially valuable than 
inauthentic happiness.  So I modify HH to try and make it accord with the case of Sally, 
appealing to Fred Feldman’s truth-adjusted and desert-adjusted hedonistic theories of welfare.  
Authentic hedonism about happiness, however, seems false because both truth-adjusted and 
desert-adjusted theories fail to accord with intuition in the case of Sally.  Thus, happiness—
authentic or not—seems neither necessary nor sufficient for welfare.  
This brings us to chapter five, where I begin my discussion of welfare, as such.  Here I 
continue my discussion of what welfare is not.  I explicate and then criticize five theories of 
welfare: desire-satisfaction, life-satisfaction, self-fulfillment, perfectionism, and objective list.  
The first three fail to accord with intuition in the case of Sally.  Once modified to distinguish 
between authentic and inauthentic happiness, however, desire-satisfaction and life-satisfaction 
accord with intuition in the case of Sally.  But they are only able to accord with intuition by 
becoming more like my own theory of welfare.  Moreover, even though they now accord with 
intuition, each has internal problems.  And while perfectionism and objective list can be 
formulated to accord with intuition in the case of Sally, they only do so by becoming more like 
my own theory; plus, they suffer from problems my own theory of welfare is not susceptible to.  
In my last chapter, chapter six, I introduce my own theory of welfare: capacity-
fulfillment about welfare (hereafter also referred to as ‘CFW’).  If it is right, you are well off to 
the extent that you successfully exercise your basic capacities.  As I see it, we possess four basic 
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capacities: affection, cognition, conation, and locomotion.  All of our non-basic capacities can be 
explained by one or more of our basic capacities.  CFW accords with intuition in the case of 
Sally and incorporates some of the strengths of the welfare theories I criticize while remaining 
immune to the internal problems they have.  For example, CFW accords with the world as well 
as some objective lists; yet CFW is not merely a list of purported goods: CFW is also an 
explanation for why those goods are intrinsically good for us.  I conclude the chapter by 
defending CFW against objections. 
The thesis, then, that I defend in this dissertation is: hedonism seems to be the correct 
theory of happiness in that pleasure seems to be the essence of happiness; but happiness does not 
seem to be the essence of welfare, since it appears that a person may be brainwashed over a 
given duration, may be happy over that same duration, but not also be well off over that duration, 
all things considered; this suggests that well-being consists of capacity-fulfillment.  The capacity 
theory I have in mind maintains that you are well off to the extent that you successfully exercise 
your basic capacities: affection, cognition, conation, and locomotion.  With this said, let us 
begin.   
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Chapter 1: Happiness Preliminaries 
1.1 Preliminaries 
1.1.1 Apparent and actual happiness 
 
We use the term ‘happy’ in several different ways.2  Sometimes people say that they feel 
happy.  Other times people say that they are happy.  When talking about others, sometimes we 
even say that they seem happy.  What is going on here?—that is, are there distinctions between 
being, feeling, and seeming to be happy, or are they all the same phenomenon?  In this section I 
aim to show that while it is not clear whether there is a distinction between feeling happy and 
being happy, it is clear that there is a distinction between being happy and merely seeming to be 
happy, between actual happiness and merely apparent happiness.   
Imagine Blake, a hard working accountant for a tax accounting firm.  It so happens that it 
is tax season, Blake’s busiest time of the year.  In order to please his customers (and his bosses), 
Blake makes sure to don both a smile and a cheerful demeanor.  His customers walk away 
feeling satisfied over saving money and having a pleasant tax representative to work with.  
Unbeknownst to his customers, however, Blake is not feeling very pleasant: he is not pleased to 
work at his firm, especially during tax season.  He also feels dissatisfied in general for not 
putting his graduate degree in history to good use.  In this scenario, it would be strange to 
describe Blake as happy.  While he may appear happy from his demeanor, this is merely a 
façade: he dons it merely to stay employed.  He merely seems happy; he is not actually happy. 
Cases like this illustrate that there is a difference between the predicates ‘seems happy’ 
and ‘is happy’.  The first denotes seeming to be happy, apparent happiness, while the latter 
                                                
2 In the following five sections of chapter one I do not focus on unhappiness.  This is for brevity’s sake.  For each 
discussion of happiness, the same can be made for unhappiness, unless otherwise noted.  For instance, just as we can 
distinguish actual from merely apparent happiness, we can distinguish actual from merely apparent unhappiness.  
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denotes being happy, actual happiness.3  Now, this of course is not to say that one cannot both 
seem to be happy and be happy at the same time.  Indeed, most people who are happy seem 
happy, too.  That is, most who are happy display signs that make it look as though they are 
happy.  But the point is: not all people who seem happy are actually happy.4  There of course 
appears to be a common set of behavior we associate with happiness; but that set of behavior is 
not identical with happiness itself since one can portray the common signs of happiness without 
actually being happy.  What I am interested in explicating is, actual, not merely apparent, 
happiness. 
Unfortunately, while it is clear that one can seem happy without being happy, it is not so 
clear that one can feel happy without also being happy.5  Every time I have said that “I feel 
happy” I think I also meant that I am happy; but while it would seem odd for one to say that “I 
feel happy, but I am not happy”, the sentence does not appear to imply a contradiction.  The term 
‘I feel happy’ does not appear to imply that you are happy.6  How about the other way around: 
can you be happy without feeling happy?  Does one contradict oneself if one says, “I am happy, 
                                                
3 Davis (1981a: 111) makes this distinction, too. 
 
4 I said previously that as there is a difference between actual and merely apparent happiness, there is also a 
difference between actual and merely apparent unhappiness.  But while the prospect of someone feigning happiness 
even though she is not happy seems commonplace, the prospect of someone feigning unhappiness even though she 
is not unhappy may seem odd.  I grant this oddity: it seems far less common that people feign unhappiness than they 
feign happiness.  But the same conceptual distinction applies: it is possible for one to seem to be unhappy and yet 
not be unhappy.  Hence, there is a distinction between actual and merely apparent unhappiness, too. 
 
5 See Wayne Sumner; he discusses the phenomena of feeling happy, but does not discuss how we understand what 
the connection is between feeling happy and being happy (1996: 144-145). 
 
6 Davis and Christine Vitrano apparently disagree.  Davis implies that the relationship between feeling and happy 
and being happy is not that of feeling sick and being sick: while one may feel sick and actually not be sick, one may 
not feel happy unless one is also actually happy (Davis 1981a: 111).  But he fails to offer an argument to support his 
claim.  Vitrano maintains that just as one cannot feel scared or feel angry without being scared or being angry, one 
cannot feel happy without also being happy (Vitrano 2013: 112).  Happiness, according to Vitrano, is like any other 
emotion: if you are feeling it, “there is no principled way to distinguish the “feeling” from the “being”” (Ibid.).  For 
reasons discussed below (see section 2.3), I doubt, however, that happiness is an emotion. 
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but I do not feel happy”?  It is not obvious that one does.  I am puzzled by this.  The correct 
account of happiness should help solve this puzzle.  
1.1.2 Descriptive versus evaluative senses of ‘happy’ 
It is all well and good to discuss merely apparent versus actual happiness; but we also 
need to discuss the difference between descriptive and evaluative senses of ‘happy’.  We use ‘is 
happy’ in at least three different ways.  Sometimes we use it to express a property that is good 
for the person who has it, where ‘Sally is happy’ expresses something like the proposition that 
Sally is leading a life that is good for her.  Thus construed, ‘is happy’ is evaluative, since it 
implies that happiness is valuable for the person who has it.  But this judgment does not 
necessarily express a fact about all value, taking into account moral, aesthetic, and perhaps other 
value; all it tells us is that Sally’s life is high in a particular type of value: prudential value.  
There is another evaluative sense of ‘is happy’ that does seem to express a fact about all value.  
Think of the sentence ‘Sally is leading a happy life’.  It seems to express something like the 
proposition that Sally is leading an overall good life.  The idea is that Sally does not merely live 
a life that is good for her, but an overall good life: her life is not only high in prudential value; it 
is also high in moral, aesthetic, and other value.   
Not only do we use ‘is happy’ in evaluative ways; we also use it to express a 
psychological, or mental, fact about the person who has it, where ‘Sally is happy’ expresses 
something like the proposition that Sally is currently experiencing a particular psychological 
state: happiness.  Thus construed, ‘is happy’ is descriptive, not necessarily evaluative, since there 
is nothing in the meaning of the term that mentions ‘value’ (or its synonyms): it is logically 
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possible for Sally to be happy but her life not be high in prudential value.7  In order to avoid 
unnecessary confusion, hereafter, following the literature, I shall use terms like ‘is happy’ and 
‘happiness’ to connote this latter, descriptive, sense.  And I shall use ‘well-being’ and ‘welfare’ 
to connote the first evaluative sense such that ‘well-being’ and ‘welfare’ track just prudential 
value.8   
I want to briefly return to feeling happy.  There appears to be no contradiction implied by 
the sentence ‘I feel happy but I am not happy’.  What may be going on here is the employment of 
two different senses of ‘happy’.  The first conjunct ‘I feel happy’ may employ the descriptive 
sense of happiness, where ‘I feel happy’ means I currently possess the psychological state: 
happiness.  The second conjunct ‘I am not happy’ may employ the evaluative sense of happiness, 
where ‘I am not happy’ means I am not well off.  Thus understood, the sentence ‘I feel happy but 
am not happy’ means I am happy but am not well off.  While I think this makes some sense of 
the distinction between feeling and being happy, I am not convinced that it explains the 
distinction completely.   
1.1.3 Being occurrently, dispositionally, and predominately happy 
 Distinguishing actual from apparent psychological happiness is a good start; but I also 
need to distinguish what it is to be occurrently happy from what it is to be dispositionally happy, 
                                                
7 Notice that this is a logical or semantic point about the concept of happiness, not a substantial claim about whether 
happiness is good for the happy.  In section 4.2 I discuss the metaphysical issue of whether happiness is intrinsically 
prudentially valuable. 
 
8 Haybron also distinguishes these three different senses of ‘happiness’ (2008: 208-213). Although Feldman (2010: 
8-10) and Goldstein (1973) do not discuss the use of ‘happiness’ to connote overall value, they discuss the 
distinction between ‘happiness’ used to connote a psychological state and ‘happiness’ used to connote an evaluative 
state. 
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and this involves distinguishing them both from what it is to be predominately happy.9  A person 
is occurrently happy because of φ at time t if and only if she is happy because of φ right at t.  
Occurrent happiness is experienced in moments or episodes.  If you are currently happy right 
now, you are occurrently happy.  Suppose that you are watching the Broncos play the Seahawks 
in the Super Bowl.  If while watching the Seahawks win you are made happy by the refreshing 
taste of the ice-cold beverage you are drinking, you experience occurrent happiness.  And if 
drinking a second ice-cold beverage would make you happy at some future moment t1, you are 
dispositionally happy in regard to the second beverage at t in the sense that that beverage 
disposes you to be happy at t1.  A person is dispositionally happy because of ψ only if, other 
things equal, she would be made occurrently happy by ψ if she were to think about ψ or 
experience it.10 
In addition to being occurrently or dispositionally happy, you can also be predominately 
happy over a period of time.  If I were to say that you were predominately happy, I would be 
saying you are approximately happy, that although you may have experienced some 
unhappiness, you were (occurrently) happy more often than not.  It follows that you are 
predominately happy over a duration d if and only if you experience more occurrent happiness 
over d than occurrent unhappiness.   
                                                
9 Feldman also discusses the distinctions between being dispositionally and predominantly happy (2010: 56-57) and 
occurrent and dispositional pleasure (2010: 111-112).  Because he thinks that pleasure is essentially attitudinal, 
Feldman describes the distinction between occurrent and dispositional pleasures using propositions as objects.  You 
have occurrent pleasure over p if the fact that p is true is pleasurable to you.  You have dispositional pleasure over p 
when if you were to think about p, its being true would be pleasurable to you.  When I use ‘occurrently happy’ or 
‘dispositionally happy’ I do not mean to suggest that pleasure is essentially attitudinal or even that pleasure is the 
essence of happiness.  I think that there is a distinction being occurrently and dispositionally happy, whatever the 
correct theory of pleasure or happiness turns out to be.  
 
10 Davis also mentions the distinction between being occurrently and dispositionally happy.  But he defines the latter 
in terms of being predominantly happy: “In the dispositional sense, ‘A is happy’ means that A is predominantly 
happy in the occurrent sense” (Davis 1981a: 305, 1981b: 111).  I agree with Feldman, who criticizes Davis for 
failing to use the term ‘dispositional’ in its ordinary everyday sense (Feldman 2010: 56-57).  I use ‘predominantly 
happy’ to express Davis’s being dispositionally happy.  
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Occurrent happiness, then, is epistemically prior to both being dispositionally and 
predominantly happy.  In order to understand what it is to be dispositionally or predominantly 
happy, we have to understand what it is to be occurrently happy; while one may understand what 
it is to be occurrently happy without also understanding what it is to be dispositionally or 
predominantly happy.  I am therefore interested in explicating actual occurrent happiness. 
1.1.4 Relational and non-relational happiness 
 There are at least two ways that you may be happy: you may be 1) relationally happy, or 
you may be 2) non-relationally happy.11  You may be happy about something or with something; 
or you may be happy that something is the case; you may even be happy to, as in happy to be 
here.  These are all examples of relational happiness, where ‘happy’ occurs with a compliment.  
Used in this manner, ‘happy’ is a dyadic, not a monadic, term.  In these cases, you are not just 
happy; rather, you are happy in regards to something.  In some cases, your happiness has an 
intentional object.12  For example, you may happy about or with a friend of your finding a job.  
                                                
11 Davis (1981a: 111) and Sumner (1996: 143-147) make this distinction, too.  Davis distinguishes between 
relational happiness and non-relational happiness the same way I do. Sumner distinguishes between 1) being happy 
with or about something, 2) feeling happy, and 3) being happy/having a happy life.  Being happy with or about 
something is “roughly equivalent to being satisfied or content with it” (143).  Feeling happy does not require an 
intentional object; instead, it roughly amounts to the feeling or mood of contentment or joy (144).  Being happy or 
having a happy life roughly consists of being positively disposed to your life (145-146). 
 
12 One, it seems, can be relationally happy in two distinct ways: 1) intrinsically, and 2) extrinsically.  You are 
intrinsically happy that p if p by itself brings you happiness; whereas, you are extrinsically happy that p if it brings 
you happiness only insofar as it relates to something else that brings you happiness.  That is, one is made happy by p 
intrinsically if and only if there is no q such that one is made happy by p in virtue of being made happy by q; p is the 
final object of your happiness.  Whereas you are made happy by p extrinsically only if there is some other object q 
such that p makes you happy in virtue of q making you happy; p makes you happy not because it alone brings you 
happiness; rather, one is made happy by p because it brings about q, which by itself makes you happy (See, for 
example, Feldman (2004), where he distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic pleasure). 
 
Intrinsic happiness, then, is epistemically and ontologically prior to extrinsic happiness.  In order to understand 
extrinsic happiness, we need to first understand intrinsic happiness.  And this is because you are extrinsically happy 
that q only if you think q brings about p and you are intrinsically happy that p.  I previously said that I am interested 
in both non-relational and relational happiness.  When it comes to relational happiness, I am primarily interested in 
intrinsic, not extrinsic, happiness. 
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In other cases, your happiness has a propositional object.  For example, you may be happy that 
Barrack Obama won re-election.  There is also non-relational occurrent happiness, where 
‘happy’ occurs without a compliment.  Used in this manner, ‘happy’ is a monadic, not a dyadic, 
term.  In such cases you are not happy in regards to, related to, something; you are just happy.  
Non-relational happiness, then, has no intentional or propositional object.   
 Suppose that you have a craving for your favorite cigar.  Unfortunately, you have not 
been able to acquire one in years; your local cigar store always seems to be sold out of them.  
But the day finally arrives: the store now has a few in stock.  As you start smoking the cigar, you 
are reminded by how incredible the taste is.  Smoking this cigar makes you happy.  Moreover, as 
you enjoy smoking the cigar, you also find yourself happy that you are smoking the cigar.   
 In this example you experience both non-relational and relational happiness.  Smoking 
the cigar causes you to be happy.  And you are also happy that you are smoking such a fine 
cigar.  The former is a token of non-relational happiness while the latter is a token of relational 
happiness.  In the former case, while smoking the cigar caused you to be happy, there is no 
intentional or propositional object that you are happy over; you are just happy.  In the latter case, 
there is a propositional object that you are happy in regards to: the state of affairs of you smoking 
your favorite cigar.  I see no reason for supposing that relational happiness is different in kind 
from non-relational happiness; rather, they seem to be the same type of phenomenon: it just so 
happens that one has a propositional or intentional object, and the other does not.   
Some argue that relational happiness is essentially attitudinal, that being relationally 
happy essentially amounts to having the relevant pro-attitude toward the object of your 
happiness.  Now, there seem to be many different pro-attitudes, like: admiration, approval, 
enjoyment, hope, intending, liking, preference, satisfaction, and want, amongst others.  So if 
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relational happiness consists of having a pro-attitude, what particular pro-attitude does it consist 
of?  Well, it seems obvious that you can be happy over φ without admiring φ, hoping that φ, or 
preferring φ.  And while it may not seem obvious that you can be happy over φ without 
approving of, liking, or wanting φ, all three pro-attitudes seem to be some form of satisfaction.  
Not only does it not seem obvious that you can be happy over φ without enjoying φ or be 
satisfied that φ, neither enjoyment nor satisfaction obviously entails the other.  Satisfaction and 
enjoyment, then, are plausible answers for what pro-attitude relational happiness consists of, if it 
consists of an attitude at all.  
Those who claim relational happiness consists of satisfaction maintain that “[b]eing 
happy with something is roughly equivalent to being satisfied or content with it” (Sumner 1996: 
143-144).  Relational happiness, understood in such a way, is a cognitive matter with no 
necessary affective component: you may be happy that something is true without experiencing 
any occurrent feeling.  Those who think that relational happiness consists of enjoyment, not 
satisfaction, maintain that being happy with something is roughly equivalent to enjoying the fact 
that something is true.  Enjoyment differs from satisfaction in two relevant ways.  First, you may 
enjoy p without being satisfied p is true.  Second, enjoying p may entail that you occurrently feel 
something in regards to p.13  Point being: relational happiness understood as satisfaction would 
make relational happiness just a cognitive manner, whereas relational happiness understood as 
enjoyment leaves open the possibility that relational happiness is affective. 
For my money, relational happiness is best understood as enjoyment.  I am interested in 
both non-relational happiness and relational happiness.  I will argue (in chapter three) that 
pleasure is the essence of both non-relational happiness and relational happiness.  It just so 
                                                
13 A lot is riding on how we understand ‘enjoyment’.  Some argue that S’s enjoying the fact p is true does not imply 
that enjoyment consists of an occurrent feeling (See Feldman, 2004 and 2010).  My point is: conceptually speaking, 
enjoyment can be understood in such a way as to entail an occurrent feeling whereas mere satisfaction cannot. 
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happens that the pleasure associated with relational happiness has intentional or propositional 
content whereas the pleasure associated with non-relational happiness does not.  I think that we 
commonly use ‘enjoyment’ to refer to pleasure that has intentional or propositional content.  
That is how I will be using it in the rest of the dissertation.   
Now that I have said a few things about happiness, I need to discuss what I mean when I 
say that I am engaging in a philosophical analysis of happiness. 
1.1.5 Philosophical analysis of happiness 
This philosophical project does not concern itself with the likely causes of happiness.  
Being in love, raising a family, owning vast material wealth, whatever you think likely causes 
happiness, so be it; just recognize that this does not provide us an answer to our question: what is 
happiness?  I am also not interested in practical advice on how to get happiness.  Investing in 
blue chip stocks, going oversees as an Oxfam volunteer, marrying young, whatever you think 
will best enable you to achieve happiness, so be it; just recognize that this also does not get at the 
essence of happiness.  For that, I need to construct, as Feldman states, a “suitably general 
statement of necessary and sufficient conditions” of what it is for a person to be happy (Feldman 
2004: 13).  
So I attempt to construct such a statement in chapter three of this dissertation.  If I am 
right, hedonism about happiness is the correct theory of happiness.  That is, if I am correct, very 
roughly, happiness is nothing essentially other than the experience of pleasure. This is not, 
however, to say that every time we say something like ‘Sally is happy’ we mean something like 
Sally is experiencing more pleasure than pain.  People use ‘happy’ to express all sorts of things, 
some not very precise, after all.  My thesis, HH, is a metaphysical project about the phenomenon 
of happiness.  This is distinct from the linguistic project about the meaning of ‘happy’.  My aim 
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is to discover what it is that all and only happy people have in common, not necessarily what 
‘happiness’ means.  
Now, there may be nothing common among all phenomena we call ‘happy’.  Our use of 
‘happiness’ may be arbitrary or at least vary to such an extent that makes it impossible to 
perform a philosophical analysis of.  While this may be right, the only way to know if 
‘happiness’ is not capable of being analyzed is by first trying to analyze it.  To presume that 
happiness is incapable of being analyzed in this manner without even trying to do so is clearly 
rash and therefore unjustified.  Let us try to analyze it, then.  If it turns out we cannot do so, then 
we cannot do so; but it may turn out that we can. 
 It is also possible that the best we can do with the term ‘happiness’ is label it a “family 
resemblance” concept.  Terms like ‘game’ or ‘sport’ are sometimes said to bear family 
resemblance in that although no statement of necessary and sufficient conditions of the essence 
of a game or a sport can be made intelligible, there are sufficient similarities between all 
phenomena described by ‘game’ or ‘sport’ such that we recognize what ‘game’ or ‘sport’ mean; 
it is just that those similarities are impossible of being summarized in a formula.  Perhaps our 
efforts will reveal that while we may gain a better understanding of happiness by discussing 
some similarities many (but not all) happy people have in common, we cannot declare with 
confidence that happiness has an essence.  But again, the only way to justifiably believe that 
being happy is a family resemblance property is by first trying to explicate happiness.  Clearly, it 
would be irrational to presume that being happy is a family resemblance property without first 
trying to describe what it is to be happy. 
 
 17 
Not only is analyzing happiness a philosophical project, I contend that it is a 
philosophical project worth pursuing.  While there is nothing in the concept of happiness that 
makes it an evaluative concept, I shall argue later in section 4.2 that happiness is good for the 
happy: whenever it is present, it seems to make us better off.  Indeed, the theory of welfare that I 
defend in chapter six implies that happiness is a constituent of welfare.  If this is correct, clearly, 
happiness is worth investigating. 
I have yet to address a pertinent question: if I am interested in the descriptive, 
psychological, sense of ‘happy’, why is this a philosophical project?  Is it not the domain of 
psychology to analyze the psychological sense of happiness?  I think not.  When we philosophers 
analyze a phenomenon, we attempt to give an account of that phenomenon’s essence.  A 
philosophical analysis of happiness consists of describing what it is that all and only happy 
people have in common.  This is a task suited for philosophers since we have the training to do 
it; it is what we do.  Psychologists are more interested in empirical issues like measuring how 
happy people are, helping people attain happiness, and examining what happiness looks like on a 
brain scan.  They are less interested in describing what all and only happy have in common than 
they are in describing how happy a person appears to be.  Knowing what the psychological 
literature says about happiness is useful for understanding what it essentially is; I am not 
disputing that.  But surely we may use philosophical methods and see how far they get us.  We 
can try to determine the plausibility of a given theory of happiness by weighing it against our 
intuitions and by determining whether there are any internal problems within the theory.  If what 
follows is correct, we can use these methods to arrive at the correct theory of happiness.   
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 This concludes my discussion of preliminary matters.  For the remainder of this chapter I 
introduce five examples of happiness. 
1.2 Examples of happiness 
I mean for the following cases to be uncontroversial examples of happiness.  The people I 
describe, our non-inferential prereflective inclinations tell us, are happy.  The correct theory of 
happiness should accord with our commonsense intuitions on these cases, or in the event it does 
not accord, provide us with an adequate explanation for why we are mistaken.   
1.2.1 Brainwashed Sally 
 This is the case from the introduction.  Over the past few months Sally feels great.  Never 
has she been so confident of the truth of her convictions, socially adept with others, and just 
fulfilled.  And not only does she experience much pleasure, her feeling so much pleasure pleases 
her, too.  Although she feels so great, Sally is a member of destructive cult.  She would not be so 
high on life if she were not being brainwashed.  Fortunately for Sally, her parents see what is 
really going on and conduct an intervention on her behalf.  The intervention goes well, so well 
that Sally leaves the cult.  In the first month or two after she leaves Sally often feels miserable 
and depressed.  She is deeply unsatisfied with her lot.  Yet she is now beginning to exercise her 
critical capacities in a manner she did not while brainwashed.  And she takes pleasure in relying 
on her own beliefs and capacities rather than those of another.  Several years later Sally is no 
longer struggling with her departure from the group.  She often feels good, just not as good as 
when she was brainwashed.  Sally is pleased that she left the cult, so pleased that she would 
rather continue her life outside the group than return to it.  Further, she is now a more rational 
person than she was even prior to joining the cult. 
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1.2.2 Mary the mother14 
Mary is giving birth to her first child, which she always wanted.  While giving birth she 
experiences a wide variety of emotions, from elation to dread.  She also feels intense pain: the 
drugs the doctors give her can only do so much.  Yet, she enjoys giving birth to her child; indeed, 
she has so much enjoyment that she would describe this moment as the happiest of her life thus 
far.   
1.2.3 Glenda the graduate student15 
Glenda is a graduate student who above all both wants to write a great dissertation and 
obtain a tenure-track position at a research university; but she is not confident that she will 
satisfy either desire.  Perhaps Glenda doubts herself because she does not possess the requisite 
skills to excel in her academic discipline: she is just a moderately gifted graduate student.  
Glenda toils day after day on her dissertation with no apparent prospect of success.  This toiling 
weighs her down, leaving her feeling despondent and anxious most of the time.  Her depression 
prevents Glenda from sleeping more than a few hours a night.  Not only does she often feel bad, 
not too many people enjoy her company; indeed, most would describe her in one word: 
‘irritable’.  Fortunately, Glenda is now seeing a psychiatrist.   
The psychiatrist first tries to counsel Glenda by applying cognitive behavior therapy.  Her 
psychiatrist encourages her (despite Glenda’s only moderate talents) to believe both that she will 
write a great dissertation and procure a tenure-track position at a prestigious university.  
However, no matter how hard the psychiatrist tries, Glenda refuses to give up her beliefs; they 
are just too entrenched.  Accepting Glenda’s obstinacy, the psychiatrist now attempts to change 
                                                
14 I take this example from Feldman (2010: 33-34). 
 
15 I also take this example from Feldman, who calls Glenda ‘Susan’ (2010: 63-65). 
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her desires.  This, too, ends in failure: her desires are like her beliefs—too entrenched for her to 
give up.  So the psychiatrist changes his tactics.  Instead of trying to get Glenda to change her 
beliefs or desires, the psychiatrist now prescribes some mood altering medication, medication 
that is intended to make the pessimistic more cheerful.  Thankfully, the medication works as 
advertised, improving Glenda’s mood considerably: although she still has the same beliefs and 
unsatisfied desires, Glenda is no longer so pessimistic.  She feels cheerful, not depressed.  
Glenda now sleeps well at night, enjoys working on her dissertation, and is much less irritable.    
1.2.4 Seneca the Stoic 
 Being a Stoic, Seneca has unusual self-control, learning long ago not to permit his 
emotions from interfering with his reason.  He exercises this self-control by not allowing himself 
to be emotional.  Imagine that he has just given an excellent oration on why the Roman Empire 
needs to adopt fiscal and judicial reforms whereby slaves would be treated more humanly.  
Seneca is pleased with himself and his speech: it seems likely that Rome will act in the manner 
he prescribed.  Yet if you were to look at Seneca in the moments following his oration you 
would not be able to tell how much pleasure he experiences.  He does not seem particularly 
cheerful: not even a smile cracks his lips.  Indeed, his demeanor is the same it would have been if 
Seneca had not just given the speech.  He is no more cheerful or optimistic than he was before 
the speech.  Nonetheless, he has a lot of enjoyment right now, not much displeasure.   
1.2.5 Andrew the swine 
Andrew’s father is a farmer.  But being that his dad has enough hired hands, Andrew is 
left with much free time.  So he spends his life in utter debauchery, using illegal substances and 
engaging in illicit activities like fornicating with some of his father’s hired hands and even 
committing bestiality with the farm animals.  Why does Andrew engage in such debauchery?—
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the answer is simple: because he receives a lot of pleasure from doing so.  Now, as you can 
imagine, Andrew is not the most reflective person; he just enjoys the feelings his activities give 
him.  During his more lucid moments, Andrew is displeased by the fact that such activities feel 
so pleasant to him.  Now, this displeasure does not come close to the strength or intensity of the 
pleasure he gets from the activities themselves.  Overall, Andrew is a very cheerful person.  He 
just happens to enjoy what we would likely say are disgusting activities.   
The above five cases, I contend, are all uncontroversial examples of happiness.  
Prereflectively I think that we are inclined to judge the people described as happy.  In the next 
chapter I consider whether three popular theories of happiness accord with them and whether the 
theories have internal problems. 
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Chapter 2: What Happiness is Not 
 In this chapter I discuss three different theories of happiness.  After explicating each, I 
discuss to what extent the theory accords with intuition in the five examples of happiness 
discussed above.  If I am correct, each theory fails to accord with intuition in at least one case; 
this is because, I argue, the things these theories claim constitute happiness do not in fact 
constitute happiness.  I start with desire-satisfaction about happiness. 
2.1 Desire-satisfaction about happiness (DSH) 
2.1.1 The essence of DSH 
Roughly, DSH is the position that happiness is the satisfaction of your desires: you are 
happy to the extent that your desires are satisfied, unhappy to the extent that they are frustrated.  
It is important to note how strong a position DSH is: it implies that the satisfaction of any of your 
desires makes you happier, period.  Now, in order to understand DSH we have to understand 
what proponents of DSH mean by both ‘desire’ and by ‘satisfaction’.   
A desire is a mental state; more precisely, it is an attitude, not necessarily a feeling or an 
emotion.  A desire is not just any attitude, however: it is a pro-attitude.  To desire something is to 
be positively disposed to that thing.  There is a long-standing tradition that understands desiring 
ϕ to be nothing essentially besides being motivated to do ϕ.  Like belief, then, while you may be 
aware of a desire you have, you need not be.  You seem to desire many different things without 
being vividly aware that you do, namely: breathing, hunger, thirst, and so on.  Hence, proponents 
of a desire view acknowledge that the extent to which a particular desire-satisfaction contributes 
to happiness is determined, at least in part, by how intense and how long the desire is.  Basically, 
the more intensely and the longer you desire ϕ the more satisfying your desire will increase your 
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happiness.  Desires are similar to beliefs in at least one further way: there is propositional content 
to a desire; whenever you desire something you want the content of your desire to obtain.  
Suppose that you desire to be with your family at Christmas.  You would then desire the 
proposition that you are with your family at Christmas be true.  Now that I have provided a brief 
account of what desires are, let us move on to satisfaction. 
There are two different ways to understand ‘satisfaction’.  First, we may understand 
‘satisfaction’ as objective satisfaction, where a desire for ϕ is satisfied if and only if ϕ.  Thus 
construed, DSH maintains that you are happy to the extent that you get what you want, unhappy 
to the extent that you do not.16  Now, it could be the case that you get what you want but do not 
know about it; then again, it could also be the case that you do not get what you want but you 
nevertheless believe that you do.  The point is: for objective DSH, it is not whether you believe 
that you get what you want that constitutes happiness; it is actually getting what you want that 
constitutes happiness.  
Second, we may understand ‘satisfaction’ as subjective satisfaction, where a desire is 
satisfied if and only if the person who has the desire believes that the desire is satisfied.  Thus 
construed, DSH maintains that you are happy to the extent you believe you get what you want, 
unhappy to the extent you do not.17  According to subjective DSH, you may get what you want 
or you may not; either way, it does not constitute happiness; the only thing that constitutes your 
                                                
16 V. J. McGill is sometimes referred to as a proponent of objective DSH (See Feldman 2010: 53).  I, however, am 
not comfortable referring to McGill as a proponent of DSH.  True, he does espouse a desire-satisfaction theory, but 
he seems to offer it as a theory of welfare, not happiness.  Like Aristotle, he considers happiness to be the highest 
good we can achieve, that which is “(1) desired for its own sake, and (2) not desired for the sake of anything else, 
and (3) will be the only good of which (1) and (2) are both true” (McGill 1967b: 13).  Although he does not 
distinguish between psychological and evaluative happiness, McGill seems to be using ‘happiness’ to express 
something like the value-laden concept of welfare, not the value-neutral psychological state I refer to as ‘happiness’.  
 
17 For perhaps the most sophisticated versions of subjective DSH, refer to Davis (1981b) and Chris Heathwood 
(2005 and 2007); although Heathwood does not explicitly maintain that satisfied desires constitute happiness, he 
constructs a sophisticated formulation of desire-satisfaction about welfare that employs this subjective sense of 
‘satisfaction’. 
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happiness is your believing that you get what you want.  Belief, like happiness, may be occurrent 
or dispositional; proponents of DSH maintain that both are relevant for your happiness.  You 
need not be occurrently thinking about a desire that you believe has been satisfied in order for it 
to increase your happiness.18  You believe that 2+2 = 4, but you may not have thought about it in 
months.  Presumably, you have beliefs that you are not completely aware of and beliefs while 
you are sleeping; these would be dispositional beliefs. 
According to DSH you are happy to the extent that your desires are satisfied; the extent to 
which a particular desire is satisfied contributes to your happiness is determined by the desire’s 
intensity and duration.  But remember: happiness is a psychological or mental state that you 
experience in moments at a time.  Your happiness at a particular time seems to be determined by 
happiness-constitutive experiences or states that you have at that time.  DSH may seem to fail to 
accommodate this restraint.  Suppose that you intensely desire to run a marathon in the year 
2016.  But between now and then, say, in 2015, you stop desiring to run that marathon.  When 
2016 rolls around, however, circumstances dictate that you run the marathon, anyway.19  Does 
running the marathon make you any happier?  If so, when does it make you happier?—back in 
2014 when you desired to run that marathon, or in 2016 when you actually ran it?   
Neither of these answers is correct.  Your psychological state back in 2014 is not at all 
affected by what you do in 2016; so how can running a marathon in 2016 affect how happy you 
are back in 2014?  And in 2016 when you actually run the marathon, you do not even desire to 
run it, however; so according to DSH, you are made no happier by running it.  The obvious 
answer to the question is no: satisfying that desire makes you no happier.  DSH can 
                                                
18 See Davis (1981b: 113). 
 
19 Dorsey (2013: 153-154) uses a similar example in his defense of a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare.  
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accommodate this if it includes a concurrence restraint such that ϕ is a satisfied desire for S at a 
time t only if S desires ϕ at t.20  Thus formulated, only satisfied desires that you desire at the time 
they occur constitute your happiness.  DSH, modified in such a way, maintains that you are 
happy at t to the extent that your desires at t are satisfied at t.  Going forward, I shall understand 
DSH as this formulation. 
2.1.2 DSH and our five cases 
Let us now run both types of DSH through the gauntlet of the above five cases, starting 
with Sally.  Although we are inclined to believe that Sally is happy both while she is being 
brainwashed and several years after she leaves the brainwashing, she seems happier 
brainwashed: she is more cheerful, feels better about herself, has more pleasure, and more 
satisfied desires brainwashed than not.  We are also inclined to believe that Sally is unhappy in 
the first month after she leaves the cult because she often feels downright miserable.  What is 
DSH’s verdict?  
Well, according to subjective DSH, Sally is happy to the extent she believes that her 
desires are satisfied, unhappy to the extent she believes they are not.  Over the months Sally is 
brainwashed she believes that she has satisfied many of her desires, and she believes she has 
failed to satisfy few of her desires; indeed, over this duration Sally has more net subjective 
desire-satisfaction than during any other similar duration in her life.  Thus, subjective DSH 
deems Sally happy, the happiest she has ever been (over a similar duration).  Years after she 
leaves the cult Sally believes that she is satisfying more desires than not, but Sally does not 
believe she is satisfying as many desires as she was while she was being brainwashed; and even 
though she believes that she fails to satisfy few desires years after the brainwashing, she believed 
                                                
20 Dorsey (2013) and Heathwood (2005) defend a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare with a concurrence 
constraint. 
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that she failed to satisfy even fewer desires while brainwashed.  According to subjective DSH, 
then, Sally is happier brainwashed than years afterward.  Subjective DSH also deems Sally 
unhappy in the first couple months she leaves the brainwashing because she does not believe that 
she satisfied many of her more intense desires.  Hence, subjective DSH accords with our 
intuitions in the case of Sally.  The same goes for objective DSH: objective DSH deems Sally 
happy while brainwashed because more of her desires go fulfilled than unfulfilled; and objective 
DSH implies that Sally is happy years after she leaves the cult, just not as happy as she was in it 
because not as many of her desires are fulfilled as they were previously (and more go 
unfulfilled).  Objective DSH also deems Sally unhappy in the first month after the intervention, 
since many of her desires go unfulfilled.  Hence, no matter how we interpret ‘satisfaction’ DSH 
accords with our pretheoretical inclinations about Sally.  
It seems reasonable to suppose that both subjective and objective DSH also accord with 
the intuition that Mary is happy while giving birth to her first child.  Sure, she experiences much 
pain; but both versions of DSH deny that pain intrinsically affects how happy Mary is.  What 
matters, according to DSH, is that she intensely wants to give birth to her child, she believes that 
she is satisfying that desire, and she is in fact satisfying that desire.  That said, Mary does not 
want to experience the pain of childbirth.  Sure, she may be said to desire it extrinsically in the 
sense that what she desires most of all is to give birth and she therefore desires anything 
necessary—including the pain of childbirth—to fulfill that desire.  But proponents of DSH 
usually formulate DSH such that the fulfillment of only intrinsic desires makes one happier.21  
Since Mary does not desire the pain of childbirth for its own sake, her pain, then, does not 
contribute to her happiness.  So, for the proponent of DSH, whether Mary is happy comes down 
to this: whether she prefers giving birth more than preferring not being in pain.  Since she prefers 
                                                
21 See both Davis (1981a and 1981b) and Heathwood (2005 and 2007). 
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the former over the latter and she believes that she is giving birth, subjective DSH deems her 
happy.  Likewise, since she prefers giving birth to not experiencing the pain, objective DSH 
deems her happy, too. 
The case of Glenda poses a problem for DSH.  Remember, Glenda is the one who above 
all else desires to write an excellent dissertation and ascertain an excellent professorship.  While 
many of her unconscious desires go satisfied—like breathing, eating, drinking, and so on, her 
most intense desires do not: she neither believes that she writes an excellent dissertation nor does 
she actually write an excellent dissertation; neither does she believe she obtains a tenure-track 
position nor does she actually obtain one.  That said, her mood changes due to the medication her 
psychiatrist prescribes such that although her desires remain unsatisfied, she no longer feels 
despondent or anxious; rather, she feels great, enjoying long bouts of optimism and cheerfulness.  
This is why Glenda seems happy, or at least happier than prior to taking the medicine.  But both 
versions of DSH deny that Glenda is any happier: after she takes the medication, although her 
mood improves, she is still not getting what she wants; nor does she believe that she is getting 
what she wants.  Thus, both subjective and objective DSH deem Glenda just as happy while 
depressed as not depressed.  This seems wrong, however: Glenda seems happier medicated and 
cheerful than unmedicated and depressed.   
The proponent of DSH has a response to this.  She could argue that Glenda believes that 
more of her desires go satisfied after she takes the medication and that more of Glenda’s desires 
are actually satisfied after taking the medication.  She feels cheerful after taking the medication, 
not despondent or anxious.  Obviously, she desires to be cheerful, at least more so than she 
desires to be despondent or anxious.  And because more of Glenda’s desires go satisfied (both 
subjectively and objectively), DSH deems her happier after the medication.  This is not a good 
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response.  DSH does not deem the satisfaction of any desire as equally happiness-constitutive as 
any other; rather, the extent to which a particular satisfied desire is happiness-constitutive is 
determined by how intense and how long the desire is.  In the case of Glenda, while she desires 
to be cheerful and does not desire to be depressed, the intensity and length for which she desires 
being cheerful pales in comparison to her most intense and long-lasting desires of writing an 
excellent dissertation and obtaining a tenure-track position.  According to DSH, then, roughly 
speaking, Glenda is no happier after taking the medication, which seems wrong.   
Although they fail to accord with intuition in the case of Glenda, both versions of DSH 
accord with intuition in the cases of Seneca and Andrew: Seneca and Andrew both believe that 
they are doing what they want and both get what they want.  In the case of Andrew, he wants to 
do illegal drugs; he wants to fornicate with his father’s hired hands and commit bestiality; doing 
so brings him much pleasure, after all.  While it is also true that upon reflection Andrew desires 
not to have such base desires, he does not reflect all that often: so he has more base desires than 
desires not to have such desires, and his desires for base pleasures are much stronger than his 
desires not to engage in such activities.  Andrew, then, both believes that he gets much of he 
wants and he actually gets much of what he wants.  Hence, both forms of DSH deem Andrew 
happy, which accords with our prereflective inclinations. 
In the table below I sum up the results of to the extent to which DSH accords with 
intuition in the five cases. 
 Intuition Subjective 
DS 
Objective 
DS 
1. Brainwashed Sally H H H 
2. Mary the mother H H H 
3. Glenda the talented student H U U 
4. Seneca the Stoic H H H 
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5. Andrew the swine H H H 
 
2.1.3 Additional considerations 
Judging from the above cases DSH may seem like a plausible theory of happiness; it 
accords with intuition in four of the five cases, after all.  I contend, however, that appearances 
are deceiving: desire-satisfaction seems wrong about happiness.  Objective DSH, in particular, 
seems wildly implausible.  I shall criticize it first, then move on to criticizing subjective DSH.   
Suppose that you desire ϕ.  It seems strange that ϕ’s obtaining can make you happy 
without you believing that ϕ has obtained or without you gaining pleasure from ϕ’s obtaining.  
Indeed, if objective DSH is correct, ϕ makes you happier even if it does not affect your mental 
states.  Suppose that you are travelling on a subway and notice someone, call her ‘Sarah’, on 
crutches with a cast around her leg.22  Being that you are a morally decent person, you desire for 
Sarah to get well, for her leg to heal.  Suppose that weeks later, unbeknownst to you, Sarah’s leg 
heals.  When it is healed, a desire of yours has been fulfilled.  Thus, according to objective DSH, 
you are happier in virtue of Sarah’s leg being healed, even though you do not know it has been 
healed; but how can this be?  Sure, Sarah may feel happier; her leg is no longer broken, after all.  
But how does the mere fact that her leg has healed affect your psychology such that you are 
happier?   
The above case strikes us as strange, I contend, for a reason: I think that objective DSH is 
in tension with itself.  Remember, I am using the term ‘happiness’ to denote a descriptive state of 
your psychology, of your mental states.  So happiness is a mental state or a series of mental 
states.  If something affects your happiness, it must affect a mental state of yours.  But if 
                                                
22 I borrow this example from Parfit (1984: 494). 
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objective DSH is correct, your happiness may increase even if your mental states do not change. 
This is not possible, however.  If the theory is not incoherent, there is at least a considerable 
tension that needs to be resolved.23 
The above criticism seems reason enough to render objective DSH an implausible theory 
of happiness.  Now I shall criticize subjective DSH.  My criticism of subjective DSH relies on 
cases like Glenda: she seems happier after taking the medication even though she believes that 
her intense desires are unsatisfied.  Having your most intense desires satisfied just does not seem 
necessary for you to be happy.  Not only that, satisfying intense desires seems insufficient for 
happiness.  Think of Daniel, an ascetic.  He deeply desires to commune with God; so he joins a 
monastery.  Such an environment gives him plenty of time to reflect on God’s mysterious ways.  
The thing is: much of the time he feels deep melancholy.  Now, he knows that he could just leave 
the monastery to feel better; but Daniel does not want that: he prefers the melancholy that comes 
from his service to God to the pleasure of a more “worldly” existence.  Even though he believes 
that he gets what he yearns for, he does not seem happy. 
Not only does desire-satisfaction seem neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness, 
some satisfied desires seem to leave us unhappy, not happy.24  Take Oscar.  For months now he 
as yearned for the release of Dungeon Siege II.  Indeed, not a day goes by where he is not 
intensely looking forward to playing this video game.  Once it is released, however, and he 
begins playing it he is sorely disappointed: it is just not fun to play, or at least not nearly as fun to 
play as he expected it would be.  Now, Oscar does not feel disappointed as soon as begins 
playing but five minutes into it; call this moment ‘t5’.  He gives the game a few days before 
giving up and shelving it for the foreseeable future.  According to DSH, since his intense desire 
                                                
23 Using a similar argument Sumner deems objective theories of happiness “unintelligible” (1996: 140). 
 
24 Such desires are what Sidgwick calls ‘dead sea apples’ (1981: 110). 
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for playing the game has been satisfied (both subjectively and objectively), he should be thereby 
happier.  Yet he feels disappointed and thereby less happy.  Oscar desires to play the game at t5 
and he believes that he is playing the game at t5; yet he feels unhappy at t5. 
There is a fix to this problem, but it requires a substantial change to DSH.  Rather than 
maintain that anything you desire affects your happiness so long as it occurs at the time you 
desire it, DSH could maintain that only sensations that you experience at the same time that you 
desire them (for their own sake) make you happier.  While you desire to play that video game, 
playing the game is not an experience for you.  The disappointment is, though.  But because you 
do not desire the disappointment when you are experiencing it, it does not make you any happier.  
While this modified DSH is no longer susceptible to the worry I described above, this 
modification has considerable cost: we no longer have a desire-satisfaction theory of happiness, 
but something similar to my own theory of happiness.  What kind of experiences are you going 
to desire for their own sake?  The obvious answer is pleasant ones.  Many philosophers contend 
that there is nothing essential to a pleasant experience besides you desiring that experience for its 
own sake when it is occurring.25  If pleasure is understood in this way, not only is my own theory 
of happiness coextensive with this modified DSH, this modified DSH just collapses into my own 
theory. 
My last criticism of subjective DSW concerns the desire to be unhappy.  It may sound 
strange, but it seems possible for us to desire our own unhappiness.  It is not hard to think of 
individuals who want to be unhappy; Daniel the ascetic, described above, is one example.  Yet it 
is difficult to think of individuals who want to have their desires frustrated.  As Feldman says, 
“this consideration by itself may be sufficient to show that happiness cannot be identified with 
                                                
25 In section 3.1.1.1 below I discuss this theory of pleasure along with another; I also provide a list of the 
philosophers who espouse a particular theory. 
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desire satisfaction” (2010: 68), or at least that unhappiness cannot be identified with desire 
frustration.  I want to add some more substance to this important criticism; to do so, I shall use 
the example of Daniel.  Suppose that he only has one intense desire at t: to be unhappy at t.  Call 
this desire for unhappiness at ‘U’.  He either believes that he is happy at t, or he believes that he 
is unhappy at t.  On the one hand, if he believes that he is unhappy at t, according to subjective 
DSH, he is happy at t: he desires U and he believes U; that is, his intense desire has been 
satisfied; which makes him, according to DSH, happy.  On the other, if he believes that he is 
happy at t, according to subjective DSH, he is unhappy at t: he desires U and he believes U; that 
is, his intense desire has been frustrated, which makes him unhappy.  This is not quite 
paradoxical, but it is odd that no matter what Daniel believes about his happiness he is 
mistaken.26 
Now that I have criticized DSH, let us move on to our next theory of happiness. 
2.2 Life-satisfaction about happiness (LSH) 
2.2.1 The essence of LSH 
LSH is the position that happiness is the satisfaction of our lives as a whole: you are 
happy to the extent that you are satisfied with your life as a whole, unhappy to the extent that you 
are dissatisfied with it.27  This does not merely involve satisfaction with one’s life; it involves 
satisfaction with one’s whole life.  By ‘whole life’ most advocates of LSH mean a person’s life 
up to the moment in question.28  The most plausible LSH theories consider satisfaction to consist 
                                                
26 Feldman makes the same point (2010: 68). 
 
27 Proponents of LSH include Benditt (1974), Montague (1966), Sumner (1996), and Tatarkiewicz (1976). 
 
28 A minority take ‘whole life’ to mean past, present, and future life; see Tatarkiewicz (1976: 140). 
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of two components, one cognitive, the other affective.  A person is cognitively satisfied with her 
life as a whole to the extent her life on balance at least roughly “measures up favorably against 
[her] standards or evaluations” (Sumner 1996: 145-146).  A person is affectively satisfied with 
her life as a whole to the extent that she experiences “a sense of well-being: finding [her] life 
enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it” (Ibid.).29  A person, then, is not 
happy according to LSH unless she is generally speaking both cognitively and affectively 
favorably disposed to her whole life: cognitive satisfaction and affective satisfaction are each 
necessary for happiness; together they are sufficient, or so says LSH.  
Remember how there are two ways of understanding ‘satisfaction’ in desire-satisfaction 
theories of happiness?—well, the same is true for LSH.  On the one hand, we may understand 
‘satisfaction’ to mean actual satisfaction, meaning you are happy if and only if you are actually 
overall satisfied with your whole life.  On the other hand, we may understand ‘satisfaction’ to 
mean hypothetical satisfaction, meaning you are happy if and only if if you were to think about 
your whole life, you would be overall satisfied with it.  Hypothetical satisfaction is less stringent 
than actual satisfaction.  According to the former, you need not be occurrently reflecting about 
your life and find it to be on the whole worthwhile.  No, you only need to find your life on the 
whole worthwhile in the counterfactual where you are actively thinking about your life.  Actual 
satisfaction is more stringent: in order for you to be happy, you must be occurrently reflecting 
about your life and find it on the whole satisfactory.  Now, neither proponents of actual LSH nor 
proponents of hypothetical LSH maintain that you must be completely satisfied with your whole 
                                                
29 Proponents of LSH are in rough agreement on what they mean by ‘satisfaction’.  See, Richard Brandt, who says 
that a person is cognitively satisfied with her life when she “does not want [it] to be substantially different, and that 
[it] measure[s] up, at least roughly, to the life ideal [she] had hoped to attain” (1967: 413-414).  He also says that a 
person is affectively satisfied with her life when she “feel[s] joy or enthusiasm or enjoy[s] what [s]he was doing or 
experiencing” (Ibid.). 
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life for you to be happy.  Rather, they merely require that you be on the whole satisfied with your 
life: there may be parts of your life that you are not satisfied with; but so long as you are satisfied 
with your whole life overall, LSH deems you happy. 
We can measure how happy you are over a period of time or how happy you are at a 
single moment.  Your momentary happiness, if LSH is right, is nothing other than how 
affectively satisfied you are at that particular moment and how cognitively satisfied you are with 
your life up to and including that moment.  Your happiness over a duration is simply the sum of 
how happy you are over each moment of that duration. 
Now that I have explicated LSH, it is time to consider how well it accords with intuition 
in our five cases. 
2.2.2 LSH and our five cases 
Let us first recall Sally, who feels great, gets much pleasure, and satisfies many of her 
desires even though she is being brainwashed.  Actual LSH deems that Sally is happy so long as 
she is satisfied with her life as a whole, while hypothetical LSH deems Sally happy so long as if 
she were to reflect about her life as a whole, she would be satisfied with it.  Sally is clearly 
affectively satisfied while she is brainwashed: she feels fulfilled, the most fulfilled she ever has.30 
Sally is also cognitively—actually and hypothetically—satisfied with her life.  While she is 
displeased by the fact that she wasted the vast majority of her life thus far, Sally regards her life 
prior to the joining cult as necessary to getting her to where she is today.  Sure, she would prefer 
it if she always had her new beliefs—that is, prefer to have always been a member of the group; 
                                                
30 Some critics of LSH fail to discuss affective satisfaction in their criticisms of LSH.  I am not sure why this is 
when proponents of LSH are clear that satisfaction includes an affective dimension.  Examples of such forgetful 
critics are Feldman (2010: 83-90) and Haybron (2008: 82-96). 
 35 
but she recognizes that her prior life was necessary for her to be a member of the group and thus 
is overall satisfied with it.  
Both versions of LSH also accord with the intuition that Sally is unhappy in the first 
month after she leaves the cult.  She feels far less fulfilled outside the cult than inside; in fact, 
she feels downright lousy.  Cognitively, Sally is not at all satisfied with her life, either: she is 
coming to grips with the fact that she wasted a year of her life following the whims of a 
megalomaniac.  Years after she leaves the brainwashing Sally feels much better: she generally 
feels cheerful and optimistic and usually experiences more pleasure than displeasure.  Sally also 
fares better cognitively: now that she has learned about the nature of brainwashing, she 
understands what it was about her that enabled someone else to take advantage of her.  With the 
aid of therapy, Sally tends to reflect a lot about her life.  She has thus come to accept that she 
was brainwashed and is now even attempting to learn from it.  That said, she was more 
affectively and cognitively satisfied while brainwashed.  Thus, according to either version of 
LSH, Sally is happy years after she leaves the brainwashing, not happy a month after the 
brainwashing.  And both actual and hypothetical LSH deem Sally happiest while brainwashed.  
LSH, then, accords with intuition in the case of Sally. 
This brings us to our next case: Mary.  Mary is not currently reflecting about her life.  
She does not form something like the judgment I am satisfied with my life thus far: Mary is too 
busy giving birth to engage in such reflection.  Actual LSH, hence, deems her unhappy at the 
moment she is giving birth.  And while Mary finds her current experience of giving birth 
rewarding and fulfilling, if Mary was to reflect about her life as a whole, she would not find it 
roughly satisfactory.  You see, Mary is a single parent whose life thus far falls far short of the 
expectations and values she has possessed since childhood.  Hypothetical LSH, then, deems her 
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unhappy, as well.  Hence, both actual and hypothetical LSH conflict with intuition in the case of 
Mary.  Mary clearly seems happy when she gives birth; she even claims that she is the happiest 
she has ever been.   
But the proponent of LSH is not done, yet.  While LSH fails to deem Mary happy at the 
moment she is giving birth, it could be modified to deem Mary happy over the duration in which 
she is giving birth.  The problem with LSH with this case is that while Mary is (both cognitively 
and affectively) satisfied with her life over the duration of giving birth to her child, Mary is not 
roughly satisfied with the duration of her life to date.  According to LSH, you are happy at 
moment m to the extent that: 1) you are affectively satisfied at m, and 2) you are on balance 
cognitively satisfied with your life up to and including m.  Thus, LSH fails to deem Mary happy.   
Let us modify LSH to the position that you are happy over m to the extent that 1) you are 
affectively satisfied at m, and 2) you are cognitively satisfied with your life as it is at m.  
Modified in such a way, you are cognitively satisfied at m to the extent that your life at m meets 
your expectations and standards at m.  To determine how happy Mary is over the duration of her 
giving birth, we just add up all the moments of life-satisfaction she has over that duration.  If we 
do this under modified LSH, Mary is happy: she feels fulfilled during most of the moments of 
that duration and she is cognitively satisfied with her life over that duration.  This modification, 
then, works in the case of Mary; it does not, however, in the case of Glenda. 
Intuition tells us Glenda is happier after taking the medication, since it leaves her feeling 
uplifted and optimistic instead of despotic and pessimistic.  So she meets the affective dimension 
of satisfaction for LSH.  Before she takes the medication Glenda reflects about her life fairly 
often; she is a graduate student, after all.  What she finds out is not satisfactory to her: she views 
much of her life as a failure because she thinks that she has fruitlessly spent a good chunk of her 
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life pursuing a career she does not have the abilities for.  Hence, actual LSH deems her unhappy 
before she takes the medication.  So far, so good.  But after she takes the medication Glenda does 
not reflect about her life terribly often: she forms no judgment either that she is or is not satisfied 
with it.  Actual LSH, then, deems Glenda unhappy after she takes the medication, in conflict with 
intuition.  Hypothetical LSH conflicts with intuition, here, too: if after taking the medication 
Glenda were to reflect about her life, she would be just as dissatisfied with it as she was 
previously.  Hypothetical LSH, then, deems Glenda unhappy after she takes the medication, too, 
in conflict with intuition.  Modified LSH also conflicts with intuition.  At any particular moment 
over the duration in question Glenda is not only not cognitively satisfied with her life to date, she 
is not satisfied with it at that particular moment.  It does not meet her expectations; it just so 
happens that she does not reflect about it all that often.  
The proponent of LSH may have a response to this.  The proponent could state that while 
Glenda is neither hypothetically nor actually cognitively satisfied, she does feel as though she is 
leading a fulfilled and rewarding life.  This at least makes her feel happy.  Although we would be 
wrong to say that she is happy, we would be right to assert that she feels happy.  We started 
discussing the possible distinction between being happy and feeling happy back in section 1.1.  
LSH provides us with a way to understand the distinction.  The proponent of LSH may maintain 
that while being happy has both cognitive and affective components, feeling happy only has the 
latter.31   
                                                
31 See Sumner: “The cognitive component of happiness is therefore beyond the range of many subjects-of-a-life, 
such as small children and non-human animals.  However, there is more involved in being happy than being 
disposed to think that your life is going (or has gone) well. The affective side of happiness consists in what we 
commonly call a sense of well-being: finding your life enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it.  
Because it is less cognitively demanding than a judgment about how one’s life is going as a whole, it is what we 
have in mind when say that a child or an animal is happy, or is leading a happy life” (1996: 146). 
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While this response allows LSH to better accord with intuition in the case of Glenda, it 
still fails to completely accord with intuition.  Remember, Glenda just seems happy after she 
takes the medication.  Sure, common sense suggests that she feels happy after taking her 
medication; but it does not suggest, like LSH does, that she is not happy.  That is, we are not 
inclined to say that she merely feels happy.   
In the case of Seneca, while it is true that after he finishes his oration he has no judgment 
that his whole life is worthwhile, if he were to reflect about his whole life, he would find it 
satisfactory; he is Seneca, after all.  He also does find his life rewarding and fulfilling; he just 
does not show it.  Thus while actual LSH deems him unhappy, hypothetical LSH accords with 
intuition by deeming him happy. 
Both versions of LSH clash with intuition in the case of Andrew.  Although he enjoys 
using illegal substances, fornicating with farm hands, and engaging in bestiality, he fails to 
reflect about his whole life.  He has the necessary cognitive capacities, of course; he is just not a 
reflective person.  Hence actual LSH deems him unhappy.  And if he were to reflect about his 
life, Andrew would find it deeply unsatisfactory: he would feel ashamed of enjoying the 
pleasures that he does; perhaps this is why he does not reflect all that often.  Hence, although we 
are prereflectively inclined to judge Andrew happy, neither version of LSH deems him happy.  
Modified LSH also deems Andrew not happy.  Not only would he not be cognitively satisfied 
with his life to date, he would not be cognitively satisfied with his life at any particular moment 
over the duration in question. 
Again, the proponent of LSH could maintain that while Andrew is not in fact happy, he 
nonetheless feels happy.  This makes the view more palatable, but prevents it from fully 
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according with intuition, since, contra LSH, Andrew not only merely seem to feel happy; he also 
seems happy.  
In the table below I sum up the results of to the extent to which LSH accords with 
intuition in the five cases. 
 Intuition Actual 
LSH 
Hypothetical 
LSH 
1. Brainwashed Sally H H H 
2. Mary the mother H U U 
3. Glenda the grad student H U U 
4. Seneca the Stoic H U H 
5. Andrew the swine H U U 
 
2.2.3 Additional considerations 
Unlike DSH, LSH maintains that there are two components of happiness: an affective one 
and a cognitive one.  I doubt that either component constitutes happiness.  I shall examine the 
affective component first.  Of course I think that feelings of well-being, fulfillment, enrichment, 
and the like contribute to happiness; I just wonder whether feelings of this sort by themselves 
contribute to happiness.  Sumner admits that his theory of happiness implies that small children 
and non-human animals are not capable of being (un)happy, since they lack the cognitive 
capacities for life-satisfaction.  They may, however, feel happy: they may experience feelings of 
well-being, fulfillment, enrichment and such.  So Sumner is committed to the position that one 
may experience feelings of well-being and such without your life actually being well off, 
fulfilled, or enriched.   
I wonder why Sumner focuses on these feelings in particular.  I suppose Sumner could 
say that it is just a brute fact that these feelings constitute happiness; it is not as if these feelings 
have anything in common; they just constitute feeling happy, and that is all there is to it.  At 
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some point, explanations need to bottom out, and this is it.  I am skeptical of this retort: I think 
Sumner would be appealing to a brute fact too early.  I agree that at some point explanations 
must bottom out; I just doubt that Sumner is there, yet. 
Try to divorce the feelings of well-being, fulfillment, enrichment and the like from any 
pleasure.  Imagine them no longer as pleasurable experiences.  It is difficult to do, right?  I think 
this is for a reason: there is something about these feelings that seems necessarily pleasant.  If 
you feel well off, fulfilled, enriched, there is something pleasant about them.  So while I admit 
that these feelings contribute to happiness, I think they contribute to happiness only in virtue of 
being pleasurable.  Thus, the pleasure, not the feelings themselves, is the more fundamental 
constituent of happiness. 
Not only do I doubt that the feelings LSH maintains constitute feeling happy by 
themselves contribute to feeling happy, I also question the cognitive element of LSH.  It is easy 
to see that hypothetical LSH accords with more intuitions than actual LSH.  Actual LSH just 
seems to set too high a standard for what constitutes happiness: having the judgment that your 
life is satisfying at moment m does not seem necessary for you to be happy at m.  It seems that 
one can be happy without occurrently reflecting in such a manner.  Although hypothetical LSH 
fares better, it only accords with intuition in two cases.  As actual LSH seems to set too high a 
standard for what constitutes happiness, so does hypothetical: having the hypothetical judgment 
that your life is satisfying at m does not seem necessary for you to be happy at m.  
LSH does not seem to be an adequate account for what it is for a person to be occurrently 
happy.  While the happy may often be satisfied with their lives to date, it seems possible for them 
not to be.  LSH seems to conflate being happy with your life with being happy.32  It seems 
                                                
32 Carson (382-383) makes a similar point. 
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possible for one to be happy without also being happy with one’s life.  The above examples of 
Mary, Glenda, and Andrew are cases in point.  If this is correct, then, the relationship between 
happiness and life-satisfaction seems merely contingent; LSH, thus, seems false. 
2.3 The emotional state theory of happiness (EH) 
2.3.1 The essence of EH 
EH is the position that the essence of happiness is psychic affirmation, emotionally 
responding to your life as a favorable one:33 you are happy to the extent that you are favorably 
emotionally disposed your life, unhappy to the extent you are negatively emotionally disposed to 
your life.34  EH should strike us as similar to LSH, which requires one to be both cognitively and 
affectively favorably disposed to one’s life.  EH just breaks the conjunct in half, tossing the 
notion of cognitive satisfaction aside.35  According EH, happiness concerns the psyche; so LSH 
goes wrong in focusing both on cognition and one’s overall emotional condition: happiness 
merely concerns the latter, not the former.  And your overall emotional condition has two 
                                                
33 Daniel Haybron is the author of EH.  He says that we commonly distinguish between plain happiness and true 
happiness, where true happiness is reserved for states where we feel we could not be leading a more fulfilling life.  
Such a state, Haybron says, is not merely psychic affirmation, but psychic flourishing, when our lives are “more or 
less” perfectly matched to our emotional nature (2008a: 148-149).  Using Haybron’s term I am interested in plain 
happiness, not necessarily true happiness. 
 
34 Haybron’s EH is more nuanced than my presentation of it.  Although he does maintain that happiness is 
constituted by psychic affirmation, emotionally responding to your life as a favorable one, he argues that there are 
three modes of emotional response: attunement, engagement, and endorsement (2008a: 147).  I am not convinced 
these three modes are relevant for our purposes, however.  My explication of EH differs from Haybron’s in at least 
one other respect: Haybron does not commit himself to the claim that one is happy to the extent that one’s emotional 
condition is positive, unhappy to the extent one’s emotional condition is negative.  Rather, he maintains that if one is 
happy, one’s emotional condition is broadly positive, experiencing only minor negative emotional responses at most 
(Ibid.).  
 
35 Haybron makes a similar point in comparison between LSH and EH (2008a: 111).  But he ignores the affective 
dimension to LSH and insists that whereas LSH concerns being cognitive favorably disposed to one’s life, EH 
concerns being affectively favorably disposed to one’s life.  This is an incorrect dichotomy to make, since LSH 
includes an affective dimension, too. 
 
 42 
components: 1) your central affective states, and 2) your mood propensities (Haybron 2008a: 
147).  We need to discuss both; I shall start with central affective states. 
EH distinguishes between two different degrees of affective states: central and periphery.  
The former “get to us” whereas the latter “bounce right off us” and are thereby quickly forgotten 
(Haybron 2008a: 129).  Because happiness gets to us, it is composed of central affective states, 
not peripheral ones.  Central affective states “constitute changes in us”, whereas peripheral 
affective states are “merely things that happen to us” (Haybron 2008a: 130).  Further, central 
affective states dispose us “to experience certain affective states rather than others” (Ibid.), 
whereas peripheral states do not.  A depressed mood, for example, tends to make us pessimistic, 
causing us to experience little pleasure and look on the darker side of things.  Anxiety, for 
another example, tends to make us “multiply and exaggerate potential threats” (Ibid.).36  The 
mild annoyance someone feels after dropping her pencil, however, and the trivial pleasure one 
receives from scratching a nagging itch are examples of peripheral affective states.  Sure, you 
may have an emotional reaction to the dropping of a pencil; but your annoyance is only brief and 
fleeting: it bounces right off you.  Likewise for the pleasure you receive from scratching an itch: 
although the pleasure is an emotional reaction, it is merely a peripheral affective state since it 
does not dispose you to experience other affective states; although it impacts you, the impact is 
fleeting. 
Now that we discussed the central affective states aspect of EH, let us move on to its 
other aspect: mood propensities.  Happiness, Haybron says, does not merely consist of positive 
                                                
36 Central affective states, Haybron tells us, also tend to possess four other characteristics.  First, they are productive, 
causing many and varied consequences, like the creation of another affective state or a physiological change (2008a: 
130).  Second, central affective states are persistent in that they have a long duration; they do not vanish quickly as 
peripheral states do (Ibid.).  Third, they tend to pervasively “permeate the whole of consciousness” (Ibid.).  Fourth, 
central affective states tend to be profound in that they deeply affect us in a way mere physical pleasures do not 
(2008a: 131). 
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central affective states; it also consists of something “deeper and more continuous”: your 
“propensity to respond […] favorably to things” (2008a: 135).  Think of someone who 
experiences “a preponderance of positive affect result[ing] purely from a fortunate confluence of 
positive events” and compare her to someone who experiences positive affect not by chance but 
“from an underlying endogenous condition” (Ibid.).  The latter, not the former, Haybron 
contends, is a lasting condition, just like happiness.  While moods are longer lasting than 
emotions, they are not as long lasting as temperaments or personalities.  Your personality is how 
you are “characteristically disposed to react”, while your temperament “var[ies] considerably 
over time” (Haybron 2008a: 137).   
And propensities are dispositions: possessing a positive mood propensity is to be 
disposed to respond to things in a certain way.  Haybron provides us with an example of a friend 
who “has had a hair-trigger propensity for anxiety in recent months” (2008a: 135).  The mere 
fact that your friend has this propensity, Haybron contends, makes her less happy than she would 
have been without the propensity.37  Although not as essential to happiness as affective states, 
moods are relevant.  Moods have this tie-breaking contribution to happiness: if two people 
experience the same amounts of positive and negative affective states but one has a more 
positive mood propensity (after subtracting any negative mood propensity) than the other, that 
person is thereby happier than the other.   
2.3.2 EH and our five cases 
 EH certainly deems Sally happy, both during the brainwashing and several years later.  
According to EH, Sally is happy to the extent that she has positive central affective states and to 
                                                
37 Haybron is careful to note that some mood propensities seem irrelevant to happiness (2008a: 137).  Suppose that 
you are disposed to be mildly annoyed by the dropping of a pencil.  Although you possess this propensity, it does 
not seem relevant to your (un)happiness.  The propensities that are relevant for happiness, Haybron maintains, are 
those that are emotionally-based: they directly affect your emotional state (Ibid.).   
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a lesser degree, to the extent she has positive mood propensities.  While being brainwashed, 
Sally experiences many more positive affective states than negative: she usually feels optimistic, 
cheerful, confident, and powerful.  A Month or two after leaving the cult Sally is struggling with 
the loss she feels.  She often feels depressed and despondent, not at all cheerful; indeed, this is a 
miserable time for her.  She thus experiences more negative affective states than positive, for 
which EH deems her unhappy, in accordance with intuition.  Although she experiences fewer 
positive affective states years after she leaves the brainwashing, she still has more positive 
affective states than negatives ones.  Thus, while EH deems that Sally is happy during and years 
after the brainwashing, it also deems her happier brainwashed, in accordance with intuition.  
 So long as the joy Mary experiences from giving birth to her first child is experienced in 
a central affective state, EH also deems Mary happy.  True, she is experiencing much pain, so 
much pain that it is unlikely that it does not get to her.  Her pain, then, appears to be a central 
affective state, not a peripheral one.  But so long as her joy outweighs her pain, which it does, 
EH deems Mary happy, in accordance with intuition.   
I want to change the scenario.  Suppose that Mary’s pain outweighs her joy; 
consequently, while Mary still thinks of herself as happy when she gives birth, she no longer 
considers it her happiest moment.  In this modified case, EH no longer deems Mary happy: 
Mary’s emotional condition is now mostly negative.  And this may constitute a problem for EH: 
intuition seems to deem Mary happy in this latter case, too; because EH does not, EH seems 
mistaken.   
It is not difficult for the proponent of EH to respond to this.  EH could be modified such 
that rather than implying that Mary is happy to the extent that she has positive affective states, it 
implies that Mary is happy if she is in a broadly positive affective state.  Because Mary is in 
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neither a broadly positive or negative state, this modified EH deems her neither happy nor 
unhappy.  While it still conflicts with intuition since it fails to deem Mary happy, it does not, like 
unmodified EH, deem Mary unhappy.  For my money, I do not think that this modification is 
necessary.   
First, note that while intuition is clear in the original case that Mary seems happy, 
intuition is not as clear in the modified case.  Indeed, if we supposed that Mary’s pain far 
outweighs her joy, we would not deem her happy even if she thought that she was.  We also have 
some reasons to be skeptical of the infallibility of self-reports of happiness in general.  
According to Haybron, we appear to have a bias in favor of viewing ourselves as happy (2008a: 
212).  Think of “Polyannas” who always look on the bright side of things or “Kvetches” who just 
focus on their negative experiences.  There is some empirical evidence that seems to confirm this 
bias.  A study by Lykken and Tellegen for Western countries reveals that 86 percent of subjects 
tested “rated themselves more “happy and contented” than about two-thirds of the population” 
(qtd. in 2008a: 212).  And a survey completed in 1995 by the University of Michigan found that 
94 percent of Americans reported being happy (qtd. in 2008a: 216).  It does not seem plausible 
that so many of us are happy. 
Not only do we have reasons for doubting the infallibility of self-reports of happiness in 
general, we also have some reasons for doubting that someone in Mary’s situation will be 
infallible about reporting her happiness.  Basically, Mary may have very good reasons for 
thinking of herself as happy.  Here are four.  First, perhaps it is in her best interest to believe that 
she is happy (even though she is not).  Or, secondly, it could be Mary’s motherly instinct kicking 
in: her believing that she is happy may benefit her child.  Third, sometimes we find it difficult to 
come to grips with our actual affective state at a given time and instead rely on what we should 
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feel like in that situation.  Haybron has us think of a groom on his wedding day (2008a: 209).  
Rather than “come to grips with the complexity of his emotions”, he thinks of himself as “filled 
with pure joy, mainly because that’s how he is supposed to feel, and how he imagines any 
newlywed must feel” (Ibid.).  Perhaps Mary thinks of herself as happy because that is how a 
mother is supposed to feel when she has just given birth.  Fourth, it even seems possible that we 
could be mistaken about the valence of our emotional state (Haybron 2008a: 209-210).  Refer 
back to the groom; suppose that he is experiencing more negative affect than positive.  The thing 
is: he sincerely believes that he is experiencing more positive affect.  He is a bridegroom on his 
wedding day, after all; and grooms are supposed to be happy.   
Let us now proceed by considering how well EH accords with the cases of Glenda, 
Seneca, and Andrew. 
 EH certainly deems Glenda happy.  After taking the medication she feels great, uplifted 
rather than despondent.  The medication she takes is designed to improve her mood, and that is 
exactly what it does.  Although she remains skeptical of her academic talents and although her 
desires remain unsatisfied, she has many more positive affective states than negative ones.  So 
EH accords with intuition here, as well.   
 Seneca has just delivered an impressive oration in front of the Senate.  Although he is 
pleased by this fact, he does not show any outward signs of it; he is a Stoic, after all.  From 
appearances, Seneca seems neither happy nor unhappy, just calm.  No smile or frown adorns his 
face.  He learned to suppress his emotions long ago.  Seneca, then, is not currently experiencing 
any emotional states, let alone positive ones.  Nor is he inclined to be in moods in the future, let 
alone positive ones.  He is neither disposed to be cheerful or anxious, jubilant or depressed but 
just affectively neutral.  Because he is not experiencing emotions, EH fails to deem him any 
 47 
happier after delivering his oration than before.  But he is experiencing pleasure over delivering a 
good speech, and he is experiencing no pain.  Intuition tells us that he is happy, at least happier 
after giving the oration than before, contra EH. 
Of course Haybron could respond by asserting that it is not possible for Seneca to 
experience pleasure without also experiencing that pleasure in an emotional state.  This seems 
wrong, however.  While there is considerable debate over the nature of pleasure, almost 
everyone agrees that pleasure is essentially either some sort of sensation, an attitude, or a 
combination of both sensation and attitude.  I of course admit that some pleasures are emotional 
pleasures; but I also contend that there are many pleasures that involve no emotion.  Think of the 
pleasurable warmth of a hot shower on a cold winter day.  While the pleasurable warmth you feel 
is certainly a sensation, it does not appear to be an emotion.  Or think of the pleasure you may 
have over Seahawks winning the Super Bowl.  You may express this pleasure in an emotional 
outburst when the game finishes; but it seems that you may enjoy the win without expressing it 
in an emotion, too. 
In the table below I sum up the results of to the extent to which EH accords with intuition 
in the five cases. 
 Intuition EH 
1. Brainwashed Sally H H 
2. Mary the mother H H 
3. Glenda the talented 
tudent 
H H 
4. Seneca the Stoic H U 
5. Andrew the swine H H 
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2.3.3 Additional considerations 
While I think that the case of Seneca is sufficient to render EH implausible, I want to 
discuss in detail why neither component of EH—central affective states or mood propensities—
seems to constitute happiness.  Let us start with mood propensities, then discuss affective states.   
Haybron asserts that mood propensities contribute to happiness merely in a tie-breaking 
sense.  In the event that two individuals share the same level of positive central affective states 
EH looks at their moods to determine who is happier.  But mood propensities are dispositional, 
not occurrent.  While it is true that if two individuals S and U share the same level of occurrent 
happiness at t1 but S is disposed to be happier than U at t2, then S may be said to be 
dispositionally happier than U at t1, she is not thereby any occurrently happier than U at t1.  Just 
because an individual is dispositionally happier than another at a certain time does not mean that 
she is also occurrently happier at that time.  Mood propensities, because of their dispositional 
nature, then, do not seem to be an essential part of occurrent happiness.38 
Haybron responds to criticisms like mine by offering three arguments against them.  He 
first suggests that Sumner depicts LSH as primarily dispositional: “to be satisfied with one’s life, 
e.g., just is, at least in part, to be disposed to think about one’s life in certain ways, to have 
certain feelings when contemplating one’s life, and so forth” (Haybron 2011: 27).  To support 
this reading Haybron refers to Sumner, 1996: 146.  This reading misunderstands Sumner, 
however.  On the previous page (145) Sumner clearly distinguishes what he calls ‘having a 
                                                
38 Scott Hill (2007) also criticizes Haybron for including mood propensities as a component of happiness; but Hill 
gives them too much importance: Hill characterizes EH as stating that mood propensities are a necessary condition 
for happiness, whereas Haybron gives them something like tie-breaking importance (see Haybron (2011: 21), where 
Haybron clarifies the role of mood propensities in his theory).  Haybron (2011) attempts to defend EH against Hill 
by arguing that EH accords with intuition in the two cases Hill contends that EH does not accord with.  I do not wish 
to step into that debate since Hill’s criticism relies on a mischaracterization of EH.  My criticism, however, relies on 
no such mischaracterization.  Morris’s (2011: 269) criticism of EH, though not identical, is more like mine: he 
argues that “Dispositions only have extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic value so far as happiness is concerned. Any 
value they confer derives from the experiences they help to bring about”.  Hence, Morris concludes, dispositions 
“are not an essential component of happiness” (Ibid.). 
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happy disposition/personality’ from what he calls ‘being happy/having a happy life’, the latter of 
which he is “principally concerned”.  His description of the cognitive aspect of LSH follows. 
The cognitive aspect of happiness consists in a positive evaluation of the conditions of your life, a 
judgment that, at least on balance, it measures up favorably against your standards or 
expectations.  This evaluation may be global, covering all of the important sectors of your life, or 
it might focus on one in particular (your work, say, or your family).  In either case it represents an 
affirmation or endorsement of some (or all of) the conditions or circumstances of your life, a 
judgment that, on balance and taking everything into account, your life is going well for you.  
(145) 
 
Now, Sumner occasionally slips into using language that may suggest that LSH includes a 
dispositional element: “there is more involved in being happy than being disposed to think your 
life is going (or has gone) well” (this is the bit Haybron (2011: 27) cites); but charitably 
interpreted, it is clear that Sumner does not mean for LSH to consist of a dispositional element, 
let alone a primary dispositional element, as Haybron suggests.  This interpretive argument that 
Haybron gives, then, falls flat: Sumner does not seem to intend for LSH to be interpreted as 
primarily dispositional.  
 Let us suppose that Haybron is right, however.  That is, let us suppose that Sumner 
understands LSH as being primarily dispositional.  What is the upshot?—what does this do for 
Haybron?  My criticism that dispositional elements—like Haybron’s mood propensities—do not 
belong in a formulation about the essence of occurrent happiness would now just apply to 
Sumner in addition to Haybron.  So even if Sumner did maintain that LSH includes an 
essentially dispositional element, it is not clear how this addresses the worry. 
Haybron relies not only an argument based on interpretation for his claim, he also argues 
that LSH is best understood (independent of how Sumner describes it) as dispositional: how else, 
Haybron states, can LSH avoid requiring one to have an “occurrent thought or feeling about her 
life at every moment” without referring to disposition (2011: 27-28)?  The answer is simple: as 
described above, we understand LSH to mean hypothetical, not actual, satisfaction.  Now, we 
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could understand the type of satisfaction in LSH as dispositional; I will give Haybron that.  But 
we need not to: LSH seems just as plausible, if not more plausible understood hypothetically 
than dispositionally.  After all, understood dispositionally LSH faces the criticism I have levied 
against Haybron. 
Haybron’s last argument for including a dispositional component in a theory of happiness 
is that, “arguably”, including such a component better tracks “popular views of the unconscious” 
(2011: 28).  Here, Haybron implies that if we were to understand happiness as merely a 
collection of occurrent, conscious, mental states, then thinkers in the psychoanalytic tradition 
would reject it.  I am no expert in psychoanalysis; so I will not debate whether psychoanalysts 
have such a position.  Instead, I shall suppose Haybron is right to think that it is possible for 
unconscious states to be a part of happiness, and thus that we do not want to endorse a theory of 
happiness that rules out that possibility.  But I fail to see why Haybron equates occurrent states 
with conscious states: supposing that happiness merely consists of occurrent mental states does 
not imply that happiness consists of occurrent, conscious, mental states.  I could occurrently 
experience a myriad of affective states and not be conscious of them.  One of Haybron’s own 
examples illustrates this.  Suppose that you have the unfortunate circumstance of possessing an 
old refrigerator, one that whines apparently due to a bad bearing.  Over time you fail to notice the 
racket that the machine makes.  But occasionally, when the compressor stops, you notice a 
sudden glorious silence.  You also notice that you have a painful headache, apparently from the 
obnoxious racket that you did not realize was occurring until now.  You were in pain and just did 
not realize it.   
While Haybron does not say this, there is a more convincing response that he could give.  
He could accept that there is nothing in the concept of occurrent happiness that implies a 
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dispositional element, but nonetheless contend that there is also nothing in the concept that 
proscribes a dispositional element.  Happiness could be like the color red.  I own a red car.  Its 
redness is merely dispositional; it merely has the disposition for redness: under the right 
circumstances, to the right sort of perceivers, it appears red to them.39    
Let us refer back to Haybron’s example.  He describes a friend who “has had a hair-
trigger propensity for anxiety in recent months” (2008a: 135).  Refer to the friend as ‘Antha’. 
Antha possesses a propensity for anxiety in that if the right circumstances obtained, she would be 
anxious.  Suppose that we catch Antha on a good day, when the right circumstances have not yet 
obtained to trigger the anxiety.  According to Haybron, we would conclude that she is less happy 
on this day even though she has no anxiety than on a day where she not only is not anxious but 
also where she is “relatively immune to anxiety” (2008a: 135).   
I disagree with Haybron’s intuition here.  Antha’s propensity for anxiety and the redness 
of my car are disanalagous: while the right circumstances have obtained to make my car red 
(when someone views it), the right circumstances have not yet obtained to make Antha anxious. 
If they did, they would make her anxious.  In that case, her anxiety, not her propensity for the 
anxiety, seems to make her less happy.  The mere fact that Antha has this propensity, Haybron 
contends, makes her less happy than she would have been without the propensity.  This does not 
seem right to me.  If Antha has this propensity for anxiety at t1 but does not experience anxiety at 
t1, I fail to see how Antha’s happiness at t1 is impacted by the propensity.  Sure, Antha’s 
happiness at a later moment, say, t3, when the circumstances have obtained making her anxious, 
may be impacted by her propensity at t1; but this is not what the proponent of EH needs. 
                                                
39 According to Haybron, mood propensities are not object-specific: you are not disposed to be in a certain mood “in 
response to particular objects or events”; rather, you are disposed to be in a certain mood over a wide range of 
circumstances (2008a: 137).  So the right circumstances here have to be wide ranging.  
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Haybron provides more examples that we should consider.  Suppose that you are at a 
funeral and see grieving family members of the deceased laughing with old friends.  We would 
not, according to Haybron, “think their unhappiness has completely, if temporarily, lifted”; 
rather, we would think that “[a] deeper unhappiness remains” (2008a: 135-136).  While I agree 
with Haybron that we would think of the grieving family members as unhappy despite their 
laughter, I doubt that we would think this because of some propensity for grieving that they are 
not currently exercising.  Rather, a deeper unhappiness seems to remain in the family members 
because they are still grieving: although they are laughing with close friends and thus may seem 
to be happy, they are likely experiencing some dissatisfaction, pain, or negative affect at the loss 
of their family member; they just do not express it.  Back in section 1.1.1 I discussed the 
distinction between merely seeming to be happy and being happy: one can display signs of 
happiness without being happy.  Suppose that I just lost my job.  My friends take me out for a 
few drinks to get my mind off it.  While I may appear jolly in their company, a deeper 
dissatisfaction I have lies underneath the surface.  While I may seem happy, I am really unhappy.  
Then again, maybe the family members experience a few moments of happiness while laughing 
with their close friends; over the duration of the funeral, however, the family members are 
predominately unhappy; and so a deeper unhappiness remains.  My point is: in order to conclude 
that the grieving family members are unhappy despite their appearances, we need not adopt the 
idea of mood propensities.   
Haybron offers another example that we should consider: the case of Tom and Jerry.  
They both have a happy temperament and take a relaxing vacation to the beach.   
During their several days together, their moods are generally quite similar and fairly positive, 
save that Tom is a bit more cheerful, being pleased finally to get away from home some months 
after a difficult divorce.  By and large he is not the least melancholic—most of the time he feels 
wholly unburdened, laughter comes easily, and he takes great pleasure in catching up with his old 
friend and conversing with other vacationers.  Yet Tom’s emotional state remains unusually 
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fragile: on two occasions he bursts into tears and weeps uncontrollably.  These episodes don’t last 
long, so that Tom’s moods are still, on the whole, a little more positive than Jerry’s.  (2008a: 136) 
 
If Haybron is right, “Tom’s elevated propensity for sadness diminishes his happiness in itself, 
and […] he is less happy than Jerry” (Ibid.).  I again differ with Haybron.  While I agree that 
Tom’s sadness diminishes his happiness, I just do no think that his propensity for sadness 
divorced from his sadness also diminishes it.  I would, then, conclude that Tom is not less happy 
than Jerry, contra Haybron.  If, on the whole, Tom’s moods are indeed more positive than 
Jerry’s, then Tom seems, on the whole, happier.  Although he is more likely than Jerry to burst 
into tears and experience intense sadness in a wide ranger of circumstances, these circumstances 
do not obtain except in two short bursts, which do not prevent Tom from feeling “wholly 
unburdened” and from feeling much pleasure most of the time.  If Tom is indeed “a bit more 
cheerful” than Jerry over this duration, then, he seems a bit happier, too, despite his fragility.   
Not only am I skeptical of EH’s reliance on mood propensities, I also question whether 
happiness essentially consists of positive central affective states.  I shall focus on centrality, then 
positivity.  If I am correct, happiness is neither a central nor a positive affective state. 
While Haybron may be right in that happiness may have more to do with one’s affective 
states than one’s cognitive states, does happiness seem to be just a matter of possessing certain 
emotions or moods?  Let us consider what these certain emotions and moods consist of.  
Haybron maintains that the only emotions and moods that constitute happiness are central, not 
peripheral, states.  Central affective states get to us and constitute changes in us; they also 
dispose to act in characteristic ways.  Peripheral states, however, bounce right off us and hence 
do not get to us in the same way central affective states do.  While happiness sometimes, perhaps 
often, does get to us and constitutes changes in us, happiness need not do so: sometimes 
happiness is brief and fleeting; sometimes we are happy one moment, unhappy the next.  When 
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this occurs, happiness bounces right off us, and hence is not a central state.  Suppose that you are 
a Seahawks fan enjoying them win the Super Bowl.  While you watch the game, you feel content 
and you experience much pleasure, no pain.  On your drive home from watching the game, 
however, you no longer feel so satisfied nor experience much pleasure: you have already 
forgotten about the game entirely; it was a pleasant distraction, but now it is time to get back to 
the real world.  Although you seem happy while watching the Seahawks, the happiness does not 
seem particularly deep.  While not all happiness is so shallow, some of it is.  Haybron, then, is 
wrong to think that happiness is constituted only by central affective states. 
I also do not think that Haybron use of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ is justified.  He labels 
happiness-constitutive emotions ‘positive’, unhappiness-constitutive emotions, ‘negative’.  A 
typical positive affective state are is cheerfulness; a typical negative affective state is depression.  
What distinguishes positive emotions from negative ones?  The natural response is: whether 
experiencing the emotions is pleasurable.  Positive emotions are simply emotions that are 
pleasant to experience; negative emotions are simply emotions that are unpleasant to experience.  
Haybron disagrees with this response, insisting that it is not merely pleasure that distinguishes 
positive emotions.  He says that 
affective states of the same type usually, but not always, have the same hedonic properties.  Just 
as one might find a painful sensation pleasant, so is it possible to find pleasure in anger, fear, and 
even sadness—say, while reading a tragedy.  Yet anger, fear, and sadness look to be unhappiness-
constituting whether or not they are pleasant. (2008a: 146) 
 
 Haybron’s argument, then, is something like this.  If all that distinguished positive 
emotions was their being pleasurable, then all pleasant emotions are happiness-constituting.  But 
not all pleasant emotions are happiness-constituting: anger, fear, and sadness are all emotions 
that we may find pleasure in but are nonetheless unhappiness-constituting.  Thus, pleasure is not 
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the only thing that distinguishes positive emotions from negative ones.  This is a valid argument; 
I just think the second premise is false.   
The phrase “find pleasure in” is ambiguous.  On the one hand, it may mean that negative 
emotions like anger, fear, or sadness themselves are pleasurable.  On the other, it may mean 
taking pleasure in experiencing anger, fear, or sadness.  In the former it is the experience of 
sadness itself that one finds pleasure in, whereas in the latter it is not the experience itself but 
something like the attitude one has toward the experience that is pleasurable.  Haybron needs the 
former understanding; but all that I am willing to grant is the latter.  There is nothing pleasurable 
in anger, fear, or sadness themselves.  While we may experience pleasure while also 
experiencing these emotions, the pleasure is not found in the emotions themselves.  At most, one 
may take pleasure in the state of affairs that includes one feeling angry, sad, or fearful.  While 
reading a tragedy you may feel angry, fearful, and sad as well as take pleasure in reading the 
tragedy or even in feeling the way you do. 
The same point applies to the examples Haybron uses.   
Some people have unusual tastes or values: they like, find pleasant, many of the things that 
ordinary people find disagreeable.  For instance, a melancholy person—a Keats, perhaps—might 
seek comfort in his sorrow, and enjoy wallowing in his own grief.  For this sort of individual, his 
unhappiness is his pleasure.  […]  And a tortured artist need not derive any pleasure from the 
cheerful affects that disgust her (feelings brought on, say, by a shamefully maudlin episode of 
Barney the purple dinosaur).  (2008a: 72) 
 
I do not dispute that some people find pleasure in things ordinary people find unpleasant.  
Hedonism permits individuals like Keats to enjoy their own grief.  Perhaps Keats finds his 
sorrow to enable him to write such inspiring poetry.  Thus understood, it is not the grief itself 
that Keats finds enjoyable but rather the state of affairs where his grief is necessary for poetry.  If 
Keats’s sorrow is more intense and lasts longer than his enjoyment, HH deems him unhappy.   
Imagine someone who is sad whose sadness is not at all unpleasant to her.  Not only is she not 
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displeased by her being said: there is nothing about the sadness itself that is unpleasant.  It is 
strange to think to that this person’s sadness makes her unhappier.  Haybron disagrees: 
“intuitively, a said person is unhappy whether or not she likes how it feels, whether or not it feels 
good to her” (2008a: 71).  This may be simple table-pounding, but I fail to see how a person’s 
sadness affects her happiness if the sadness is not at all unpleasant for her.  And I think most 
people agree with me.  Likewise for the tortured artist: she may be disgusted by feeling cheerful.  
Just because she finds her cheerfulness disgusting does not mean that she gets no pleasure from 
the cheerful mood. 
Haybron refers to characteristically pleasant or unpleasant emotions.  But what happens if 
we consider a more neutral emotion like surprise?  Does it contribute to your happiness or to 
your unhappiness?  The hedonist’s answer is simple: it depends on whether the surprise is 
pleasant or unpleasant.  It is not obvious what response EH would give.  Indeed, Haybron 
contends that  
it seems obvious that in some perfectly ordinary sense the happiness-constitutive states are 
“positive,” the unhappiness-constitutive states “negative”—and, moreover, that a proper account 
of this can be given in scientifically respectable terms without relying on value judgments.  
(2008a: 146)  
 
I admit that many emotions contribute to our happiness, like cheerfulness, joy, and 
euphoria; many emotions also seem to contribute to our unhappiness, like anxiety, depression 
and irritability.  This, however, is because the emotions are either pleasant or unpleasant.  An 
emotion, like surprise, that neither typically contributes to our happiness or unhappiness is 
neither positive nor negative on Haybron’s account.  Yet it can clearly contribute to our 
happiness.  And if it is the pleasure, not the emotion, that differentiates positive from negative 
affect, the pleasure is the more fundamental constituent of happiness.  The only emotions and 
moods that contribute to happiness, I contend, are pleasant ones, ones that feel good to 
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experience. And it is the pleasure, then, that constitutes happiness; the emotion or mood is 
merely the vehicle or effect of the pleasure, as far as happiness is concerned.  
2.4 Chapter conclusion 
 In this chapter I argued against three theories of happiness: DSH, LSH, and EH.  The 
case of Glenda seems to falsify DSH.  She seems happier after taking the medication when she 
feels cheerful and optimistic than before taking it when she feels despondent.  Yet, because she 
does not satisfy her intense desires before or after the medication, DSH deems her just as happy.  
LSH conflicts with our commonsense judgments about happiness not only in the case of Glenda, 
but also in the cases of Mary and Andrew.  Andrew is not at all happy with the overall quality of 
his life; yet he seems happy.  LSH seems to err in conflating happiness about your life with being 
happy.  While EH seems more plausible than either DSH or LSH, it conflicts with intuition in the 
case of Seneca.  One does not seem to need to be in a positive central emotional state or have 
positive mood propensities in order to be happy.  And while our affective states do seem to 
contribute to our happiness, they seem to do so only in virtue of being pleasurable; and if this is 
correct, it is the pleasure, not the affective state, that is more fundamental to happiness. 
  
 58 
Chapter 3: What Happiness Is 
3.1 Hedonism about happiness (HH) 
3.1.1 The essence of HH 
 In this chapter I introduce and then defend my own theory of happiness: hedonism about 
happiness (HH).  HH is the position that the essence of happiness is pleasure: you are happy to 
the extent that you have pleasure, unhappy to the extent that you have pain.  In order to 
understand HH we need to discuss both pleasure and pain.  I shall start with pleasure, then 
proceed to pain.  
Let us start off with some uncontroversial apparent facts about pleasure.  Suppose that 
you are a Seattle Seahawks fan watching the Super Bowl.  While watching the game you are 
drinking a crisp, refreshing, and soothingly bitter India Pale Ale, your favorite kind of beer.  The 
aroma and flavor of the hops in the IPA make drinking it a pleasurable experience for you.  
We can glean several things from this example.  First, note that pleasure is an internal 
phenomenon: pleasure occurs within our minds or bodies, not in external objects.  Moreover, 
there is always a reason for why you experience a particular pleasure, there is always something 
causing you to have that pleasure—in the above case, it is sensations from the drinking of the 
beer.  Now, while there always seems to be something causing a particular pleasure, a person 
may be mistaken about it.  Suppose that you are at a nice restaurant enjoying a glass of wine.  
You think that you enjoy the glass of wine because of the pleasurable feelings the wine gives 
you; truth be told, however, you enjoy the wine because of the fact that your dinner party sees 
you drinking a reputable wine.40   
                                                
40 I take this example from Feldman (2004: 60), who uses it to make the same point. 
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There are plenty of other examples of pleasurable experiences; the following are but a 
few: the pleasurable warmth felt from a shower taken after shoveling deep, back-breaking, wet 
snow, the pleasing taste of a refreshing ice-cold beer after working outside in the yard all day, 
and the pleasant thrill of riding Kingda Ka, the world’s tallest steel roller-coaster.  The warmth 
you feel from the shower is an example of a tactile pleasure; the taste of the refreshing beer is a 
taste pleasure; and the thrill of riding Kingda Ka is an emotional pleasure.  There are plenty of 
other pleasures: aural, gustatory, olfactory, visual, and propositional attitudinal.  The last item on 
the list—propositional attitudinal pleasure—is not like the others.  Where the others are feelings 
or sensations, propositional attitudes are not.  The idea of receiving pleasure from a propositional 
attitude may sound strange; so a few comments are in order. 
Suppose you are not only enjoying the taste of a good beer but that you are also enjoying 
that the Seahawks are winning.  Although both instances involve pleasure, you are pleased by 
two different things: in the former you enjoy the taste of your beer, whereas in the latter you 
enjoy the state of affairs that contains your favorite team winning the Super Bowl.  Your positive 
attitude toward the Seahawks winning brings you pleasure.     
Now, pleasure caused by sensations and pleasure over states of affairs are closely related 
such that one often follows the other.  Suppose that you have just finished shoveling, wet, deep, 
back breaking snow from your driveway.  As a reward for your hard work, you treat yourself to a 
delicious, steaming, cup of hot chocolate.  As soon as you begin drinking it, a feeling of warmth 
permeates throughout your body.  You enjoy this feeling: the warmth brings you much pleasure; 
it is an intense, pleasurable, feeling.  But suppose that you do not just receive pleasure from the 
hot chocolate; you also enjoy being in the state of receiving pleasurable sensations from the 
coco.  In this case you have pleasure both from a sensation and from a state of affairs obtaining. 
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The two need not, however, always intertwine: it seems possible for you to enjoy a state 
of affairs without having pleasure from a sensation.  Suppose that you have an arthritic 
grandfather, Kenneth.  Due to his arthritis he usually experiences, say, 100 units of pain a day.  
Unfortunately, Kenneth usually experiences far less pleasure in a given day, say, 50 units.  
Luckily for him, however, he starts taking new arthritic medication that reduces the intensity of 
his pain from 100 to 20.  Now, your grandfather takes much pleasure in this state of affairs, 
namely, that he feels much less pain than normal.  Although he currently experiences no pleasure 
from sensations, he does take pleasure in experiencing far less arthritic pain than usual.  In this 
case, then, we have someone who enjoys a state of affairs without also receiving pleasure from 
any sensation. 
Likewise, it seems that you may experience pleasure from a sensation without also 
having pleasure from a propositional attitude.  Think back to that hot chocolate you had after 
shoveling snow from your driveway.  It seems that you can receive pleasure from the hot 
chocolate without also finding enjoyment in receiving the pleasure.  While the two need not 
intertwine, pleasure from sensations and pleasure from states of affairs seem to be the same type 
of phenomenon; they just have different objects.  Now that we have discussed pleasure in some 
detail, I shall discuss pain. 
While hedonists about happiness all use ‘pleasure’ to describe what constitutes happiness, 
they differ on the term they use to describe what constitutes unhappiness.  Feldman uses 
‘displeasure’.  But as Stuart Rachels notes, ‘displeasure’ seems to connote disapproval: if φ 
causes you displeasure, you seem to bear the negative attitude of being displeased that φ (2004: 
247-248).  ‘Pleasure’, Rachels claims, is not like this: it seems possible for φ to bring you 
pleasure without you being pleased that φ.  That is, ‘displeasure’ suggests an externalist 
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understanding of pleasure such that pleasure essentially consists of an attitude.  While 
externalism about pleasure may be true, ‘pleasure’ itself is neutral.41  Externalists should argue 
for their position, not “cook the books” beforehand by using a term that suggests their theory is 
right.  I am in agreement with Rachels: ‘displeasure’ is more of an antonym for being pleased by 
something than it is for ‘pleasure’.   
After ‘displeasure’, the most commonly used antonym for ‘pleasure’ is ‘pain’.  Rachels is 
concerned about ‘pain’, too, however.  He worries that the term excludes unpleasant states like 
anxiety, humiliation, and terror (Rachels 2004: 248).  We do not seem to be in pain when we 
experience such states, but they are nonetheless unpleasant.  Rachels’s solution is to borrow 
‘unpleasure’ from the psychoanalysts and use it as the antonym to ‘pleasure’.  While I think that 
Rachels’s point is a good one, rather than use a neologism like ‘unpleasure’, I prefer ‘pain’.  But 
by ‘pain’ I mean to include unpleasant states like anxiety and humiliation; that is, I use the term 
broadly to include all unpleasant phenomenon.   
Like pleasure, pain is an internal phenomenon, something that occurs within us.  And 
while something always causes us to experience pain, we may be mistaken about what that cause 
is.  Just as there are a variety of pleasurable experiences, there are also a variety of painful ones.  
There are tactile, taste, aural, and other pains.  You may also take pain over some state of affairs.  
It strikes me that you may feel pain from a sensation without being pained by some state of 
affairs.  I have often found myself feeling pain from the soreness I feel after a workout yet not 
distressed that I was feeling the pain.  Likewise, I contend that you may find a particular state of 
affairs unpleasant and yet not feel pain from a sensation.  You may find it unpleasant that the gap 
between the most well off and the worst off has never been greater in the United States without 
also receiving pain from a sensation. 
                                                
41 I will discuss externalism and internalism about pleasure in more detail below in section 3.1.1.1. 
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The extent to which a particular pleasant experience contributes to happiness, according 
to HH, is determined by the pleasure’s intensity and duration: the more intense and the more 
lasting an episode of pleasure is, the happier it makes you.  Likewise with pain: the more intense 
and the longer an episode of pain is, the unhappier it makes you.  HH permits both happiness in a 
moment and happiness over a duration.  You are happy, according to HH, at a given moment m 
to the extent that you experience more pleasure than pain (taking into account the intensity and 
duration of the experiences) at m.  You are happy over a duration to the extent that you 
experience more pleasure than pain (again, taking into account the intensity and duration of the 
experiences) over all of the moments in that duration.  
The distinction between momentary happiness and happiness over a duration helps 
explain how people sometimes seem to take pride in their misery or suffering.  If you are 
unhappy over a given duration, according to HH, you experience more pain than pleasure over 
that duration.  While you may take pleasure in being unhappy, HH does not thereby deem you 
unhappy, unless the pleasure you have from your propositional attitude outweighs the pain.  In 
that event, HH deems you happy, but only because you have more pleasure than pain.  This may 
seem strange, but I do not think that it is all that uncommon.  
 Similarly, you may also be displeased about being happy.  Suppose that you are eating a 
finely cooked meal at the establishment of your choice.  While eating you reflect over how well 
your life is going for you: you have a modest income and are in the process of raising a family.  
You are well on track for satisfying many of your lifetime goals.  Not to mention, the delicious 
taste of the meal is pleasurable to you; so is the state of affairs that includes you doing 
reasonably well.  But then you reflect about how worse off many others are.  You consider what 
you have done to deserve your happiness.  Without being able to find an answer, you feel 
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ashamed of your happiness: you feel unpleasant.  Now, so long as the pain does not outweigh the 
pleasure, HH still deems you happy.  But if the pain you have from your shame outweighs the 
pleasure you are experiencing, HH deems you unhappy.  This seems to jive well with intuition. 
 Relational happiness, then, according to HH, is nothing besides pleasure over an object, 
whether it be intentional or propositional.  When you are happy that the Seahawks won the Super 
Bowl, you are simply taking pleasure over their having won the Super Bowl.  Non-relational 
happiness, according to HH, is nothing besides pleasure; there is no intentional or propositional 
object that one has happiness over; rather, one is just receiving pleasure.  Drinking the beer 
during the Super Bowl brings you pleasure; it is not that you have pleasure over your drinking of 
the beer; no, the taste of the beer gives you pleasure, period. 
 Before moving on to see how well HH fares with our five cases I would to discuss how 
HH is different from other hedonistic theories; and to do that I need to discuss the essence of 
pleasure.  
3.1.1.1 The essence of pleasure 
Broadly speaking, there are two different theories about what it is that all and only 
experiences that are pleasurable have in common: 1) internalist theories that postulate something 
internal to the experience—like a sensation or a feeling—is common amongst all pleasurable 
experiences, and 2) externalist theories that postulate something external to the experience—like 
an attitude—is common amongst all pleasurable experiences.42  If we asked the everyday person 
                                                
42 What is said in this section about the essence of pleasure, also applies to pain: as there are internalist and 
externalist theories of pleasure, there are also internalist and externalist theories of pain.  Presumably, if internalism 
about pleasure is correct, so will internalism about pain be correct.  As I am neutral in regards to the correct theory 
of pleasure, I am also neutral in regards to the correct theory of pain: whatever pain turns out to be, it is the essence 
of unhappiness, or so implies HH. 
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on the street, I think that, generally speaking, she is inclined to say that pleasure is a kind of 
sensation or feeling, not necessarily a kind of attitude.   
Although internalism may seem more intuitive than externalism, it faces a challenge: the 
so-called heterogeneity problem.43  Think back to the pleasurable warmth felt from a shower 
taken after shoveling deep, back-breaking, wet snow and the pleasing taste of a refreshing ice-
cold beer after working outside in the yard all day—what do these experiences have in common?  
If pleasure has an essence, there is something that these experiences share.  But what common 
feeling or sensation is there?  And we have not even discussed pleasure over states of affairs.  
Think back to your enjoying the Seahawks winning the Super Bowl.  What possible feeling does 
this experience have in common with the pleasurable warmth from a hot shower or the refreshing 
taste of an ice-cold beverage?  Pleasurable experiences just seem to be too heterogenetic for 
there to be a common feeling or sensation that is shared amongst them. 
In response to the heterogeneity problem internalists still insist that pleasure is essentially 
a feeling or a sensation; they just maintain that the feeling or sensation is sometimes miniscule 
and therefore difficult to detect.  Where internalists disagree is over what precisely that shared 
feeling or sensation is.  Some maintain that pleasure is a hedonic tone;44 others maintain that it is 
a distinctive feeling.45  The difference between the two is supposed to be that according to the 
hedonic tone theory, pleasure is not a particular sensation or feeling (as it is according to the 
distinctive feeling theory) but a quality, like feeling good or being enjoyable.   
                                                
43 See, amongst others, Sumner (1996: 92-93) and Feldman (2004: 79-81) on the heterogeneity problem. 
 
44 The following endorse a hedonic tone theory of pleasure: Crisp (2006), Kagan (1992), and Smuts (2010). 
 
45 Bramble (2011) endorses a distinctive feeling theory of pleasure. 
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Externalist theories of pleasure have an easy way out of the heterogeneity problem: they 
just deny that there is some common internal phenomenon to all pleasurable experiences.46  
Instead, they maintain that whatever experience brings us pleasure—whether it is the warmth of 
a shower or the fact that our favorite team is winning the Super Bowl—brings us pleasure 
because we have a positive attitude toward that experience.  The most common externalist 
theories of pleasure maintain that desire is the pro-attitude that constitutes pleasure.  Roughly, a 
desiderative theory of pleasure maintains that mental state m is pleasurable for person S to the 
extent that S desires m to occur.  The most sophisticated desiderative externalist theories of 
pleasure are more nuanced: they maintain that S finds m to be pleasurable at time t if and only if 
S desires, intrinsically and de re, at t, of m that it be occurring at t.47  Thus construed, it is not the 
occurrence of any desired mental state that is pleasurable; rather, only the desire for a mental 
state contemporaneous with the desired mental state is pleasurable.   
One theory of happiness, the continuation theory of happiness (CH), is nothing more than 
a desiderative theory of pleasure combined with HH.  According to CH, S is happy to the extent 
she desires her current experiences to continue.48  If it turns out that pleasure is essentially 
desire-based, then, CH will be identical with HH.  This is why rather than discussing CH as an 
additional theory of happiness I mention it here. 
                                                
46 See Heathwood (2007) and Sidgwick (1981: 127) for endorsements of an externalist understanding of pleasure. 
 
47 Heathwood endorses this formulation (2007: 32). 
 
48 The most well-known continuationist is Daniel Kahneman, who is regarded as the “founding father” of the new 
field “positive psychology” and who is also considered a founding father of happiness studies.  Although Kahneman 
appears to offer different theories of happiness in a number of his works, he espouses a continuationist approach in 
his (1999) “Objective Happiness”.  But in this paper he seems less interested in offering an analysis of happiness 
than he is in offering a stipulative definition of ‘happiness’.  While Kahneman favors a continuationist approach in 
“Objective Happiness”, I do not mean to imply that he is a proponent of CH: CH is a theory of what it is that all and 
only happy people have in common; it does not purport to offer a stipulative definition of ‘happy’. 
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There is much debate about which theory of pleasure is correct.  Rather than get bogged 
down adjudicating between internalism and externalism, I remain neutral.  Where other 
hedonistic theories adopt a particular understanding of pleasure, HH does not: it just maintains 
that happiness consists of pleasure.  Whether pleasure turns out to be a sensation or feeling, an 
attitude, a combination of the two, or something else, does not matter: pleasure remains the 
essence of happiness; or so says HH. 
Now that I have discussed the essence of pleasure, it is time to determine how well HH 
accords with our commonsense intuitions about happiness. 
3.1.2 HH and our five cases 
 HH deems Sally happy, both while brainwashed and several years after the brainwashing: 
she has more pleasure than pain—both from sensations and from states of affairs—while 
brainwashed and several years after leaving the cult.  But because she has less net pleasure over 
pain after she leaves the cult than while she is a member, HH deems Sally happier in the cult.  
During the first month after Sally leaves the group HH deems her unhappy, since she experiences 
more pain than pleasure.  Thus, HH accords with intuition in the case of Sally. 
 HH also deems Mary happy: although she experiences intense pain while giving birth to 
her first child, so long as her pleasure over giving birth to her first child outweighs that pain, HH 
deems her happy.  And because her pleasure over giving birth outweighs the pain of childbirth, 
HH, then, deems her happy.  
 As we did above for EH, let us change the case.  Mary still thinks of herself as happy, just 
not the happiest she has ever been; and instead of supposing that Mary’s joy over being a mother 
outweighs her pain while giving birth, suppose that her pain outweighs her joy.  What verdict 
does HH now give?  Like EH, HH no longer deems Mary happy: she no longer has more 
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pleasure than pain; so HH deems her unhappy.  Yet we would still deem Mary happy; hence, HH 
seems false. 
I have two responses to this, each of which mirrors the responses that I provided for EH 
above in section 2.3.2.  First, I question whether intuition is so clear on this modified case.  Sure, 
it seems clear that we intuitively agree that Mary is happy when she is giving birth to her child: 
not only does she think it is the happiest moment of her life, her pleasure from being a mother 
outweighs the pain she experiences while giving birth.  Is it so clear that we would agree with 
Mary that she is happy if her pain outweighs her pleasure?  I doubt it.  But if we did, I think that 
the intuition is much less strong than it is in the original case.  Second, I agree with Haybron’s 
reasons that I explicated above for being skeptical that someone in Mary’s situation should be 
considered infallible in regards to her happiness.  Mary has good reasons for thinking of herself 
as happy.  She is, after all, giving birth to her first child; and mothers are supposed to be happy.  
There are plenty of explanations for why Mary thinks of herself as happy even though she is 
experiencing more pain than pleasure.  I think that I have provided enough to make us doubt the 
veracity of Mary’s self-report. 
I should also address another criticism, which requires me to change the case of Mary yet 
again.  Suppose that the intensity of her pleasure over giving birth to her first child is slightly less 
than the pain she experiences at the moment she gives birth; Mary still deems this the happiest 
moment of her life, however.  HH now entails that Mary is unhappy: she has more pain than 
pleasure at this moment.  Intuition, however, the critic could contend, is against HH here: 
although she experiences slightly more pain than pleasure, Mary seems happy. 
Note that this criticism not only applies to HH but any theory of happiness: any necessary 
and sufficient condition we postulate that happiness consists in is going to run into intuitive 
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difficulty with borderline cases, like this modified case of Mary, above.  If just one more of 
Mary’s desires is frustrated than satisfied, DSH deems her unhappy at the moment she is giving 
birth even if she thinks it is the happiest of her life; likewise with LSH and EH: if Mary is just 
slightly more dissatisfied with her life than she is satisfied with it or if she has just one more 
negative central affective state than positive ones, LSH and EH deem her unhappy in this case, 
too.  So it is less the case that this criticism applies to HH alone than it does theories of happiness 
in general. 
The most common response to criticisms like this is to adopt the so-called threshold 
view.49  If HH is made into a threshold view, rather than maintaining that S is happy to the extent 
that she experiences pleasure, unhappy to the extent she experiences pain, it would maintain that 
S is happy if she reaches a certain threshold of net pleasure over pain, unhappy if she reaches a 
certain threshold of net pain over pleasure, and neither happy nor unhappy if her experiences of 
pleasure and pain fall in between the two thresholds.  I do not have a problem with this 
modification as such; but I wonder whether it is needed.  HH already recognizes that people may 
be neither happy nor unhappy: if S experiences the same amount, intensity, and duration of 
pleasure at m as she does pain, HH deems her neither happy nor unhappy at m.  If she 
experiences slightly more pleasure than pain, HH deems her slightly happier; if S has the same 
number of pleasant experiences as unpleasant experiences but her pleasurable experiences are 
slightly more intense or slightly longer, HH again deems her slightly happier.   
While HH may generate counterintuitive results on borderline cases, I doubt that it needs 
to be modified.  Our intuitions are not so clear on borderline cases like the above Mary.  
Although HH is clear on such cases, I think that our intuitions are unclear because it is difficult 
                                                
49 Haybron (2008: 147) combines a threshold view with EH and Feldman (2010: 25-26) combines a threshold view 
with his own hedonistic theory of happiness. 
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at times to determine how much pleasure you are experiencing and how much pleasure someone 
else is experiencing.  While HH generates a clear result, it does not imply that it is easy for us to 
determine how happy Mary is.  Now that I have addressed this criticism, let us move on to 
Glenda. 
Before she takes the medication Glenda is displeased with many things about her life.  No 
matter how hard she tries she cannot seem to write anything like the dissertation she wants to.  
Nor is she successful at acquiring the job she believes that she deserves.  This makes her 
depressed, and her being depressed displeases her.  After she takes the medication, however, her 
mood lifts: she goes from feeling down and out to feeling cheerful and optimistic.  She was 
feeling lousy before taking the medicine but afterward feels good.  Hence, HH deems Glenda 
happier after taking the medication than she was before, in accordance with intuition. 
Seneca, being a Stoic, exercises control over his emotions.  Thus, after delivering his 
rousing oration to the Senate, his mood does not change: he remains no more cheerful than 
despondent, no more tranquil than anxious.  Yet Seneca does feel good: he takes pleasure over 
his desire to motivate the Senate being satisfied.  The pleasure he receives outweighs any pain he 
may currently be experiencing.  HH, thus, deems him happy.  Lastly, in the case of Andrew, HH 
also deems him happy.  He may receive pleasure from disgusting or immoral things; but he 
experiences far more pleasure than pain.  
 Intuition HH 
1. Brainwashed Sally H H 
2. Mary the mother H H 
3. Glenda the talented 
tudent 
H H 
4. Seneca the Stoic H H 
5. Andrew the swine H H 
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Unlike, DSH, LSH, or even EH, HH accords with intuition in all five cases.  I contend 
that the case of Glenda is sufficient to make us skeptical that happiness is essentially desire-
satisfaction, the case of Andrew sufficient to make us skeptical that happiness is essentially life-
satisfaction, and the case of Seneca sufficient to make us skeptical that happiness essentially 
consists of emotions and moods.  I contend that HH is a more intuitive theory than its rivals.  
What I need to do now is defend HH from criticism.  But first I want to return to feeling and 
being happy. 
3.1.3 Feeling and being happy 
In several places since section 1.1.1 above I discussed the possible distinction between 
feeling and being happy.  While HH does not imply, it certainly permits there to be a distinction 
between feeling and being happy.  I think that feeling happy consists of being in a pleasurable 
emotional or mood state.  When you are cheerful, you feel happy.  This seems to accord with 
how we typically use the term ‘feeling happy’.  But it strikes me that you may be happy without 
also feeling happy.  When you are happy over the Seahawks winning the Super Bowl, you need 
not feel happy, too.  While you may enjoy the Seahawks victory, you need not be in a positive 
emotional or mood state: your emotional or mood state could be neutral, neither positive or 
negative.  This leaves the distinction between feeling and being happy somewhat mysterious.  I 
am still not sure whether one may feel happy without also being happy.  That said, I think that 
our discussion of theories of happiness, EH and HH in particular, has enabled us to get a better 
grasp of the possible distinction. 
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3.1.4 Defending HH against Haybron 
In this section I explicate and respond to the criticisms of Dan Haybron.  Haybron is one 
of HH’s most recent and most able critics whose criticisms have yet to be fully considered.50   
Haybron’s first objection concerns what he calls ‘irrelevant pleasures’, pleasures that 
although perhaps extremely pleasant do not, according to Haybron, make us happier (2008: 63).  
Some pleasures, we are told, simply do not “have the slightest impact on one’s happiness” 
(Ibid.).  HH is, therefore, false, since it states that any pleasure S has makes her happier.  
Haybron provides us with several examples of irrelevant pleasures: “[o]ne’s enjoyment of eating 
crackers, hearing a good song, sexual intercourse, scratching an itch, solving a puzzle, [and] 
playing football” (Ibid.).  Although orgasm may be pleasurable, likely even extremely 
pleasurable, this objection goes, it need not affect one’s happiness.  Furthermore, Haybron adds, 
“it is not just that any particular superficial pleasure seems irrelevant”; rather, superficial 
pleasure fails to “impact some deeper aspect of one’s psychology” (2008: 63).  “[N]otoriously”, 
Haybron says, “sexual activity can leave us cold.  Sometimes it just doesn’t move us.  This is one 
of the hard lessons dealt to the unsophisticated libertine, or the troubled youth seeking to relieve 
his melancholy through meaningless sexual encounters” (2008: 108).  Intensely pleasurable 
experiences, like orgasm, then, may fail to move us the way central affective states like serenity 
and anxiety do (2008: 131).  
I do not find this criticism convincing.  While some pleasures, even intense ones, are 
brief and fleeting, Haybron discounts the possibility of brief and fleeting happiness.  That is, why 
should we think that happiness always “impact[s] some deeper aspect of one’s psychology”?   
Moreover, even if happiness is some deep state that is not fleeting, why not think that something 
                                                
50 Strictly speaking, Haybron does not criticize HH in particular, but rather hedonistic theories of happiness in 
general. 
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may only have a fleeting impact on one’s happiness?  Although HH implies that the presence of 
any pleasure makes you happier, the increase in happiness is proportional to several facts about 
that pleasure, mainly: its intensity and duration.  That is, while HH implies that every episode of 
pleasure by itself makes you happier and that every episode of pain by itself makes you less 
happy, the extent to which an episode makes you happier or unhappier is determined by the 
episode’s intensity and duration.  A proponent of HH may well admit that some pleasures, 
though very intense, last only a very short duration and hence have only a miniscule impact on 
one’s happiness.  Such pleasures, if HH is right, do impact one’s happiness; but the impact is 
only fleeting.51  Take orgasm: in my mind, it is often extremely pleasurable but often fleeting; it 
does thereby have an impact on one’s happiness; but the impact is mitigated by its short duration, 
how quickly the pleasant feeling dissipates.   
And while orgasms and other intensely pleasurable experiences may fail to move us the 
way serenity and anxiety do, Haybron forgets how varied pleasurable experiences seem.  Surely, 
one may experience much pleasure from sensations, say, during sex but also be displeased about 
some state of affairs.  Although the sex feels good, perhaps it does not feel as good as it used to, 
or perhaps you are displeased about something at work.  Even though the pleasurable sensations 
that you have during sex contribute to your happiness, according to HH, that contribution is 
mitigated by anything unpleasant you are experiencing.  
What Haybron needs is an example of an intense pleasure (pain) that is experienced over 
a long duration that does not appear to make us any (un)happier.  I can think of such an example.  
Some people claim to have experienced intense pain and yet also say that the pain did not get to 
them, that they did not mind it.  Such persons would likely deny that they were made any 
unhappier by their pain.  I find these claims hard to believe.  It seems unlikely that anyone 
                                                
51 Feldman offers a similar reply to Haybron (2010: 27-28). 
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experiencing intense pain is happy while she is experiencing the pain.  In such cases we may 
have good reason to believe that the pain we experienced did not make us any unhappier.  
Perhaps this belief better enables us to cope with the pain.  Again, if Haybron is correct, we have 
several good reasons for thinking that we are not as in touch with how happy or unhappy we 
commonly think we are.  So I contend that this example is just a case of someone who is not in 
touch with her level of happiness: even if she did not “mind the pain”, it still made her less 
happy. 
Haybron’s second objection concerns the temporality of hedonism.  Happiness, the 
objection goes, is forward-looking: when we say that S is happy, it entails that S is happy now, 
not necessarily that S was happy leading up to this time (2008: 69).  That is, ascriptions of 
happiness have a certain temporarility: they describe a psychological state S is now feeling; they 
do not necessarily describe the series of states leading up to now.  If HH is correct, however, 
happiness is backward-looking:  
to know that someone is happy on this view is only to know that his recent experience has been 
mostly positive.  So construed, ascriptions of happiness are little more than capsule summaries or 
histories of subjects’ conscious episodes.  They purport only to characterize the general tenor of a 
sequence of experiential events—namely, experiencings and liking […] Hedonistic happiness is 
an essentially episodic and (in ordinary ascriptions) backward-looking phenomenon. (2008: 69) 
 
The idea seems to be this.  If we ascribed happiness to S, according to HH, we would ascribe to 
S a fact about her past conscious episodes, namely: that they were more pleasant than they were 
unpleasant.  If this objection is correct happiness, however, does not have this feature; HH is, 
therefore, false. 
But, surely, there is a distinction between momentary happiness and happiness over a 
duration.52  If HH is right, S is happy at moment m to the extent she experiences pleasure, 
unhappy to the extent she experiences pain.  This is not at all backward-looking in the manner 
                                                
52 Feldman responds to Haybron’s criticism in a similar way (2010: 31). 
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Haybron describes.  Now, there is happiness over a duration.  Suppose that duration d is 
composed of moments m1 through m3.  In order to determine how happy S is over d we need to 
add up the pleasure S experiences from m1 to m3.  Then we subtract any pain she experiences 
over d.  So long as we have a positive result, HH deems S happy.  While it is true that at m3 we 
would have to look back at m1 and m2 to determine how happy S is over d, this does not mean 
that pleasure is backward-looking. Indeed, if HH is correct, ascriptions of happiness concern 
whether S is currently experiencing more pleasure than displeasure; they do not necessarily tell 
us anything about whether S’s experiences to this moment have been pleasant.   
Perhaps what Haybron means by ‘backward-looking’ is that pleasure is not forward-
looking.  Happiness is, however: it disposes us to act and be in a certain way.  “If I know that 
Gertrude is happy”, Haybron says, “then I can reasonably expect her to be a more pleasant and 
agreeable companion than where she otherwise disposed” (2008: 74).  There is no question that 
happiness is sometimes forward-looking in this regard.  Yet I wonder whether happiness is 
always like this.  For my money, happiness is sometimes what Feldman calls ‘fragile’: “A person 
will be said to experience fragile happiness at t time iff she is happy at that time, but is also 
disposed to lose that happiness, or to lapse into unhappiness” (2010: 29).  Think back to the 
example I described above in section 2.3.3.  You enjoy the Seahawks’ victory; but you forget 
about the victory on your drive home.  Although you seem happy that the Seahawks won, your 
experience of happiness seems like an episode of fragile happiness, since you seem no longer 
happy on your drive back from watching the game.  Such experiences of happiness seem 
common enough; if this is right, happiness is not, contra Haybron, always forward-looking. 
I do think that sometimes happiness is forward-looking, that sometimes when we 
experience happiness, we are disposed to continue to be happy.  Such happiness may only be 
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possible if we are in a positive central affective state, when we are in an emotional or mood state 
that disposes us to continue to be in that positive state.  And when happiness is like this, I have 
no problem saying that happiness consists of the affective state; I also contend, however, that it is 
the pleasure of that affective state that more fundamentally constitutes Gertrude’s happiness.  
Haybron, then, seems to conflate this perhaps deeper sense of happiness with happiness itself.  
Happiness is sometimes deep in that it penetrates our whole being in the manner Haybron 
describes; but it need not do so.  And when it does do so, affective states may be the reason; but 
they seem to contribute to happiness only insofar as they are pleasurable.  
Haybron’s last two criticisms are his strongest; neither of them—as far as I am aware—
have been debunked in the literature.  We shall examine both criticisms together.  They both 
deny that one needs pleasure (pain) in order to be (un)happy.  Some moods, the first objection 
goes, affect our (un)happiness without causing pleasure (pain) (2008: 67-68).  Think, for 
example, of irritability: when S is in an irritable mood, she thereby seems unhappy, other things 
equal, even if she receives no pain from being irritable.  Or think of depression.  “One is 
unhappy by virtue of being depressed”, Haybron tells us, “not by virtue of experiencing the 
unpleasantness of depression.  Happiness has depth that the pleasure theory misses” (2008: 108).  
Some affective states, the second objection goes, affect our (un)happiness without causing 
pleasure (pain) (2008: 71).  Think, for example, of sadness: when S feels sad, she thereby seems 
unhappy, other things equal, even if she receives no pain from the sadness.   
I have two responses to this.  First, I deny that S can be in an irritable mood (be sad) 
without also receiving some pain from being irritable (sad).  Now, this is an empirical matter, a 
matter that is decided by the relevant psychological scholarship, scholarship which asserts that 
pleasure and pain are essential components of both emotions and moods.  The authorities on the 
 76 
psychology of emotion and moods—Barrett, Russell, Watson, and Clark—all agree on this.  
Take Russell for instance.  He writes: “At the heart of emotion, mood, and any other emotionally 
charged event are states experienced as simply feeling good or bad, energized or enervated” 
(2003: 145).  He even defines ‘mood’ as “Prolonged core affect with no Object (simple mood) or 
with a quasi-Object” (Ibid.: 148), where ‘core affect’ is defined as “A neurophysiological state 
that is consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of 
hedonic (pleasure–displeasure) and arousal (sleepy–activated) values” (Ibid.: 147).  Or take 
Eisenberger who has produced research that shows that negative emotions, like the feeling of 
being rejected, are experienced as pain (2012a and 2012b).   
In response, Haybron may well admit that affective states and moods cannot be divorced 
from the pleasure (pain) associated with them but nonetheless maintain that it is not the pleasure 
(pain) that is happiness-constitutive; rather, he may insist that it is the affective state or mood 
itself that is happiness-constitutive.  If it is affective states or moods that constitute happiness, 
not pleasure, then it would be impossible for one to have pleasure without being in an affective 
state or mood and also be happy.  But this strikes me as incorrect, at least when it comes to 
pleasure over states of affairs.  Think back to Seneca.  He takes pleasure over his giving a 
rousing oration and yet does not experience any emotions or moods.  Sure, he may be happier if 
in addition to the pleasure he received from delivering a successful speech he also became elated 
and cheerful; but the fact remains: Seneca seems happier in virtue of experiencing the pleasure 
even though it is not accompanied by any emotion or mood.  
My second response is that even if the literature is wrong and the affective states 
Haybron labels ‘positive’, like cheerfulness, may be experienced without their feeling pleasant, 
why should we think that they contribute to happiness?  Refer back to Antha and suppose that 
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she no longer has the propensity for anxiety; suppose, rather, that she is anxious.  The thing is: 
her anxiety is not at all unpleasant for her.  Note how strange this seems.  It is difficult to 
imagine sadness not feeling unpleasant for the person feeling sad.  Indeed, if someone told us 
they were feeling sad but that the feeling was not at all unpleasant, we may think that he or she 
did not understand what ‘sadness’ means.  Such a worry suggests that negative affective states, 
like sadness, are necessarily unpleasant.  That said, it is logically possible for one to feel sad but 
not unpleasant: there is no contradiction between being sad and not having that sadness feel 
unpleasant.  Intuitively, I just doubt that we are still inclined to deem Antha less happy as a result 
of her anxiety if her anxiety is not all unpleasant for her.  Perhaps others around her who are 
displeased by her anxiety are made less happy because of it; but Antha’s happiness appears 
unaffected.   
Thus concludes my discussion of Haybron’s criticisms to hedonistic theories of 
happiness.   
3.2 Chapter conclusion 
 In this chapter I introduced hedonism about happiness, which postulates that you are 
happy to the extent you experience pleasure, unhappy to the extent you experience pain.  It 
differs from other hedonistic theories by being neutral about the nature of pleasure.  After 
explicating HH I showed how intuitive it is by measuring how well it accords with the five 
examples of happiness.  Lastly, I defended it from the criticisms of Haybron.  Now that we have 
a handle on happiness, in the next chapter I discuss its relationship with welfare.  
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Chapter 4: Happiness and Welfare 
4.1 Introduction to welfare 
The previous chapters of this dissertation concerned a certain psychological phenomenon: 
happiness.  If I am correct, happiness just consists of pleasure and unhappiness just consists of 
pain.  In the rest of this dissertation I am concerned with value, intrinsic value in particular.  If φ 
is intrinsically valuable, φ is valuable for its own sake.53  In contrast, if φ is instrumentally 
valuable, φ is valuable as a means to something that is intrinsically valuable.54  Suppose that 
pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable.  If this is correct, the pleasure you 
received from devouring that three-layered lasagna you had for lunch was intrinsically valuable.  
The lasagna was instrumentally valuable: it was valuable as a means for delivering you pleasure.   
As I see it, there are at least three different conceptualizations of intrinsic value: aesthetic, 
moral, and prudential.  Each value is distinct from the other.  Take a person’s life.  It may be 
high in one value, but low in another.  Suppose that Ted is a promising graduate student.  He is a 
rather happy and successful individual who feels compelled to give something back to the world.  
So he joins the Peace Corps and heads off to Botswana, thereby putting grad school on hold.  
There he teaches about the dangers of unprotected sex.  Suppose that he makes a difference in 
Botswana, greatly increasing the well-being of the locals.  Other things equal, this duration of 
Ted’s life is clearly high in moral value: he not only goes to Botswana with the morally right sort 
                                                
53 When I use ‘intrinsically valuable’ and ‘valuable for its own sake’ interchangeably throughout this dissertation, I 
should not be taken to deny the supervenience principle, which states that φ can be intrinsically valuable only if φ is 
valuable in virtue of its internal properties.  I remain neutral as to whether intrinsic value entails supervenience.   
 
54 Not everyone agrees with this understanding of instrumental value; see Dorsey (2012a), where he claims that “An 
object, state, or event φ is instrumentally valuable if and only if it possesses the disposition to be instrumental to 
value” (146).  I am inclined to think that φ is not valuable if it merely possesses the disposition to be instrumental to 
value; as I see it, in order for φ to be instrumentally valuable, it needs to be instrumental to value, not just be 
disposed to be instrumental to value.  
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of intention, his presence increases the overall welfare of the area.  The thing is: Ted is not 
happy.  He misses his home, his family, and even the intellectual rigors of graduate school.  He is 
depressed and despondent much of the time; he just does an excellent job hiding it.  In this case, 
it is clear that Ted does an efficient job of seeking the good of others; but he does not do an 
efficient job of seeking his own good.  He seems to be a moral individual—at least over this 
duration, just not a prudent one.  That is, Ted’s life seems low in prudential value, whereas it 
seems high in moral value. 
It is also easy to think of lives high in prudential value without much moral value.  Just 
think of Gordon, a Wall Street banker hell-bent on maximizing his own profit without regard for 
how his actions affect others.  In his mind, the world be damned: so long as he gets what he 
wants, that is all that matters.  Not only does Gordon successfully maximize his own profit, he is 
also esteemed highly by his peers.  He has earned this esteem by corporate raiding, buying large 
stakes in companies only to liquidate them.  Unbeknownst to the SEC Gordon relies on insider 
information.  While he has no family, he has many friends.  And while he works long hours, his 
nights are filled with glee and luxury.  He is a very happy man.  Other things being equal, such a 
life seems high in prudential value, low in moral value.   
Here on out I am not concerned with value in general, but rather a particular value: 
prudential value.  Prudential value differs from aesthetic and moral value in at least one crucial 
respect.  A given piece of art—say, The Beatles’ “Let it Be”—may be more aesthetically 
valuable than another—say, The Beatles’ “Revolution 9”.  And a person’s life—say, Ted’s—
may have more moral value than another’s—say, Gordon’s.  Both the Beatles’ “Let it Be” and 
the life of Ted may be said to possess a certain goodness.  While prudential value is also a type 
of goodness, it is different: a person’s life that is high in prudential value is not necessarily good, 
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as such; rather, it is good for that person.  If the Wall Street banker’s life is prudentially valuable, 
it is valuable for him; it benefits him, makes him better off.  Following the literature, I use the 
terms ‘well-being’ and ‘welfare’ to refer to prudential value: S has well-being to the extent S 
lives a life that is good for her. 
Unfortunately, we have a tendency to be loose with our language when it comes to 
precisely what we are seeking when it comes explicating the essence of welfare.  Some 
philosophers say that they are seeking to describe what it is for something to be intrinsically 
valuable.55  This suggests that they are seeking an answer to the following question. 
1) What is intrinsically valuable? 
 
I dot not, however, think that this is the question they are actually seeking.  The question I think 
they mean to answer is the following. 
2) What is intrinsically prudentially valuable? 
 
These two questions are distinct.  Say knowledge turns out to be intrinsically valuable, to be 
good, as such.  In this case, the knowledge you possess would be intrinsically good, but it need 
not also be good for you.  After all, just because something is good for its own sake does not 
mean that your possession of it makes you better off, at least not conceptually.  An answer for (1) 
is not necessarily an answer for (2), and vice versa.  It is logically possible for something to be 
intrinsically good without your possession of it being good for you.  For all we know, there could 
be nothing of intrinsic goodness, just things that are intrinsically good for you.  Or, on the other 
hand, there could be nothing intrinsically good for you but something that is nonetheless 
                                                
55 See, for example, Feldman (2004).  He formulates default hedonism as the position that maintains “every episode 
of pleasure is intrinsically good; every episode of pain is intrinsically bad” (2004: 27).  What he means to say is that 
according to default hedonism, every episode of pleasure is intrinsically prudentially valuable; every episode of pain 
is intrinsically prudentially bad.   
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intrinsically good.  What I am interested in, then, is answering (2), what is intrinsically 
prudentially valuable.56 
I want to be clear about what my project is.  I am not interested in conducting a 
conceptual analysis of the term ‘welfare’ in order to arrive at its definition.  This is a linguistic or 
logical task that likely uses necessary truths that are justified a priori.  Rather than engage in such 
an analysis, I assume that φ is good for S =df. φ benefits S.57  I also assume that φ benefits S =df. 
φ makes S better off.  My project is to construct a description of what it is for something to be 
intrinsically prudentially valuable.  This is a metaphysical task, not a linguistic or logical one.   
While I am trying to provide an account of the essence of welfare, I am not also trying to 
take a position on whether the proposition that expresses ‘φ makes S better off’ is capable of 
being true or false.  That is a second-order question that falls under the domain of metaethics, 
since it concerns the status of moral properties.  My project here falls under the domain of 
normative ethics, since I try to answer the first-order, substantive, question of what makes φ 
instantiate a moral property.58  Think of the utilitarian claim that φ is morally required if and only 
if it maximizes welfare.  This is a criterion of moral rightness: it differentiates that which is 
morally required from that which is not.  Here I am trying to discover the criterion of prudential 
value: that which differentiates what it is that makes a person’s life good for her from that which 
                                                
56 Dorsey (2012b) makes the same distinction: he distinguishes between relational and non-relational intrinsic value.  
“An object φ is relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good for something or someone” (2012b: 269).  
“An object φ is non-relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good ‘‘period’’, ‘‘tout court’’ or ‘‘full stop’’” 
(Ibid.).  He maintains that intrinsic prudential value is relationally intrinsically valuable.  If φ is intrinsically good for 
you, φ is relationally intrinsically good, not necessarily non-relationally intrinsically good (Ibid.). 
 
57 See Zimmerman (2009) for an argument as to why ‘good for’ is synonymous with ‘benefits’. 
 
58 I borrow this way of distinguishing between metaethics and normative ethics on the topic of welfare from Alex 
Sarch’s dissertation (7-8). 
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does not.59  I did something similar with happiness, above.  Hedonism about happiness is not 
necessarily a definition of the term ‘happiness’: HH does not imply that φ makes S happier =df. 
φ brings S pleasure.  It is logically possible for happiness to have nothing to do with pleasure.  
So HH is not a logical or linguistic thesis about the meaning of a term; rather, it is a metaphysical 
account for what happiness is.   
In this chapter I explore the relationship between happiness and welfare.  I shall argue 
that while it seems clear that happiness benefits the happy, the benefit seems merely a pro tanto 
one: while I think that happiness makes the happy better off, even high levels of it need not make 
the happy well off, all things considered.  I shall also argue that in order for φ to be good for you, 
φ need not thereby make you any happier.  
4.2 The benefit of happiness 
Over the summer I had the pleasure of riding in one of New York City’s subway trains.  
Packed in like sardines, I had but no choice to listen in on the conversation that two individuals 
standing next to me were having.  One of them clearly seemed to be distressed.  Apparently, he 
lost a well-paying job a few months back.  Fortunately, he was able to find a new job; but there is 
a catch: he does not make nearly as much money as he once did.  The other individual tried to 
assuage him, saying something like, “As long as you are happy, man, that’s what matters; 
everything else don’t mean squat”.  We all have either heard something like this phrase or even 
uttered it ourselves.  I wonder whether it is correct—is it true that happiness is the only thing of 
intrinsic prudential worth?  
Well, happiness is clearly an indicator of prudential value.  When we see an apparently 
happy person, we commonly conclude that that person is not only well off, but that she is well 
                                                
59 This discussion is also similar to Sarch’s (7-8). 
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off in rough approximation to how happy she seems.  And when we see an apparently unhappy 
person, we commonly conclude that that person is not well off, in rough approximation to how 
unhappy she appears.  Furthermore, ‘(un)happiness’ is often used as a proxy for well-being (ill-
being).  In everyday conversation we commonly treat (un)happiness as a substitute for welfare 
(ilfare).  Likewise, we commonly use the term ‘enjoys’ (‘pains’) as a substitute for ‘good for’ 
(‘bad for’).  Someone who enjoys her wealth and success is said to be someone whose wealth 
and success are good for her; likewise, someone who is pained by his arthritis is someone whose 
arthritis is bad for him.  Someone whose life is high in prudential value is often said to enjoy her 
life.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a miserable person whose life is high in prudential value.  
That is, some minimum, threshold, of happiness seems necessary for well-being.   It seems 
especially clear that some minimum threshold of happiness seems necessary for high levels of 
well-being.   
It also seems obvious that happiness is good for you.  Whenever it is present in a person’s 
life, that person seems better off because of it.  Let us think of Simon, who possesses a surfeit of 
both wealth and success.  Let us also think of Peter, who possesses just as much wealth and 
success as Simon.  In fact, the only difference between Peter and Simon is that Peter enjoys his 
wealth and success whereas Simon does not.  Clearly, other things equal, Peter seems better off 
than Simon.  Peter’s happiness seems to be of some intrinsic benefit to him.   
Unhappiness is similar: it seems obvious that unhappiness is bad for you.  Whenever it is 
present, a life seems worse off because of it.  Think of a person, John, who just finished leading a 
lecture that did not live up to his expectations.  Think of another person, Paul, who also just 
finished leading a disappointing lecture.  The difference between the two is that while Paul is 
unhappy about not delivering his lecture successfully, John is not: John just shrugs off the poorly 
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delivered lecture thinking of it as a fluke while Paul feels depressed.  Clearly, John seems better 
off, other things equal, than Paul.  Paul’s unhappiness by itself seems to make him worse off.   
I conclude from the above that happiness seems to be good for you, unhappiness bad for 
you in the sense that happiness seems at least pro tanto beneficial, unhappiness at least pro tanto 
harmful.  What I want to do now is examine whether happiness also seems to be all-things-
considered beneficial, that is, whether happiness is necessary and sufficient for welfare.  To do 
that, I appeal to the case of Sally, discussing the nature of brainwashing in detail.  If I am correct, 
this case shows us that happiness is not all-things-considered beneficial. 
4.3 Brainwashing 
4.3.1 The essence of brainwashing 
Like the term ‘happiness’, ‘brainwashing’ is used in different ways.  Sometimes we use 
‘brainwashing’ to express mere indoctrination, when, for example, critics of Fox News accuse it 
of brainwashing its audience.  Other times we use the term to express something more sinister, 
when, for example, we say that Jim Jones brainwashed his followers, causing the deaths of 909 
people in Jonestown, Guyana.  The sense of brainwashing that we are interested here is this 
latter, more sinister, one.  The difference between these two senses is a difference of kind, not of 
degree: although brainwashing, as we shall see, involves indoctrination, mere indoctrination does 
not involve brainwashing.  Some history of ‘brainwashing’ should be useful.   
The English ‘brainwashing’ was coined by the journalist Edward Hunter in an article he 
wrote in 1950 reporting on the techniques China allegedly used to transform United States 
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prisoners of war into Communist sympathizers.60  He claims to have derived ‘brainwashing’ 
from the Chinese ‘xǐ nǎo’, which means to wash the brain.  Unfortunately, Hunter’s choice of 
‘brainwashing’ may lead us to associate brainwashing with something like the ability of 
transforming anyone no matter the circumstances into a mindless slave.  Such a conception 
implies that brainwashing is an involuntary process whereby anyone at anytime can be made into 
a mindless robot; this exaggerates the nature of brainwashing, making it seem unreal.   
Not only may ‘brainwashing’ be misleading, the term has been used by popular culture to 
refer to a recruitment tool, a mechanism for obtaining new members.  Scholarly research on 
brainwashing in disciplines like psychology and sociology, however, emphasizes that 
brainwashing is not a recruitment mechanism that turns anyone at anytime into a mindless slave; 
rather, scholars emphasize that brainwashing is a retaining mechanism that under the right 
circumstances can take some cult members and turn them into deployable agents.61  There are 
high costs associated with brainwashing, both to the person being brainwashed and to the person 
doing the brainwashing.  So a cult is not going to want to brainwash any run-of-the-mill new 
recruit; rather, it is going to want to brainwash only those who have demonstrated a commitment 
that outweighs the considerable cost the brainwashing involves.62  
Of particular interest for us is the work of the sociologist Benjamin Zablocki.  He has 
interviewed hundreds of ex-members and ex-leaders of cults who claim that they have been 
brainwashed or have brainwashed others (Zablocki 2001: 194-201).  Zablocki is considered a 
                                                
60 "Brainwashing." Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Credo Reference. 17 July 2008. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.credoreference.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/entry/abcprop/brainwashing>. 
 
61 See, for examples, Barker and Schein (1961), Lifton (1989), and Zablocki (1997 and 2001). 
 
62 It is not clear whether certain individuals are more susceptible to brainwashing than others or even whether 
someone may be more susceptible to brainwashing at different times of her life; rather, scholars believe “that many 
different kinds of people can, with enough effort, be brainwashed” (Zablocki 1998: 222). 
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leading scholar of brainwashing in the academy.  What we are interested here is the nature of 
brainwashing: the essential features of what it is for a person to be brainwashed; but rather than 
construct a suitably general statement of necessary and sufficient conditions from scratch, we 
shall consider Zablocki’s definition.  According to Zablocki, brainwashing is:  
a set of transactions between a charismatically-led collectivity and an isolated member of the 
collectivity with the goal of transforming the member into a deployable agent […] [where a] 
deployable agent is one who can be relied on to continue to carry out the wishes of the 
collectivity even when they are in opposition to his or her own simple hedonic interests and in the 
absence of any external controls. (2001: 239) 
 
Zablocki’s understanding of ‘deployable agent’ aptly describes the submission involved 
when one person is brainwashed by another.  It is worth quoting Zablocki again in full. 
A deployable agent is one who evaluates his self-interest rationally as the group would wish. It 
does not argue the elimination of choice but rather the modification of the preference structure on 
which choice is based. The brainwashed individual remains capable of rational choice and action 
but over a transformed substrate of values and preferences remapped to conform to the collective 
ideology. (1997: 97) 
 
Notice that brainwashing transforms the values and preferences of individuals to conform to the 
group.63  The brainwashed equate their self-interest with the group’s interest.  So the 
brainwashed are capable of making rational choices in the sense that they promote the group’s 
interest.  Zablocki’s use of ‘charismatic’ is also insightful: the authority figure must be perceived 
by the person being brainwashed as trustworthy and even capable of performing extraordinary 
deeds (2001: 241).  Nonetheless, Zablocki’s definition has two problems.   
First, although most brainwashing occurs in groups, it is possible for one individual to 
brainwash another without operating in a group.  Some therapists are alleged to have 
brainwashed their patients; if Zablocki is correct, we would have to apply a different term to 
such cases merely because the setting is not a group one; but this is an insufficient reason.  
                                                
63 Even one’s deepest values and beliefs may be changed as a result of the brainwashing: “The core hypothesis is 
that, under certain circumstances, an individual can be subject to persuasive influences so overwhelming that they 
actually restructure one’s core beliefs and world-view and profoundly modify one’s self- conception” (Zablocki 
1997: 99). 
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Second, his ‘with the goal of’ should be dropped: brainwashing is just a process, not necessarily 
an intentional process.  The degree to which the process occurs, not the degree to which the 
process is intended to occur, is the degree to which brainwashing occurs.   
Zablocki writes that brainwashing may occur even when it opposes the “simple hedonic 
interests” of the brainwashed.  At first glance, this may seem to conflict with brainwashed 
pleasure: if brainwashing happens contrary to a person’s hedonic interest, how can one find 
brainwashing pleasurable?  This misconstrues Zablocki’s definition: he is not saying that all 
brainwashing occurs contrary to a person’s hedonic interests; he merely says that brainwashing 
can occur contrary to a person’s hedonic interests.  And this is compatible with brainwashed 
pleasure: although brainwashing may occur such that the brainwashed receive little to no 
pleasure from it, it is also possible for a person to be brainwashed and receive pleasure from it. 
Zablocki’s ‘set of transactions’ highlights this: there is something that the person receives in 
return from being brainwashed. 
Considering the above, Zablocki’s definition should be modified such that 
‘brainwashing’ is defined as: the set of transactions by which a charismatic authority transforms 
another person into her deployable agent.  This, then, is the essence of brainwashing.  Now that 
we have a theory let us consider the process by which brainwashing operates.   
4.3.2 Brainwashed Sally 
Refer back to Sally, who, like most who are brainwashed, is a young adult, in her second 
year of college.  She joins a parachurch organization at her college.  At one of the organization’s 
events she meets Dianne, whose church Sally’s friends attend.  Something about Dianne just 
seems to click with Sally, leading them to share several intense conversations.  Soon enough 
Sally begins attending Dianne’s church. 
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Now, this is a small church, consisting of around just twenty members.  In fact, it just 
meets in Dianne’s home on Sundays.  While the smallness of the church initially concerns Sally, 
the positive feelings she receives from attending it overwhelm her worry.  It does not take long 
for Dianne to realize that Sally would be an asset to the church, someone to help it attract new 
members.  So Dianne begins brainwashing Sally fairly early.  According to Zablocki, 
brainwashing involves an intentional systematic psychological assault consisting of repeated 
cycles of affirmation and denial, confession and reconfession, a non-linear process of 
“intermediate steps and backsliding” (2001: 238).  This assault has three phases: 1) stripping 
away of Sally’s beliefs present before the brainwashing, 2) Sally identifying and mimicking the 
behavior of others under Dianne’s authority,64 and lastly 3) the death of the old Sally along with 
the birth of a new Sally when she has internalized her new beliefs (2001: 223).   
In phase (1), Dianne indoctrinates Sally, getting Sally to believe what she says by 
appealing to her emotions rather than her critical faculties.65  Through a series of Bible studies 
that weave together enough passages in just the right ways Dianne gets Sally to believe that she 
(Dianne) has the only correct understanding of the scriptures.  When Sally suggests alternative 
interpretations, she is scolded.  And when Sally fails to ask critical questions, Dianne rewards her 
by emotional affirmation.  This affirmation of course feels great to Sally.  She quickly learns to 
do what pleases Dianne and avoid doing what displeases her.  Following Dianne’s lead, the other 
members of the church also affirm Sally.  Soon enough, Dianne is cutting Sally off from the 
                                                
64 As phase is two is phrased, it may seem that Sally can only be brainwashed by Dianne in a group setting; but this 
is not the case: if Dianne is brainwashing Sally and no others, this phase would instead consist in Sally identifying 
and mimicking the behavior Dianne desires. 
 
65 Before the nineteenth century, both English verbs ‘indoctrinate’ and ‘doctrinate’ meant merely to teach or instruct 
("indoctrinate, v.". OED Online. September 2012. Oxford University Press. 6 October 2012 
http://www.oed.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/view/Entry/94678).  Starting in the early 1800’s, however, 
‘indoctrinate’ was used in pejoratively to mean teaching uncritically, getting S to believe something without 
appealing to S’s critical capacities. 
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outside world.  Where Dianne (and by extension, her church) has the correct understanding of 
the Bible, the rest of the world’s understanding is incorrect.  Since church members have the 
only correct understanding of the Bible, Sally has no need to refer to outsiders.  The first few 
times she does refer to outsides, she is scolded; so that soon stops.  Divorcing Sally from outside 
sources of information enables Dianne to obtain Sally’s trust, which Dianne takes advantage of 
to begin removing Sally’s beliefs present before her joining the church.  Her conversations with 
Dianne now do not merely concern the scriptures but also concern other areas, say, her boyfriend 
who she was then dating for over three years.  This moves us to phase (2).   
Phase (2) not only consists of Dianne changing the content of Sally’s beliefs, it also 
consists of Dianne changing the credence Sally assigns to her beliefs relative to one another.  
Other things equal, changes in a person’s credence level is not necessarily bad for that 
individual; other things, however, are not equal: Sally’s assigning new credence levels is the sole 
result of Dianne’s manipulations.  Dianne only accomplishes the change by dulling Sally’s 
critical faculties, using logical fallacies and emotional ploys to appeal to Sally’s affective 
capacities.   
Now, Sally also suffers over this period: she experiences at times intense grief and 
anxiety.  After all, she comes to believe that her family and friends outside of the cult are not 
saved.  Dianne also has Sally break up her relationship with her boyfriend.  Sally comes to regret 
her previous life, the one spent pursuing her own projects rather than God’s.  Yet, all things 
considered, the love and affection Sally receives from Dianne and the rest of the cult far 
outweighs any suffering she experiences.  This leads us to phase (3).   
Sally’s new beliefs and credence levels change her identity: how Sally essentially regards 
herself changes as a result of the brainwashing.  This involves a power imbalance: if Dianne 
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brainwashes Sally, Dianne has power over Sally such that Dianne has influence over every 
aspect of Sally’s life, leaving Sally without privacy with regard to Dianne.  By the end of phase 
(3), Dianne becomes Sally’s sole source of information, leaving Sally no longer able to 
cognitively or emotionally deindividuate herself from Dianne.  The result of this nine-month 
long process leaves Sally a mere deployable agent of Dianne, willing to do anything Dianne asks 
of her.  She is willing to drop out of college, abandon her degree, and spend the rest of her life 
spreading Dianne’s gospel.  Sally’s deepest beliefs and values have changed.  Her parents and 
those who were close to Sally in the past would say that she is no longer the same person, that 
who she is has changed.   
4.3.3 The harm of brainwashing 
Now that we have discussed the essence of brainwashing and how it operates, it should 
be clear that it seems bad for the person being brainwashed.  Unlike ‘happiness’, which is 
ambiguous between psychological happiness and well-being, of which only the latter is 
evaluative, ‘brainwashing’, then, is an evaluative term.  It just so happens that rather than 
connote positive value, like ‘well-being’, ‘brainwashing’ connotes negative value: if Dianne is 
brainwashing Sally, Sally is being transformed into a mere deployable agent of Dianne’s.  This 
process harms Sally: Sally is better off, other things equal, not being transformed into Dianne’s 
mere deployable agent.  This is because brainwashing violates the brainwashed: it penetrating 
deep into their psyches, changing their identities.  It takes a person who was once capable of 
thinking independently, forming her own beliefs and desires, and then transforms her into 
someone who cannot think for herself but instead performs whatever it is that the persons doing 
the brainwashing ask of her.   
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In Sally’s case, the harm that the brainwashing does to her, we commonly believe, 
justifies her parents’ intervening: they intervene on Sally’s behalf.  Sally’s parents hire 
counselors to help their daughter consider whether Dianne has absolute control over her.  During 
the next few weeks Sally comes to realize that she has been brainwashed.  Fortunately, then, the 
intervention worked in freeing Sally from Dianne’s control.  We typically deem such 
interventions justified on the grounds that the brainwashed are better off not being brainwashed.  
If Sally was not better off years after the brainwashing but was instead better off brainwashed, 
with what right do her parents have in interfering with Sally’s involvement with the group?   
4.4 Hedonism about happiness and welfare (HHW) 
 
Now that I have described what brainwashing is, I shall consider whether happiness is 
all-things-considered beneficial.  In chapter three I argued that hedonism about happiness (HH) 
was true.  If this correct, happiness just is pleasure.  So to determine whether happiness is all-
things-considered beneficial, let us consider hedonism about happiness and welfare (HHW), 
which consists of two claims: 1) you are happy to the extent that you have pleasure, unhappy to 
the extent you have pain66 and 2) you are well off (worse off) to the extent that you are 
(un)happy.  HHW is a strong claim: it says that in all cases, prudential value is determined only 
by pleasure; the more of it that you have, the better off you are, period.  If this is correct, the 
pleasure Sally has while brainwashed makes her all-things-considered well off.   
I want to be precise about what I mean by ‘all things considered’ and ‘pro tanto’.  Φ 
makes S pro tanto better off if and only if, other things equal, φ makes S better-off.  Φ makes S 
all-things-considered better off if and only if, taking everything else into account, including 
                                                
66 HHW, like HH, does not take a position on the essence of pleasure: it says that whatever pleasure essentially turns 
out to be, that is the essence of happiness, which in turn is the essence of welfare. 
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whatever is not equal, φ makes S better off.  Notice that if φ makes S all-things-considered better 
off, φ also makes S pro tanto better-off; but if φ makes S merely pro tanto better off, φ does not 
make S all-things-considered better off. 
Let us return to brainwashed Sally, who is thoroughly pleased.  Never has she felt so 
spiritually uplifted, so alive with power, so at ease with people, so confident of the truth of her 
convictions, and just so fulfilled.  Not only does she feel great: brainwashed Sally also takes 
pleasure in feeling so great.  Indeed, she feels so pleasant and takes so much pleasure in feeling 
so pleasant that Sally has a higher surplus of pleasure than pain, the highest surplus she has ever 
had over a similar duration.  
 Also remember that Sally’s family conducts an intervention on Sally’s behalf.  Her 
intervention goes well, so well that Sally leaves the cult.  Over the next several months Sally 
struggles to cope with the loss of leaving the cult.  Sally is often displeased: she feels spiritually 
deflated, alienated from others, unsure of what convictions to hold, let alone be confident of, and 
just so unfulfilled.  She realizes that she was manipulated by the cult and hence feels anxiety 
over not knowing whom she can now trust.  This leaves Sally feeling downright miserable, so 
miserable that she even contemplates suicide from time to time.  Not only does she often feel 
lousy: the fact that she feels lousy is displeasing to her, too.  Sally begins to see a therapist.  With 
the therapist’s help she begins to do something she could not do while brainwashed: exercise her 
own critical capacities, reflecting over the life she wants to lead, considering what evidence she 
has for her beliefs, and so on.  Exercising her capacities in this manner feels good to Sally, and 
she takes pleasure in once again relying on her own thinking.   
Fast-forward several years: Sally is still out of the cult.  She no longer has difficulty 
coping with it, or at least not nearly to the extent she once did.  More often than not Sally is 
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pleased: she feels content, sure of her convictions, and just fulfilled.  Not only does she feel 
good, the state of affairs of her feeling so good brings Sally pleasure, too.  She also continues to 
exercise her critical capacities; indeed, she is now a better critical thinker than she was previous 
to her brainwashing.  Sure, there are things she wishes she had done otherwise; but for the most 
part, she is content.  Indeed, if given the choice to continue the brainwashed-free life she now 
leads or go back to the brainwashed life, Sally would choose to continue her current life.  That 
said, she did feel better and was more satisfied while brainwashed than she is now: while she 
does have much more pleasure now than pain, Sally just had even more pleasure while 
brainwashed.  Sure, Sally experienced more pain while being brainwashed than she does now, 
but the increase in pleasure she experiences outweighs the pleasure she experiences such that the 
net amount of pleasure she experienced while brainwashed is significantly higher than what it is 
now. 
Focus on the three periods of her life: the year of her brainwashing, the first several 
months after she leaves the brainwashing, and several years after she has left the brainwashing.  
Of the three periods, she has the most overall pleasure while brainwashed.  If HHW is correct, 
pleasure is not only the essence of happiness, it is also the essence of welfare.  Thus, of the three 
periods of her life, HHW deems Sally best off brainwashed.  But does this seem right?  Well, 
Sally’s brainwashed happiness does seem to provide some benefit to her.  Setting aside all we 
know about brainwashing, if we just look at the pleasure Sally receives, it seems to make her 
better off.  Suppose that there is some world where Sally is brainwashed but does not receive the 
pleasure she does in ours.  Other things equal, our Sally is better off: at least our Sally receives 
pleasure from being brainwashed; the other Sally receives none at all.   
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However, given what we know about the nature of brainwashing from section 4.3, above, 
even though Sally’s pleasure seems beneficial to her, the benefit seems outweighed by the harm 
that the brainwashing does to her.  Where she was an excellent student bent on going to medical 
school, she is now the pawn of Dianne.  Where she was exercising her natural talents 
autonomously, she now does whatever it is that Dianne tells her to do.   
Now the proponent of HHW may have a ready retort: she could claim that we typically 
think that brainwashing is bad for the brainwashed because it causes more pain than pleasure, at 
least in the long term.  Consequently, while our aversion to brainwashing is justified, we 
mistakenly think it is intrinsically bad for us, when it is the pain that typically follows from the 
brainwashing that is intrinsically bad for us.  In the rare event that the brainwashed feel more 
pleasure than pain, despite our thinking otherwise, the brainwashed are actually well off, all 
things considered. 
I doubt that this is true, however.  That is, I doubt that brainwashing tends to bring more 
pleasure than pain to those undergoing the brainwashing.  Sure, it brings more pain than pleasure 
to the friends and family members of the brainwashed: they struggle with the loss of a loved one 
to an ideology.  But the brainwashed receive a benefit from the brainwashing; why else would 
they undergo it?  This benefit consists of the feelings of affirmation and affection that the cult 
provides.  The brainwashed also benefit from a living a narrative that explains precisely why 
they exist and what their purpose is.  Such a narrative feels electrifying: instead of being 
burdened by meddlesome critical questions, you can just rest in the peace that surpasses all 
understanding.     
The problem that HHW faces is that while pleasure seems to make us better off, some 
pleasures seem to make us better off than others.  The case of Sally emphasizes this: all things 
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considered, Sally seems better off enjoying the fruits of, say, being that medical student she so 
desperately wanted to be prior to the cult, than she does receiving pleasure from being 
brainwashed.  HHW cannot account for this: it says that any pleasure you experience is just as 
good for you as any other, so long as they are of the same intensity and duration. 
In response to this criticism, a proponent of HWW could modify her theory.  She could 
acknowledge that Sally is better off years after her brainwashing than she is while being 
brainwashed even though she has more pleasure brainwashed.  The theorist could maintain that 
there is something defective about the brainwashed pleasure that makes it inferior to non-
brainwashed pleasure.  The most popular way of going about such an account is to insist that 
there is a distinction between authentic happiness and inauthentic happiness.  This is where we 
shall turn.  
4.5 Authentic happiness theories of welfare 
To start, there are two ways to formulate an authentic happiness theory of welfare.  It 
could be formulated such that only authentic happiness is intrinsically good for you.  Formulated 
in such a way authentic happiness would be necessary and sufficient for well-being.  If this were 
true, inauthentic happiness would have no intrinsic prudential value; but this seems false.  
Remember, Sally seems better off brainwashed and happy, other things equal, than brainwashed 
and unhappy.  Thus, it seems like the preferred way to formulate an authentic happiness theory 
of welfare is by maintaining that all happiness is intrinsically good for you; it just so happens 
that authentic happiness is better for you than inauthentic happiness.  This is because the extent 
to which happiness makes you better off is determined, at least in part, by how authentic it is.   
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4.5.1 Authentic hedonism about happiness and welfare	    
Proponents of authentic HHW need to formulate what it is for some pleasurable 
experiences to be authentic and then give more weight to these experiences than inauthentic 
ones.  Luckily for the hedonist, Fred Feldman provides two such accounts: 1) truth-adjusted 
attitudinal hedonism and 2) desert-adjusted attitudinal hedonism.67  Notice that both employ the 
term ‘attitudinal’.  This is because both presuppose an externalist understanding of pleasure.  
That is, both imply that pleasure is essentially an attitude, not a feeling or sensation.  I shall 
explicate the former theory first, then move on to the latter. 
4.5.1.1 Truth-adjusted HHW 
Truth-adjusted attitudinal hedonism about welfare (‘truth-adjusted HHW’, for short) 
maintains that while pleasure is the essence of welfare, to what extent a particular episode of 
pleasure contributes to an individual’s welfare is determined by the pleasure’s intensity, duration, 
and whether it is based on true propositions.  Pleasures based on true propositions are more 
intrinsically prudentially valuable than pleasures based on false propositions.  Interestingly 
enough, truth-adjusted HHW makes no such claim about displeasure: it maintains that 
displeasure is bad for the individual, no matter if it is based on truth or falsehood.68  According to 
truth-adjusted HHW, then, S is happy to the extent that she experiences pleasure; S’s life goes 
well for her to the extent she is happy; and the extent to which a particular episode of happiness 
maker her better off depends, at least in part, by whether it is based on truth. 
                                                
67 Feldman formulates both what he calls ‘truth-adjusted intrinsic attitudinal hedonism’ and ‘desert-adjusted intrinsic 
attitudinal hedonism’, both of which he first links to welfare, not happiness (2004).  He later offers a theory of 
welfare and happiness that maintains happiness is intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and that welfare is desert-adjusted 
happiness (2010: 210-215). 
 
68 I have opted to use ‘displeasure’ here, not ‘pain’.  I used ‘pain’ in chapter three at least in part because I did not 
want to favor internalism or externalism.  But since truth-adjusted AHW implies that pleasure is attitudinal, there is 
no longer a reason from me to use ‘pain’. 
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I think the following example will help us understand what is for an episode of pleasure 
to be based on truth.  Imagine two individuals, Bruce and Ted: both are blissfully happy and 
successful businessmen who love their wives and children.  The only different between the two is 
that Ted’s happiness is based on a lie: his wife is cheating on him.  Intuitively, it seems that 
Bruce’s life is going better for him than Ted’s.  Yet hedonism about happiness disagrees: since 
both are equally happy, it deems both equally well off.  Truth-adjusted HHW is different, 
though.  Because Ted’s wife is cheating on him, his pleasure from his thinking that his wife is 
loyal is based on false beliefs.  Bruce’s pleasure, however, is based on true beliefs.  And since it 
is based on true beliefs, truth-adjusted HHW deems his pleasure more prudentially valuable and 
therefore deems him better off (than Ted).  While this theory accords with intuition in the case of 
Bruce and Tim, let us see how well it does with Sally. 
 Brainwashed Sally sure does believe many falsehoods.  She believes that Dianne is just 
about infallible, that she can do no wrong.  Sally also believes that she is flourishing and helping 
others to flourish, as well.  And, of course, she receives pleasure from all these false beliefs.  
Basically, Sally is blissfully unaware of the fact that she was manipulated into joining a 
destructive cult.  That said, much of her pleasure is based on truth.  For example, she takes much 
pleasure over the fact that she is a leader of her church, in fact, the right-hand gal of Dianne.  For 
another, the fact that she recruits new members on a weekly basis also brings Sally pleasure.  If 
the majority of Sally’s (intense and long-lasting) pleasure were based on false beliefs, truth-
adjusted HHW would deem that pleasure less prudentially valuable than if it were based on true 
beliefs.  And it would, therefore, deem Sally better off basing her pleasure on true beliefs, that is, 
it would deem her better off not brainwashed.  But the majority of Sally’s (intense and long-
lasting) pleasure is based on true beliefs.  So truth-adjusted HHW is not of much help to the 
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hedonist: brainwashed Sally’s truth-adjusted happiness is greater than Sally’s truth-adjusted 
happiness years after the brainwashing, meaning that truth-adjusted HHW deems Sally better off 
brainwashed.  
The proponent of truth-adjusted HHW could respond with something like the following.  
Surely Sally’s pleasure is ultimately based on falsehood.  She believes that she is not being 
brainwashed, or at least that her discipleship with Dianne is not bad for her.  And she would not 
believe that she is a powerful leader or recruitment machine without also believing that her 
brainwashing is good for her.  So at bottom her pleasures are based on false beliefs!   
I admit that in some ultimate sense Sally’s pleasure is probably based on falsehood; but I 
fail to see how this is relevant.  Look, Sally’s believing that she is a powerful leader and 
recruiting machine—both beliefs of which she takes pleasure over—are causally related to false 
beliefs in the sense that she would not have those beliefs without first having her false ones; but 
so are nearly all of our beliefs!  Most—if not all—of our beliefs are causally related to false 
ones.  Hardly any pleasure appears to be completely based on true beliefs.  So truth-adjusted 
HHW faces a dilemma: either it deems brainwashed Sally well off, all things considered, or it 
implies that hardly any of our pleasure is good for us.  Either way, truth-adjusted HHW seems 
false. 
 There is an additional famous case that truth-adjusted HHW fails to accord with intuition 
on, a case we have already discussed: Andrew the swine.  He has tons of pleasure.  He enjoys 
using illegal drugs, fornicating with the hired hands, and bestiality.  The thing is: these pleasures 
are all clearly based on facts, not falsehoods.  The problem with these pleasures does not appear 
to be that they are based on falsehoods, since they are not; rather, the problem seems to be 
something else.  Allegedly, the pleasures are just too shallow, they are beneath Andrew.  Sure, 
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the pleasure seems intrinsically good for him; but Andrew seems even better off getting pleasure 
from more worthwhile things, from things of higher desert.  This brings us to desert-adjusted 
HHW. 
4.5.1.2 Desert-adjusted HHW 
 Desert-adjusted attitudinal hedonism about welfare (‘desert-adjusted HHW’, for short) 
maintains that while pleasure is the essence of welfare, the extent to which a particular episode 
of pleasure contributes to an individual’s welfare is determined by the pleasure’s intensity, 
duration, and the worthiness of the object of pleasure: pleasures based on objects of high desert 
are more prudentially valuable than pleasures based on objects of low desert.  That is, the 
prudential value of a pleasure taken from something good or beautiful is increased; and the 
prudential value of a pleasure taken from something bad or ugly is mitigated.  Likewise, 
displeasures based on objects of low desert are less harmful than displeasures based on objects of 
high desert.  That is, is, the harm of a displeasure taken from something bad or ugly is mitigated; 
and the harm of a displeasure taken from something good or ugly is increased.  According to 
desert-adjusted HHW, then, S is happy to the extent that she experiences pleasure; S’s life goes 
well for her to the extent that she is happy; and the extent to which a particular episode of 
happiness maker her better off depends, at least in part, by how deserving the object of S’s 
pleasure is. 
Refer back to Andrew.  Sure, he has a lot of pleasure; but the pleasure is over disgusting 
things: illegal drugs and bestiality.  These objects are of low desert.  Hence, while desert-adjusted 
HHW deems the pleasure arising from them prudentially valuable, the value is mitigated by the 
low worth of the illegal drugs and bestiality.  Thus, while all pleasure that Andrew experiences 
makes him pro tanto better off, only pleasure based on things of high desert make him all-things-
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considered well off.  So according to desert-adjusted HHW, while Andrew is better off 
experiencing the pleasure he does than none at all, he is even better off taking pleasure in objects 
of high desert.  This accords well with intuition.  How does desert-adjusted HHW fare with 
Sally? 
 Again, I think that the hedonist is in trouble.  Much of what Sally takes (intense and long-
lasting) pleasure in is good, or at least not obviously bad or ugly.  She takes pleasure over being 
a part of something bigger than herself, of feeling that her life is infused with purpose and 
meaning, of recruiting new members to experience what she experiences, and of being a leader 
and having others look up to her.  Sure, these objects may be bad in the sense that they just 
further Sally’s own involvement in the cult and get new members to join it.  But this at best gets 
us instrumental badness or ugliness: the objects are not obviously intrinsically bad or ugly; the 
objects are just means to badness or ugliness.  The prudential value of brainwashed Sally’s 
desert-adjusted pleasure, then, outweighs the prudential value of her desert-adjusted pleasure 
years after she leaves the brainwashing.  Hence, desert-adjusted AHW deems Sally not only pro 
tanto better off brainwashed, but also all-things-considered well off brainwashed, in conflict with 
intuition. 
 In addition to conflicting with intuition in the case of Sally, I wonder whether desert-
adjusted HHW conflates prudential value with something like moral value.  Some immoral and 
ugly things seem to make us better off.  Think back to Gordon, the Wall Street banker hell-bent 
on maximizing his own profit, without care for how doing so affects others.  His life seems to be 
high in prudential value, low in moral value.  Gordon’s corporate raiding and insider trading give 
him success but bring suffering to many others.  He seems to lead a successful life while he 
engages in immoral and ugly activities.  While Gordon’s actions seem to hurt the good of others, 
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they seem to further his own good just as much as engaging in moral or projects would.  I find it 
difficult to see how a proponent of desert-adjusted HHW can go without appealing to moral 
value in describing what she means by ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’.   
 Both of the popular formulations, then, that a hedonist may make in order to capture the 
idea of authentic pleasure seem unsuccessful: both truth-adjusted and desert-adjusted HHW 
deem Sally well off brainwashed, all things considered.   
4.6 Chapter conclusion 
 In this chapter we explored the relationship between happiness and welfare.  Happiness 
clearly seems to be an indicator of welfare.  Moreover, ‘happiness’ is often used as a convenient 
proxy for welfare.  Happiness just seems good for the happy.  But the benefit happiness provides 
seems to be merely a pro tanto one.  I argued for this by appealing to the nature of brainwashing 
and the case of Sally.  While Sally seems happiest brainwashed, she does not seem well off, all 
things considered.  I then introduced the notion of authentic happiness and discussed how HHW 
could be modified to incorporate it in two different ways.  But both modifications failed to make 
HHW accord with intuition in the case of Sally.  Hedonism, then, although right about happiness, 
seems to miss the mark on welfare: it describes the accurate psychological state that is the 
essence of happiness, but it implies that that psychological state is, seemingly incorrectly, all-
things-considered beneficial to the happy.  Thus, while happiness seems intrinsically good for us, 
it does not seem to be the only thing intrinsically good for us.  If it were, the benefit that Sally’s 
happiness brings her could not be outweighed by the harm of her brainwashing.  But because she 
does not appear to be well off, all things considered, happiness does not appear to be the only 
intrinsic prudential good. 
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Chapter 5: What Welfare is Not 
In the above chapter I criticized hedonism about happiness and welfare.  In this chapter I 
continue explicating and criticizing theories of welfare; I focus on five of the more popular 
theories.  Each of the following five either fails to accord with intuition in the case of Sally or 
has other problems.  In the next chapter I shall explicate and defend my own theory of welfare. 
5.1 Desire-satisfaction about welfare (DSW) 
5.1.1 The essence of DSW 
DSW is the position that the essence of welfare is the satisfaction of your desires: you are 
well off to the extent that your desires are satisfied, worse off to the extent they are frustrated.  If 
DSW is correct, the satisfaction of any of your desires benefits you, period.  Proponents of DSW 
use ‘desire’ and ‘satisfaction’ in much the same way that proponents of DSH use them; that said, 
we should review both.  
Desires are pro-attitudes: to desire φ is to be positively disposed to φ.  While you may be 
aware of a desire you have, you need not be.  You seem to desire many different things without 
being vividly aware that you do, namely: breathing, hunger, thirst, and so on.  DSW maintains 
that the extent to which a particular satisfied desire contributes to your welfare is determined by 
the intensity and duration of the desire: basically, the more intensely and the longer you desire ϕ, 
the more satisfying your desire will increase your well-being.  There is propositional content to a 
desire: whenever you desire something, you want the content of your desire to obtain.   
Now that we have reviewed desire, let us move on to satisfaction.  While there were two 
different ways to understand satisfaction under DSH, there is just one way to understand it under 
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DSW: a desire for ϕ is satisfied if and only if ϕ.  Thus construed, DSW maintains that you are 
well off to the extent that you get what you want, worse off to the extent that you do not.  
5.1.2 The pro tanto benefit of satisfied desires 
Like happiness, I think that satisfied desires are an indicator of welfare. When we 
encounter a person who seems to have satisfied many of her desires, we commonly conclude that 
that person is well off; and when we encounter a person who seems to have many of his desires 
go unsatisfied, we commonly conclude that that person is not well off.  We also commonly 
define success in terms of getting what we want; and we commonly use ‘success’ as a convenient 
proxy for welfare.  Further, it is difficult to imagine a person who fails to get much of what she 
wants whose life is high in prudential value.  That is, some minimum, threshold, of satisfied 
desires seems necessary for well-being.  And it seems clear that some minimum threshold of 
satisfied desires seems necessary for high levels of well-being. 
It also seems obvious that satisfied desires are intrinsically good for you.  Whenever a 
person gets what she wants, that person thereby seems better off.  Think back to Simon and Peter 
who possess a surfeit of both wealth and success (section 4.2, above).  The only difference 
between the two is that Peter longed for his wealth and success whereas Simon did not.  Other 
things equal, Peter seems better off than Simon: Peter’s satisfied desires seem to be of some 
benefit to him.   
While satisfied desires do seem to be of some benefit to you, they do not seem to be 
beneficial, all things considered.  Refer back to Sally. 
5.1.3 DSW and Sally 
There are three relevant periods of Sally’s life: her brainwashing, her first couple of 
months after leaving the brainwashing, and several years thereafter.  Of the three periods Sally 
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clearly seems happiest while brainwashed, when she experiences the most (net) pleasure.  Yet 
Sally seems better off years after the brainwashing, when even though she is less happy, she 
relies on her own rationality and critical thinking.  Of the three periods, Sally seems least well 
off the first couple of months after her brainwashing when she is depressed and downright 
miserable.   
She not only receives much pleasure while brainwashed, she also satisfies many of her 
desires, so many that she has an abundance of satisfied to unsatisfied desires.  In the first month 
or two after she leaves the cult, although Sally has more desires satisfied than unsatisfied, she has 
many more satisfied desires while brainwashed.  And even though Sally has more net desire-
satisfaction several years after she leaves the brainwashing than in the first month or two after 
leaving the cult, she still has much more net desire-satisfaction while brainwashed.  If DSW is 
correct, the satisfied desires Sally has while brainwashed make her all-things-considered well 
off.  
Now, I admit that Sally’s satisfied desires are of some benefit to Sally; but the benefit, I 
maintain, is merely pro tanto: once we consider what brainwashing is, the benefit that the 
satisfied desires provide Sally with seems outweighed by the harm that the brainwashing does to 
her.  Even though she has more (net) desire-satisfaction while she is being brainwashed than 
several years after the brainwashing ends, Sally seems better off several years after.   
The problem that DSW faces is that while satisfied desires do seem to make us better off, 
some satisfied desires seem to make us better off than others (independent of their intensity and 
duration).  Other things equal, Sally seems better off satisfying the desires that stem from her 
independence, less well off satisfying the desires that stem from her brainwashing. 
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The proponent of DSW has a response to this criticism.  Refer back to HHW, the position 
that well-being just consists of happiness.  It, like DSW, failed to accord with intuition in the 
case of Sally.  So I modified it by distinguishing authentic from inauthentic happiness, where the 
former is more intrinsically prudentially valuable than the latter.  We can make a similar move 
with DSW.  
5.1.4 Full-information DSW 
A desire-satisfaction theory of welfare that makes the distinction between authentic and 
inauthentic desires distinguishes between a person’s current wants and her deepest wants.  Deep 
desires are supposed to be something like S’s true desires, desires S adopts of her own accord, 
not desires S adopts due to external influences.  S’s deepest desires, then, are meant to be her 
authentic desires, desires that come from who she really is.  If we can plausibly explain that 
Sally’s brainwashed desires are merely her current desires, not her deepest ones, we might be 
able to plausibly say that she is better off not brainwashed. 
The most plausible formulation of an authentic desire-satisfaction theory found in the 
literature relies on the notion of full information.  The chief proponents of a full-information 
desire-satisfaction theory about welfare, Richard Brandt and Peter Railton, maintain that S is 
well off to the extent that she satisfies desires that a fully informed and fully rational S would 
want the actual S to want (for their own sake) (Railton 1986: 17).69  We need to discuss how 
proponents of this view understand both ‘full information’ and ‘full rationality’. 
                                                
69 Railton contends that “an individual’s good consists in what he would want himself to want or pursue, were he to 
contemplate his situation from a standpoint fully and vividly informed about his circumstances, and entirely free of 
cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality” (Railton 1986: 17).  Railton also says that “an individual’s 
intrinsic good consists in attainment of what he would in idealized circumstances want to want for its own sake—or, 
more accurately, to pursue (for wanting is only one way of pursuing)—were he to assume the place of his actual 
self” (Railton 1986: 17-18). 
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S is informed to the extent that she is aware of the effects that her desires have on her 
own life; S is fully informed if and only if she is made fully aware of such effects.  Full 
information is intended to capture what Connie Rosati calls the ‘birds-eye’ perspective: a 
perspective from which we stand back and assess the different lives generated by satisfying our 
desires (Rosati 1995: 297).  Once fully informed we then choose to satisfy desires that lead to the 
most appealing life.  To be fully rational is to be “entirely free from cognitive error or lapses of 
instrumental rationality” (Railton 1986: 16).  A person follows the commands of instrumental 
rationality to the extent that she does what she has reason, not necessarily overriding reason, 
mind you, to do (Railton 1986: 7).70  Cognitive errors consist of, for example, presentation bias, 
when the ordering of the information alone influences understanding it (Railton 1986: 21-22).  
According to full-information DSW, then, S is well of to the extent that she satisfies her fully 
informed desires. 
I earlier argued that although Sally has more net desire-satisfaction brainwashed than she 
has either months or several years after the brainwashing, she seems better off several years after 
she left the brainwashing behind.  If this is correct, DSW is false.  We modified DSW to full-
information DSW in order to accommodate the case of brainwashing; does the modification 
work?   
For brainwashed Sally to satisfy her most intense desires, she must remain in the cult.  
Now, a fully informed and fully rational Sally could step back and assess (entirely free from 
cognitive errors and lapses of instrumental rationality) the myriad of lives generated by 
satisfying certain desires.  If Sally were to become fully rational, she would no longer be fooled 
                                                
70 Railton has two reasons for thinking that full rationality does not necessarily consist of overriding reason.  One, 
requiring S to perform only those acts that she has overriding reason to perform presupposes that there is some 
uncontroversial “logic of induction” that assigns univocal degrees of epistemic warrant to any proposition (1986: 6); 
the existence of such a logic is dubitable.  Two, even if such a logic exists, he maintains, the mere fact that S is 
justified in believing p does not imply that S should always obey p (Ibid.). 
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by Dianne’s tricks.  If she were to become fully informed, Sally would become aware of the 
consequences of her possible actions.  At the precise moment she becomes fully rational and 
fully informed, then, Sally also becomes aware that she is being brainwashed.  Once she 
becomes aware of all of the consequences of her actions, she sees that the period of her life thus 
far in the cult has been the happiest of her life.  And she understands that she would happiest if 
she continues her life inside rather than outside the cult.  But Sally does not value her happiness 
above all else; there are things she values more, like: living her life apart from anybody’s control, 
doing what she wants to do.  So a fully informed and fully rational Sally desires brainwashed 
Sally to leave, not stay part of, the group.  According to full-information DSW, Sally is well off 
to the extent that she satisfies the desires that a fully informed and fully rational Sally would 
want brainwashed Sally to satisfy.  A fully informed and fully rational Sally would want Sally to 
live free of the brainwashing; this requires Sally to leave the cult.  Thus, a fully informed and 
fully rational Sally would want Sally to leave the cult.  Full-information DSW, then, deems Sally 
better off years after the brainwashing than during it, in accordance with intuition.   
5.1.5 Criticizing full-information DSW 
While it is good that full-information DSW accords with intuition in the case of Sally, 
something seems amiss.  With full information, Sally understands both that she is being 
brainwashed and also that she needs to continue being brainwashed in order to maximize her 
happiness over her lifetime.  It so happens that while she desires to be happy, she does not desire 
it above all else. 
But what if Sally were different?—what if she valued her happiness above all else?  Let 
us imagine Molly, who is identical to Sally who finds herself in identical circumstances as Sally 
except that if she were to become fully informed and fully rational at any time during her 
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brainwashing, she would choose to remain in the cult: Molly, unlike Sally, values her own 
happiness above all else.  When she reflects about the most pleasant periods of her life, Molly 
decides that she wants to bring about as many of those experiences as she can, even if it takes 
being brainwashed to do so.   
What does intuition say about Molly?  There is a difference between Molly and the non-
fully-informed Sally: Molly makes her decision free of the influence of Dianne.  In an important 
sense, Sally does not choose to become Dianne’s mere deployable agent; Molly does choose, 
however.  That said, I think that we are still pretheoretically inclined to judge Molly better off 
years after the brainwashing: while she made an informed and instrumentally rational choice 
(given her values), she chose to return to being someone who merely does Dianne’s bidding.  
This requires her to once again return to the child-like state of being emotionally manipulated by 
Dianne and susceptible to her logical fallacies.   
Think of Jesse, who is addicted to benzoylmethylecgonine.  The pleasure that cocaine 
provides him is so intense that the does not want to give it up.  Jesse is aware of the drug’s side 
effects; he continues to use it just because of the way it makes him feel.  If Jesse were to become 
fully informed and fully rational, he would still desire to use cocaine; like Molly, Jesse values his 
own happiness above all else.  Full-information DSW deems Jesse best off continuing to be 
addicted to cocaine because that is what he most desires (even under idealized conditions).  
Intuitively, this seems wrong, however: although Jesse is fully informed, he seems to have acted 
against, not for, his own interest. 
I contend that the same holds true for Molly.  Intuitively, I believe that we think there is 
something wrong here, that even though Molly made an informed and instrumentally rational 
choice, it turned out to be the wrong one: she was better off choosing to leave the brainwashing.  
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We are inclined to think that although the happiness Molly receives from rejoining Dianne’s 
ranks benefits her, that benefit is outweighed by the harm done to Molly by being brainwashed.  
Thus, while full-information DSW accords with intuition in the case of Sally, it does not in the 
case of Molly.  What seems unacceptable about full-information DSW is that it is a view about 
what constitutes welfare.  While it is clear that fully informed and fully rational individuals are in 
a better position to know what is best for them, it does not follow that what is best for them just 
is satisfying fully informed desires.    
There is another worry that I have about full-information DSW: if full-information DSW 
is right, in order for a satisfied desire to be good for you, your fully informed and fully rational 
self must have the same desire.  Given that a fully informed and fully rational Sally would not 
desire to continue her involvement with the cult, she would not desire her own happiness while a 
part of the cult.  Yet Sally seems better off brainwashed and happy than brainwashed and 
miserable.  Some of our desires seem better for us to fulfill even if a fully informed and fully 
rational version of ourselves would not want us to satisfy them. 
Additionally, both pure DSW and full-information DSW are unable to accord with the 
intuition that happiness is intrinsically good for us.  Full-information DSW maintains that 
happiness is good for us only if we would desire it while fully informed and fully rational.  DSW 
also fails to accord with this intuition, since it maintains that something is good for you only if 
you desire it.  A desire-satisfactionist about welfare could accept this criticism and just maintain 
that welfare consists of both satisfied desires and happiness.  But if she makes this move, we no 
longer have a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare; rather, we have an objective list theory of 
welfare with two items on the list: desire-satisfaction and happiness.  We shall discuss such 
theories below, in section 5.6.  Briefly, while I think that such an objective list is an 
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improvement over DSW, since it better accords with intuition, I think that my own theory is 
superior.  This brings us to the second theory of welfare we shall consider. 
5.2 Life-satisfaction about welfare (LSW) 
5.2.1 The essence of LSW 
LSW is the position that the essence of welfare is the satisfaction of your life as a whole: 
you are well off to the extent that you are satisfied with your life as a whole, worse off to the 
extent that you are dissatisfied with it.  Like HHW and DSW, LSW is a strong claim: it says that 
in all cases, prudential value is essentially determined only by life-satisfaction; the more satisfied 
S is with her life, the better off S is, period.  You are satisfied with your life according to LSW in 
the same manner in which you are satisfied with your life according to LSH.  That is, life-
satisfaction, according to LSW, has the same two components that life satisfaction does for LSH: 
cognitive and affective satisfaction.  To be cognitively satisfied with your life is to find that it on 
balance measures up to your standards and evaluations; to be affectively satisfied with your life 
is for you to find your life rewarding, for you to feel fulfilled by living it.  Cognitive and 
affective satisfaction each are necessary for life satisfaction, together they are sufficient for it.  
Now that I have explicated the essence of LSW, let us see how well it fares with the case of 
brainwashing. 
5.2.2 LSW and Sally 
Not only does Sally have the most overall pleasure while brainwashed, not only does she 
have the most overall satisfied desires while brainwashed, she also is very satisfied with her life 
as a whole.  In the first months after she leaves the cult, Sally is not at all satisfied with her life as 
a whole, since she is just now coming to grips with the fact that she was brainwashed.  Several 
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years after she leaves the cult Sally is satisfied with her life, indeed, significantly more satisfied 
than she was only a month or two after leaving the cult yet not nearly as satisfied as she was 
while she was in the group. 
If this is correct, the life-satisfaction Sally has while brainwashed, by itself, makes her 
all-things-considered better off.  While I doubt that Sally’s life-satisfaction by itself makes her 
better off, let us assume for the moment that it does.  If her life-satisfaction benefits her, the 
benefit, I maintain, is merely pro tanto: once we consider what brainwashing is, the benefit life-
satisfaction provides Sally with is outweighed by the harm that the brainwashing does to her.  
Even though she has more life-satisfaction brainwashed than months or even years after she is no 
longer brainwashed, Sally seems better off years after the brainwashing, all things considered.  If 
this is correct, LSW is false. 
A proponent of LSW could accept the above criticism and yet modify her theory.  She 
could appeal to authenticity in the same manner the proponents of authentic HHW and full-
information DSW appealed to authenticity, by maintaining that it is authentic life-satisfaction 
that constitutes your welfare. 
5.2.3 Authentic LSW 
The proponent of authentic LSW deems Sally’s brainwashed life satisfaction inauthentic.  
At first glance, this seems plausible.  Sally is being brainwashed, after all.  Even though she 
believes that she is living a life fully of her own accord, she is being transformed into Dianne’s 
slave: she is being deceived and manipulated into a lifestyle that if she had all the right 
information and was acting rationally, she would not choose to practice.   
But what, precisely, does the proponent of authentic LSW mean by ‘authenticity’?  
According to authentic LSW’s leading proponent, Wayne Sumner, for S to adopt φ authentically 
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is for S to adopt her own self, free from social conditioning (Sumner 1996: 167).  Authenticity, 
for Sumner, has two components: full information and autonomy.  Sumner recognizes that full 
information is insufficient for authenticity: “the problem here is rooted not in the adequacy of 
people’s factual information but in the malleability of their personal values” (Sumner 1996: 162).  
This is a rather apt observation; full-information DSW, after all, ran into trouble because a fully 
informed and fully rational Molly still values her own happiness above all else.  Autonomy is 
intended to address the malleability of a person’s values; but Sumner finds none of the three 
different accounts of autonomy that he considers completely successful.  I want to criticize the 
account that Sumner seems to think is the most plausible, an account by John Christman.   
According to Christman, S adopts φ authentically if and only if S adopted φ fully 
knowing the nature and effects of φ or would adopt φ if she fully knew its nature and effects 
(1991: 10-13).  He is concerned with the process by which S adopts φ: so long as S either adopts 
φ under the right process or would have adopted φ under the right process, S adopts φ 
autonomously.  So, authentic LSW is the position that you are well off to the extent that you 
would be satisfied with your life as whole if you were fully informed.  Although Christman 
speaks of ‘processes’, what determines whether S would adopt φ is whether she was fully 
informed.  And remember: mere full information is not sufficient to render Sally worse off 
brainwashed than not: if at any time during the brainwashing Sally were to become fully 
informed, she would desire to stay brainwashed.  She would see all of the alternative lives she 
has available and choose the one that continues her brainwashing because that is what she 
currently values most.  (It is full information in combination with full rationality that makes a 
fully informed and fully rational Sally aware that she is being brainwashed.)  There are similar 
problems for the other accounts of autonomy Sumner discusses.  He acknowledges this, leaving 
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us with only the thought that autonomy has been violated when “autonomy-subverting 
mechanisms of social conditioning, such as indoctrination, programming, brainwashing, 
rolescripting, and the like” are present (1996: 171).  Sumner leaves it to others to find the correct 
theory of autonomy.   
While he leaves us without a viable theory of autonomy, he does maintain that 
authenticity consists, in part, of full information.  Think back to full-information DSW.  
Authenticity there consisted of both full information and full rationality. Yet full-information 
DSW only accorded with intuition in the case of Sally, not the case of Molly.  Let us see how 
full-information LSW fares.  It maintains that Sally is well off to the extent that a fully informed 
and fully rational Sally would be satisfied with her life as whole.  A fully informed Sally would 
see all of the consequences of her possible actions; and a fully rational Sally would be able to 
judge free of cognitive errors and the errors of instrumental rationality which life she would be 
most satisfied with.   Given that a life free of brainwashing would better meet the goals and 
expectations of a fully informed and fully rational Sally more than a life of brainwashing, full-
information LSW deems Sally better off not brainwashed.  Thus, full-information LSW accords 
with intuition in the case of Sally.  But what happens when we consider Molly? 
Well, Molly, unlike Sally, desires happiness more intensely than anything else.  Thus, she 
would be most satisfied with a maximally happy life.  So a fully informed and fully rational 
Molly would be most satisfied with the life that brought her the most happiness.  And because 
the life that brings her the most happiness requires her to be brainwashed, she would continue the 
brainwashing.  Like full-information DSW, then, full-information LSW fails to accord with 
intuition in the case of Molly. 
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I want to return to Sumner’s idea of the “autonomy-subverting mechanisms of social 
conditioning”, like “indoctrination, programming, brainwashing, [and] rolescripting” (1996: 
171).  Suppose that life-satisfaction that is caused by these autonomy-subverting mechanisms 
does not contribute to your welfare.  In the case of brainwashed Sally, since all of her life-
satisfaction is the result of these mechanisms, authentic LSW deems her better off years after the 
brainwashing, in accordance with intuition.  Yet it also deems Sally better off just a couple 
months after her brainwashing: while she has no authentic life-satisfaction while being 
brainwashed, she has some just a couple months after the brainwashing.  Thus, this authentic 
LSW fails to accord with intuition, too. 
There is one last modification I shall try.  Think back to the authentic hedonisms I tried 
above in section 4.8.  Rather than maintain that authentic happiness alone contributed to welfare, 
they maintained that happiness contributed to your welfare to the extent that it was authentic: 
authenticity was not a component of welfare; rather, it was something like a multiplier.  Suppose 
that we do the same thing for LSW, formulating it as follows.  According to authentic LSW, 
welfare consists of life-satisfaction, where a particular episode of life-satisfaction makes you 
well off to the extent that it is authentic.  Authenticity, here, consists of full information and the 
absence of autonomy-subverting mechanisms.  Authentic LSW accords with intuition in the case 
of Sally: although she has no authentic life-satisfaction while brainwashed, Sally has much life-
satisfaction, enough to outweigh the benefit that the authentic life-satisfaction she has just a 
couple months after being brainwashed brings her.  This modification also accords with intuition 
in the case of Molly: Molly may desire happiness above all else, even if it is inauthentic; yet 
authentic LSW deems her better off with the authentic life-satisfaction that she has years after 
leaving the cult.  
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While this final formulation of authentic LSW accords with intuition in the cases of Sally 
and Molly, it seems incomplete.  According to it, one is worse off with life-satisfaction that 
arises from autonomy-subverting mechanisms than one is with life-satisfaction that does not 
arise from such mechanisms.  But what are autonomy-subverting mechanisms?  We can point to 
Dianne’s manipulations of Sally as an example of autonomy-subversion; but what, specifically, 
is it about Dianne’s being brainwashed that subverts Sally’s autonomy?  Authentic LSW only 
stipulates that brainwashing subverts our autonomy.  A theory that does not just stipulate 
brainwashing subverts our autonomy but explains why is, other things equal, more plausible than 
authentic LSW.  My own theory of welfare—capacity fulfillment—not only accords with 
intuition on the cases of Sally and Molly, it also provides an explanation for why brainwashing 
subverts our autonomy.  Sure, authentic LSW could just adopt the explanation that my theory 
provides; but note that in doing so, LSW is becoming more like my own theory.  Moreover, 
LSW—authentic or not—is also susceptible to the following criticisms that my own theory is not 
susceptible to. 
5.2.4 Additional criticisms of LSW 
I want to question the idea that life satisfaction by itself makes Sally better off. 
Remember, to be satisfied with one’s life as a whole is to be both affectively satisfied and 
cognitively satisfied with one’s life.  It is clear to me that pleasure seems intrinsically good for 
us; but I am less certain that affective satisfaction is.  To be affectively satisfied with your life is 
to find it enriching, rewarding, or fulfilling.  It is not clear to me that the mere feelings of 
enrichment, reward, or fulfillment are prudentially valuable.  If these feelings are pleasurable, 
then, yes they seem prudentially valuable.  But they seem prudentially valuable merely because 
of the pleasure they bring about; they do not seem prudentially valuable apart from the pleasure.  
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Imagine that you have just climbed the daunting 14,411 feet that is Mt. Rainer.  At the peak of 
Rainer feelings of enrichment, reward, and fulfillment overwhelm you.  You feel, in a word: 
great.  While I of course admit that these feelings are good for you, they seem good for you 
because of the way that they make you feel.  If this is right, it is not the feelings themselves but 
their feeling good that is good for you.  Hence, as I see it, it is the pleasure you receive from 
these feelings that is good for you, not the feelings themselves. 
Relatedly, both LSW and authentic LSW fail to accord with the intuition that happiness is 
intrinsically prudentially valuable.  According to LSW, happiness is good for you only in virtue 
of it contributing to your overall satisfaction with your life; likewise, according to authentic 
LSW, happiness is good for you only in virtue of it contributing your overall life satisfaction.  As 
we discussed above, happiness does not seem good for us merely instrumentally; rather, it also 
seems intrinsically good for us.   
It is also not clear to me whether cognitive satisfaction—being satisfied that your life 
measures up reasonably well with your expectations—is intrinsically prudentially valuable, 
either.  It seems to me that most of the time it feels good to find that our lives do measure up 
reasonably well to our expectations.  When this happens I do not dispute that the pleasure you 
receive thereby makes you better off.  But again, this would be because of the pleasure, not 
cognitive satisfaction alone.  I could even agree that if you desired that your life match up with 
your expectations, it matching up with your expectations would be good for you; but this would 
mean that your cognitive satisfaction is good for you in virtue of you desiring it.  I just doubt that 
it is the combined state of affairs of your reflecting and finding that your life on the whole 
worthwhile that by itself makes you any better off.  
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That said, it seems obvious that life-satisfaction is an indicator of welfare: generally 
speaking, a person who is not at all (either cognitively or affectively) satisfied with her life as a 
whole does not seem likely to be well off.  Given the above discussion, however, the relationship 
between life satisfaction and welfare seems merely contingent: life satisfaction—authentic or 
not—just does not seem to be intrinsically prudentially valuable.  If this is correct, LSW is false. 
5.3 Self-fulfillment theory of welfare (SFW) 
5.3.1 The essence of SFW 
SFW is the position that the essence of welfare is self-fulfillment: you are well off to the 
extent that you fulfill your self, worse off to the extent that you do not fulfill your self.71  
Obviously there are two parts to SFW that need to be explicated: the self and fulfillment.  We 
shall start with the former first, then move on to the latter. 
The notion of the self that is relevant for SFW does not concern the notion of 
reidentification of individuals over time (Haybron 2008a: 183).  That is a question for those 
primarily interested in personal identity.  Rather than be concerned with which individuals we 
are, the advocate of SFW is concerned with who we are; this is a question about our “thicker” 
selves (Haybron 2008a: 183-184).  And our thicker self, Haybron contends, has both a rational 
side and an affective side.  He admits that it is difficult to state what precisely the components of 
either side are.  Nonetheless, Haybron maintains that the rational side consists of your projects, 
commitments, values, beliefs, and self-conception.  And the affective side, given his emphasis on 
emotions where happiness is concerned, must consist of affective states and moods.   
                                                
71 I take SFW from Haybron’s 2008 text.  Strictly speaking, Haybron does not endorse SFW: he acknowledges that 
well-being may not just consist “in the fulfillment of the self’s two parts, but also in the fulfillment of our 
subpersonal, “nutritive” and “animal” natures: physical vitality and pleasure” (2008a: 194).  In personal 
correspondence, Haybron confirms that well-being, in his view, does not merely consist of self-fulfillment.   
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Now that we have an idea of what the self is in self-fulfillment, let us discuss fulfillment.  
Fulfillment consists of three necessary elements; together, all three are sufficient. 
Enjoyment: φ fulfills S’s nature only if she enjoys performing φ (Haybron 2008a: 175). 
Authenticity: φ fulfills S’s nature only if she authentically performs φ (Haybron 2008a: 
186). 
Internalism: φ fulfills S’s nature only if by performing φ she fulfills the rational or 
affective sides of her individual self (Haybron 2008a: 157). 
 
Thus construed, according to SFW, φ is valuable for S if and only if she authentically enjoys 
performing φ and if by performing φ she fulfills the rational or affective sides of her individual 
self.  That is, if SFW is right, S is well off to the extent that she authentically enjoys fulfilling the 
nature of her individual thicker self.  All three of these claims require further explication.   
I began this dissertation with a discussion of happiness and pleasure, and I continued the 
discussion throughout the dissertation.  Clearly, pleasure is related to well-being; it seems to be 
intrinsically prudentially valuable.  The question is just to what extent it is prudentially valuable.  
SFW not only maintains that pleasure is good for you, it maintains that in order for φ to be 
intrinsically good for you φ needs to bring you pleasure.  That is, if SFW is correct, the 
relationship between pleasure and welfare is one of necessity: pleasure is a necessary component 
of welfare.  Now we need to discuss internalism. 
Internalism, Haybron tells us, embodies two ideas. 
First, what counts toward my well-being must depend on what I am like.  My welfare must not be 
alien to me, a value that floats down from some Platonic realm and, remora-like, affixes itself to 
me with little regard to the particulars of my constitution.  Second, what counts toward my well-
being must not depend on what any other individual, or group or class of individuals—actual or 
hypothetical—is like.  It must be possible to specify the ultimate or fundamental conditions for 
my well-being without making essential reference to other individuals, or to classes or groups of 
individuals. (2008a: 157) 
 
Haybron’s internalism constraint grounds welfare in your nature, not anything alien to you, but 
who you essentially are; no external authorities decide what is best for you.  As a part of SFW, 
internalism implies that φ fulfills S’s nature only if by performing φ she fulfills her projects, 
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commitments, values, beliefs, or self-conception or she fulfills her affective self.  S seems to 
fulfill her affective self, according to SFW, to the extent that she is happy.  Remember, happiness 
for Haybron consists of positive central emotional and mood states.  Now that we have discussed 
both enjoyment and internalism, let us move on to authenticity. 
Haybron maintains that authenticity has five “dimensions”: 1) being well enough 
informed, 2) autonomous values, 3) autonomous activities, 4) an autonomous temperament, and 
5) richness (2008a: 186).  Richness applies to happiness: the more complex the sources of your 
happiness are, the more “the authenticity of one’s happiness increases” (Ibid.).  Unfortunately, he 
does not elucidate upon what autonomy is, what distinguishes, say, autonomous values from 
non-autonomous values.  Indeed, he admits that his account of authenticity is “somewhat 
cursory” and is best left vague since you may simply insert whatever theory seems most 
plausible to you (2008a: 186).   
I contend that the most plausible account of authenticity involves successfully using your 
critical capacities, which in turn involves not only on being well enough informed but also 
rational; being rational consists of avoiding errors of instrumental rationality and cognitive 
errors.  Thus understood, you are rational, in part, to the extent that you are not susceptible to 
logical fallacies and emotional ploys.  This closely resembles full-information DSW, but it is 
different in one crucial respect: it makes welfare, at least in part, dependent upon how well you 
reason, not on the desires of one who reasons well.  So unlike full-information DSW, this 
account deems Molly better off not being brainwashed since she better exercises her critical 
capacities free of the brainwashing.  But note that SFW does by becoming more like my own 
theory of welfare, capacity-fulfillment, which maintains that you successfully exercising your 
capacities, including your critical capacities, makes you better off. 
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5.3.2 SFW and Sally 
Now that I have briefly explicated SFW, we need to discuss its verdict on the case of 
Sally.  Sally is being brainwashed by Dianne, that is, she is being transformed into a mere 
deployable agent of Dianne’s.  Sally’s self-identity and self-conception have changed: where she 
once identified herself as a loyal daughter and successful undergraduate with ambitions for going 
to medical school, she now identifies herself as nothing but an extension of Dianne.  Not only 
has the manner in which Sally regards herself changed, her deepest values, commitments, and 
beliefs have all changed, as well.  If she were to take a personality type test, her personality type 
would now be identical with Dianne’s.72  Indeed, the brainwashing leaves Sally no longer able to 
cognitively or affectively deindividuate herself from Dianne.   
Haybron wants to say that Sally is better off not being brainwashed.  But remember: Sally 
no longer has the same self.  Her deeper rational and affective selves have changed as a result of 
the brainwashing.  When measuring her self-fulfillment we do not measure the self-fulfillment 
Sally had before or after the brainwashing; rather, we must measure the self-fulfillment in her 
current brainwashed self.  If we do this, brainwashed Sally’s life seems high in self-fulfillment, 
in fact, the highest it has ever been: never before has she to this extent lived up to her values, 
beliefs, commitments, emotional nature, and so on.  Remember, intuition is clear, here: Sally 
while being brainwashed seems better off not brainwashed.  SFW agrees that Sally before she is 
brainwashed is better off not becoming brainwashed and agrees that Sally years after the 
brainwashing is better off not returning to the cult to be brainwashed again; but SFW does not 
accord with the intuition that brainwashed Sally is better off not brainwashed.   
                                                
72 See Yeakley (1985) for empirical research that members of destructive cults change their personalities in 
conformity to the identity of their leader. 
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5.3.3 SFW’s responses to Sally 
Haybron has a ready response to this objection.  He of course emphasizes the authenticity 
constraint: φ fulfills S’s nature only if she exercises φ authentically.  Brainwashed Sally clearly 
does not exercise, well, anything authentically while brainwashed; she is brainwashed, after 
all!—or so says the proponent of SFW.  Let us consider this claim.   
If we interpret autonomy as successful use of one’s critical capacities, then it is clear that 
SFW deems Sally better off not brainwashed.  If Sally were not being emotionally manipulated 
and fooled by logical fallacies, she would not have the values, temperament, and so on that she 
possesses.  So SFW deems Sally not at all well off brainwashed.  But here is the catch: SFW 
deems brainwashed Sally too badly off.  While Sally seems worse off brainwashed than years 
after the brainwashing, she seems better off brainwashed than just month or two after the 
brainwashing.  Yet if SFW is correct, Sally would be worse off brainwashed than a month after 
the brainwashing.  Thus, SFW fails to accord with intuition in the case of Sally.  
There is at least one other response that a proponent of SFW could make.  She could 
maintain that some of Sally’s possible thicker selves are better for her to fulfill than others.  
While it may be better for brainwashed Sally to fulfill her self than not fulfill it, she would be 
even better off fulfilling a self that is not brainwashed.  I think that this is right: other things 
equal, if Sally never leaves the brainwashing, Sally seems better off fulfilling the values and 
beliefs that her self-conception consists of than not fulfilling them; it just so happens that 
brainwashed Sally seems even better off having a different self-conception, say, the self-
conception she has years after the brainwashing, and fulfilling the values and beliefs that that 
self-conception consists of.  What SFW, then, requires is a mechanism that permits it to rank-
order Sally’s possible selves.  The problem is: how does SFW rank-order the selves when it 
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views each individual self as merely the contents of one’s beliefs, desires, and affections?  To 
start, SFW would need to give up its internalism constraint.  SFW seems to err in not going deep 
enough.  It needs some sort of tool to delve deeper into Sally that can say of a certain thicker self 
that it is better or worse for Sally to fulfill it than another.  The best way to do this, I think, is for 
SFW to ground welfare not in Sally’s fulfillment of her self, but in her fulfillment of her 
capacities.  If we do this, however, we wind up moving closer to my own theory of welfare. 
SFW, in addition to failing to accord with intuition in the case of Sally, faces additional 
criticisms.   
5.3.4 Additional criticisms of SFW 
As I see it, the three elements SFW deems necessary for welfare—authenticity, 
enjoyment, and internalism—do not seem necessary for welfare.  I shall start with authenticity. 
 SFW’s authenticity claim seems false.  If it were true, inauthentic happiness would be of 
no intrinsic prudential value; but inauthentic happiness does seem intrinsically prudentially 
valuable: Sally seems better off brainwashed and happy, all else equal, than brainwashed and 
unhappy.  Contra SFW, then, authenticity does not seem necessary for welfare.73 
Nor does the enjoyment claim seem true: while pleasure seems prudentially good, in 
order for φ to be good for you, it does not appear that you need to enjoy φ.  Think back to Daniel 
the ascetic from 2.1.3 above.  He satisfies many of his intense desires, yet his life consists of 
hardly any pleasure.  Sure, he seems unhappy; but at least he gets what he wants.  Daniel seems 
better off, other things equal, unhappy with many of his intense desires satisfied than unhappy 
with few of his intense desires satisfied.   
                                                
73 Haybron seems to respond to something like this concern about SFW when he suggests that pleasure has 
prudential value apart from self-fulfillment (2008a: 94).  So while SFW requires authenticity, self-fulfillment does 
not exhaust welfare, according to Haybron.   
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I also do not agree with SFW’s internalism constraint: while Sally fulfills what Haybron 
would consider the rational side of her self extraordinarily well, she seems better off not 
fulfilling it.  That is, if brainwashed Sally were to fulfill her projects, commitments, values, 
beliefs, self-conception, and so on, she would stay brainwashed as long as she could; but she 
seems better off leaving the cult, the sooner the better.  It does not seem necessary, then, that for 
φ to make S better off φ needs to fulfill S’s projects, commitments, values, and so on.   
Not only do I contend that authenticity, enjoyment, and internalism do not seem to be 
necessary components of welfare, I also question whether SFW is justified in emphasizing 
happiness: why think that S’s affective self is fulfilled by her being happy, not her being 
unhappy?  It seems that you fulfill the affective dimension of your individual self just as well by 
being unhappy as you do by being happy: both happiness and unhappiness consist of central 
emotions and moods.  I wonder what makes positive central emotions and moods fulfill your self 
but not negative ones.  This brings us to our next theory of welfare to consider. 
	   	  5.4 Perfectionism about welfare (PW) 
5.4.1 The essence of PW 
 PW is the position that welfare consists of the perfection of the nature of your species: 
you are well off to the extent that you perfect your nature qua member of the species homo 
sapiens, worse off to the extent that you do not.  Notice that this makes PW different than SFW, 
which grounds your welfare not in your nature qua member of homo sapiens, but in your nature 
qua individual self.  PW has a rich pedigree, with proponents like Aristotle, Kant, Marx, and 
Nietzsche.  Proponents of PW, generally speaking, define the term ‘nature’ in two different 
ways.  First, following Aristotle, a thing’s nature is that which it distinctly, uniquely, possesses.  
Second, following more recent perfectionists, like Thomas Hurka, a thing’s nature is the set of its 
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essential properties.  I explicate and criticize both views below before describing how PW needs 
to be modified in light of my criticism.  
5.4.2 Aristotle’s PW 
Aristotle seems to think that the nature of a living thing is that which makes it unique or 
distinctive. The nature of a human, then, does not consist of being alive, since all living things 
are alive.  Nor does a human’s nature consist of activities like growing and digesting: plants and 
animals engage in these activities, too (Nicomachean Ethics: 1097b25-1098b5).  Our nature may 
also not consist of perception, since, non-human animals perceive, too.  The one unique activity 
we do, Aristotle famously states, is rational activity.  That which something uniquely does is its 
function.  Following the function argument, a good human is someone who performs her 
function excellently.74  He then concludes by saying that the good of a human consists in 
excellent rational activity.75  According to Aristotle, then, you are well off to the extent that you 
perfect your rational abilities, worse off to the extent that you fail to do so.   
Now, the Greeks of course lacked the English ‘welfare’.  While they did use 
‘eudaimonia’, it is not clear to me that it and ‘welfare’ are synonymous.  ‘Eudaimonia’, 
unfortunately, is often translated as happiness.  As discussed above, ‘happiness’ is ambiguous.  
On the one hand, it may mean just a particular psychological, and therefore, descriptive, state.  
On the other, it may mean the sort of life that is good for the one leading it.  Given that we 
already have several clear terms for the latter sense of ‘happiness’, it is best to reserve 
‘happiness’ for the former sense.  Aristotle clearly did not mean the cheery, fell-good, 
                                                
74 As Hurka notes (1993: 10), Plato (Republic: 353a) also seems to thing that a thing’s good lies in its function.  
 
75 This interpretation of Aristotle is not with controversy; some disagree with it.  See, for example, Kraut (1979).  
According to Kraut, Aristotle concludes that the good of a human consists in virtuous activity, be it intellectual or 
moral.    
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descriptive state of happiness; rather, he meant some sort of valuable state.  Etymologically, 
‘eudaimonia’ means having a good guardian spirit.76  While it is clear that to achieve or possess 
eudaimonia is good or valuable, it is not clear to me that it is just good for you.  That is, while it 
is clear that eudaimonia is a type of value, I am not sure that it only tracks prudential value.  A 
life that is high in eudaimonia may be a life that is good for the person leading it; but it may not 
be just that: a life full of eudaimonia may be a life that is all-things-considered good, not just 
prudentially good.  Construed in this way, a life full of eudaimonia would be a life high not only 
in prudential value but moral and aesthetic (perhaps other value), too.77  Setting this concern 
aside, let us presume that ‘eudaimonia’ tracks only a particular type of value: prudential value. 
Clearly, this version of PW deems Sally better off years after the brainwashing than while 
brainwashed: while brainwashed she fails to exercise her rational capacities well at all.  In fact, 
Dianne is only able to brainwash Sally by dulling her reasoning.  Sally exercises her rational 
capacities better both a month after the brainwashing and a several years after the brainwashing.  
Thus, while Aristotle’s PW accords with intuition in deeming brainwashed Sally worse off than 
she is several years after the brainwashing, it, conflicts with intuition in deeming Sally worse off 
brainwashed than a month after the brainwashing.  In the month or two after leaving the cult 
Sally is distraught.  She realizes that she has been brainwashed and does not know who, if 
anyone, to trust.  She therefore feels rather miserable much of the time and even occasionally 
entertains her own suicide.  Sally seems better off brainwashed. 
                                                
76 I get this definition from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Taylor, C. C. W. "eudaimonia." The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy. : Oxford University Press, 2005. Oxford Reference. 2005. Date Accessed 11 Oct. 2013 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/view/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-
9780199264797-e-812>. 
 
77 See, for instance, Haybron (2008) who understands eudaimonia in this way. 
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Not only does Aristotle’s PW fail to accord with intuition in the case of Sally, it also fails 
to give any prudential weight to happiness: if something does not involve exercising your reason, 
it makes you no better off whatsoever.  Hence, this version of PW fails to accord with the 
intuition that happiness by itself has at least some benefit for the happy.  Sally seems better off 
brainwashed and happy, all else equal, than brainwashed and unhappy.  Aristotle’s PW, however, 
deems her equally worse off brainwashed and happy as brainwashed and unhappy, miserable, 
even. 
There are other objections to Aristotle’s PW, too.  Peter Glassen focuses on the function 
argument.  If Glassen is right, Aristotle conflates the good of a thing with a thing’s good.  
Aristotle describes what it is to be a good lyre player, that is, what the goodness of a lyre player 
consists in; but he wants to give us what the good of a lyre player consists in (Glassen: 320-321).  
So at best what Aristotle gives us, if Glassen is right, is what it is to be a good human, not what 
our good consists in. 
Suppose that we revise the function argument in light of Glassen’s worry.  That is, 
suppose that we replace Aristotle’s premise a good human is someone who performs her function 
excellently with the good of a thing consists in a thing exercising its function excellently.  Now 
we seem to have a valid argument.  The thing is: is it sound?  That is, is this a true premise?  I do 
not think so: why should we think that a thing’s good must be something it uniquely does?  
Suppose we learn that Martians exist and reason precisely like we do; then reason would no 
longer be unique to us, and hence, reason could not be our good.  Why should the facts that 
Martians exist and reason like us impact what it is that makes us well off?78  The idea that our 
good is determined by facts about other species seems implausible. 
                                                
78 Hurka (1993: 11) and Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations: 515-517) make the same point.  
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Further, following Bernard Williams, even if we are the only creatures who reason the 
way we do, there seem to be many abilities we uniquely posses that do not seem relevant for our 
welfare.  Using Williams’s examples, it seems that we are the only beings who make fire, have 
sex “without regard to season”, “despoil the environment”, and kill for fun (Williams 1972: 59).  
None of these activities by themselves seem to make us better off in the slightest.   
5.4.3 Hurka’s PW 
I think it is safe to say that due to the above criticisms Aristotle’s PW does not seem 
plausible.  Fortunately for the perfectionist there are other versions of PW.  Instead of defining 
nature in terms of distinctness, as Aristotle does, one could define it in terms of essence.  This is 
the move that Thomas Hurka makes.  Taking a page from Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, Hurka 
thinks of φ’s essence as its essential properties, which understood modally, are those properties it 
has in every possible world (where it exists).  Now, Kripke and Putnam, for the most part, only 
discuss the essential properties of physiochemical kinds at the micro level.  The essence of gold, 
for example, they argue, is the atomic number 79: in every possible world where gold exists, 
while it may not be yellow, shiny, and so on, it will have the same atomic structure denoted by 
atomic number 79.  Hurka goes a step further in applying essential properties to humans.  An 
essential property for a member of the homo sapien species, then, is a property that a human 
would have in every possible world.   
But there is a problem with this proposal that Hurka recognizes immediately: it, like 
Aristotle’s notion of essence, is guilty of the wrong properties objection. There are some 
properties that we possess essentially that do not seem relevant for our welfare.79  For example, 
                                                
79 Strictly speaking, Hurka is not a proponent of PW: while he is a perfectionist, he does not maintain that 
perfectionism tracks welfare (Hurka 1993: 17).  So while he maintains that you live a good life to the extent that you 
perfect your human nature, he does not maintain that such a life is good for you; such a life is just good, period.  
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in all possible worlds we are identical with ourselves.  Self-identity is, then, an essential 
property.  But it would be very odd to think that being self-identical somehow constitutes your 
welfare.  So he further maintains that we must limit essence to properties that are “conditioned 
on their being living things” (Hurka 1993: 16).  The property of being identical to yourself is not 
a property conditioned on you being a living thing; rather, it is a property conditioned on you 
being an object.  Hurka aptly refers to his theory as an “essence-and-life” view (Hurka 1993: 17). 
What properties are essential to humans qua living things?  First off, humans, Hurka says, 
have an essential physical nature, constituted by circular, digestive, muscular, nervous, and 
respiratory systems.  If something is not able to “breathe, move, process nutrients, and exercise 
central control, it is not a human” (Hurka 1993: 37).  Well, then, what is it to perfect one’s 
physical nature?  Hurka’s answer is simple: achievement of good bodily health in that the 
aforementioned bodily systems “function in an efficient, unrestricted way” (Hurka 1993: 38).  
There seems to be some intuitive support for this.  Think of a soldier who goes off to war 
healthy, with her bodily systems operating efficiently.  Suppose that when she returns, however, 
she is without his right leg.  Lacking her leg, she does not seem complete.  She seems less well 
off, not just because she may get less pleasure and less of what she wants; the loss of her leg 
itself seems like it harms her. 
Humans do not only have a certain physical nature; according to Hurka, they also have 
practical and rational natures, too.  Humans are practical in that we not only “have local aims”, 
we also “can envisage patterns of action that can stretch through time or include other agents and 
can perform particular acts as a means to them” (Hurka 1993: 39).  Humans are rational in that 
                                                                                                                                                       
Welfare, in his mind, is subjective, consisting of desires.  I take his theory of perfectionism and use it as a kind of 
theory about welfare. 
 
 129 
we “can form and act upon sophisticated beliefs and intentions, ones whose contents stretch 
across persons and times and that are arranged in complex hierarchies” (Hurka 1993: 39). 
You perfect your rational nature, Hurka tells us, to the extent that you are disposed to 
have justified true beliefs that are highly general (Hurka 1993: 99-101).80  Thus, it is not just the 
number of justified true beliefs you are disposed to have, it is also their generality that is relevant 
for your welfare.  On Hurka’s view, “It is better to know a fundamental law of the universe than 
the number of redheads in Beiseker, Alberta, or the workings of a friend’s personality than the 
exact length of his forearm” (Hurka 1993: 100).  A scientific law is general in the sense that “it 
includes all the objects at all times in history” (1993: 115).  But beliefs, Hurka insists, may be 
general in another sense: they may also be general if they explain other true beliefs (Ibid.).  I 
think the basic idea is that if belief b is more general than belief c, b is necessary in some sense 
to explain c; b is explanatorily prior to c.   
If our rational capacities really are essential to us, then, Hurka maintains, they “must be 
realized to some degree at every time” of our lives (Hurka 1993: 101).   And if they “must be 
realized to some degree at every time”, they must be dispositional, since dispositional beliefs 
“persist through sleep and unconsciousness” (Hurka 1993: 101).  Hurka also contends that his 
dispositional account of the rational good is more intuitive than a merely occurrent account: 
“Imagine that one person knows one truth, which he contemplates at every time in his life, 
whereas another knows many truths that she contemplates in succession, one after the other” 
(Hurka 1993: 101).  A perfectionist theory of welfare that emphasizes only occurrent beliefs 
would deem the first person’s life as just as valuable as the second’s, which is counterintuitive.   
                                                
80 Hurka (1993: 105-106) relies on an internalist account of knowledge as justified true belief.  If this makes you 
uncomfortable, I see no reason why you cannot substitute an externalist account of knowledge as, say, true beliefs 
based on reliable causal mechanisms.   
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You perfect your practical nature, Hurka tells us, to the extent that you are disposed to 
intend to achieve your goals that you are justified in thinking will be achieved (Hurka 1993: 101-
103).  Intending, for Hurka, is different than mere desiring: where desires are “idle wishes”, 
intentions are wishes someone has “set herself to pursue” (Hurka 1993: 102).81  The extent to 
which a particular intended achievement makes you better off is determined by the quality of the 
achievement itself.  On his view, “Someone who through elaborate planning achieves a major 
reform of his society does more of intrinsic worth than someone who merely ties a shoelace” 
(Hurka 1993: 100). 
Now that we have discussed the specifics of Hurka’s essentialist PW, let us see how it 
fares with the case of Sally.  The relevant differences between Hurka’s essentialist PW and 
Aristotle’s distinctive PW is that in addition to including rational perfection, Hurka’s account 
also includes physical and practical perfection.  Sally is less physically healthy just a month or 
two after the brainwashing than she is either brainwashed or several years after she leaves the 
brainwashing.  In the first couple of months after she leaves the cult, Sally feels depressed: she 
does not sleep as well, eat so well, or exercise much.  During the brainwashing she treats her 
body much better; and several years later she is back to treating it well again.  Sally also has lots 
of practical perfection while brainwashed.  While some of her intentions are unjustified—like, 
her intention to save the world—in the sense that they are not realizable, many of her intentions 
are justified.  She intends to be the second-in-command of the cult, and she intends to lead many 
to the group.  Thus, she exercises her practical nature much better while brainwashed than the 
first couple of months after the intervention.  Hurka’s PW, then, deems her better off 
                                                
81 Keller (2009) makes a similar distinction between goals and mere desires: goals aim at achievement whereas mere 
desires do not (670-672).  If you have a goal to achieve φ, Keller maintains that you are thereby “commit[ted] to 
bringing about the targeted state of affairs” (672).  Whereas if you merely desire φ, you are not thereby committed to 
bringing about φ. 
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brainwashed than a couple months after the intervention.  And even though years after the 
brainwashing Sally does not perfect her practical nature quite as well as she did while 
brainwashed, she perfects her rational nature to a much greater extent.  Hurka’s PW, then, deems 
Sally better off years after the brainwashing than being brainwashed.  Thus, Hurka’s PW, unlike 
Aristotle’s, accords with intuition in the case of Sally. 
While it accords with intuition in the case of Sally and is thus an improvement over 
Aristotle’s PW, Hurka’s PW faces numerous challenges.  First off, the capacities Hurka 
maintains are essential—namely, the particular physical, practical, and rational capacities—do 
not seem essential.  Think, for example, of a fetus.  It certainly does not possess circulatory, 
respiratory and other physical systems, let alone practical and rational capacities.  Hence, it is not 
a member of the human species, on Hurka’s view.  Same thing with certain of the mentally or 
cognitively impaired: because they lack the rational capacities Hurka deems essential to human 
beings, they are not human beings.  This does not seem plausible, however.  Think of when 
someone who is cognitively impaired dies, we think that a human being has died, not a non-
human.82  
Like Aristotle’s PW, Hurka’s PW fails to give any intrinsic prudential worth to pleasure.  
Richard Arneson has us think of cheap thrills, activities that “provide pleasure and excitement 
without any significant effort or sacrifice on the part of the agent and also without the exercise or 
development of any of the agent's significant talents” (Arneson: 11-12).  These pleasures seem to 
enhance our lives while they offer no “redeeming social value beyond their pleasantness” 
(Arneson: 12).   
If the above section is correct, neither Aristotle’s or Hurka’s PW seem plausible.  Not 
only does Aristotle’s PW fail to accord with intuition in the case of Sally, his function argument 
                                                
82 Kitcher makes the same point (Kitcher 1999: 69). 
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seems unsound and his account of nature deems certain of our capacities relevant for our welfare 
when they do not by themselves seem relevant.  As for Hurka’s PW, while it accords with 
intuition in the case of Sally, it also deems certain of our capacities essential to us that do not 
seem essential.  Moreover, neither PW grants any intrinsic prudential worth to pleasure.   
Let us try to construct a version of PW that is not susceptible to the criticisms that 
Aristotle’s and Hurka’s PW are susceptible to.  They both seem correct to emphasize the rational 
part of our selves.  It enables them to deem that Sally is better off years after the brainwashing 
than brainwashed.  As we saw, Aristotle’s account exclusive reliance on rationality emphasizes it 
too much: while we are inclined to think that Sally is better off brainwashed than just a couple 
months after her brainwashing because of how miserable she is, Aristotle’s PW deems her better 
off miserable and not brainwashed.  Hurka’s account, however, is not entirely free of this worry 
because it, too, fails to accommodate the idea that happiness is intrinsically prudentially 
valuable.   
In response, then, I think that a proponent of PW should not only contend that rationality 
is intimately connected with our welfare but our happiness, too.  Any perfectionist account of 
welfare grounds our welfare in our natures.  The two views given above—Aristotle’s uniqueness 
and Hurka’s essentialism—fail.  What we need is either an account of nature that does not fail, or 
a theory of welfare that makes no appeal to nature whatsoever.  Thus far, I have suggested that 
happiness and satisfied desires are intrinsically good for us.  If we add successfully using one’s 
critical capacities to the mix, we can accord with intuition in the case of Sally.  Why, then, not 
just suppose that welfare consists of these goods?  If we go this route, we no longer have a 
perfectionist theory of welfare, but an objective list, which we shall now discuss.  
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5.5 The objective list (OL) 
5.5.1 The essence of OL 
OL is the position that the essence of welfare is the collection of certain goods: you are 
well off to the extent that your life is full of the certain goods, worse off to the extent your life 
does not include these goods.  These goods, whatever they are, are good for you independent of 
your attitudes or feelings toward them.  This is what makes them objectively good.  A typical OL 
includes items such as: achievement, friendship, knowledge, and pleasure.  The list of the 
aforementioned goods is said to be objective because it permits something to be good for you 
independent of your feelings or attitudes toward it: your autonomy, achievements, and 
knowledge make you better off even if you are not positively disposed to them. 
What I would like to do now is explore what OL says about Sally. 
5.5.2 OL and Sally 
To determine whether OL accords with intuition in the case of Sally, we need to know 
which goods are on the objective list.  Let us suppose that this particular objective list contains 
the following aforementioned goods: achievement, friendship, knowledge, and pleasure.  During 
the brainwashing Sally achieves many of her wants and experiences much pleasure.  She also has 
considerably more knowledge of what is in the Bible and how to influence people; it is just that 
she is not very knowledgeable about how destructive her church is.  She does make many new 
friends who are also members of her group, but she loses several friends who are frightened 
away by her new lifestyle; this leaves her without a net gain or loss in the number of her friends.  
And while she feels especially close with her new friends in the group, she is no longer as close 
with several of her friends outside of the group; this leaves her without a net gain or loss in terms 
of how close she feels with her friends. 
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A month or two after the brainwashing Sally is more knowledgeable about the church and 
brainwashing; but she often feels lousy and achieves little of what she desires.  At this time, then, 
Sally has more knowledge; but she now has a dearth of two of the goods she had in spades while 
brainwashed: achievement and pleasure.  She loses more in terms of achievement and pleasure 
than she gains knowledge.  After leaving the cult, Sally has left behind many of her friends that 
remain in the group; yet she is closer with her friends outside of the group.  This seems to leave 
Sally no better or worse off in terms of her friendships before or after she leaves the cult.  Thus, 
according to this particular objective list Sally is better off brainwashed than she is a month or 
two after the brainwashing.  Years after the brainwashing, though, Sally experiences much 
pleasure, is much more well informed about the group and the nature of brainwashing, and 
achieves much of what she wants.  Still, she does not have as much pleasure nor get as much of 
what she wants as she did while brainwashed.  The gain in knowledge she has does not outweigh 
the decrease in her pleasure and achievement.  Thus, this objective list deems her better off 
brainwashed, even than years after the brainwashing, in conflict with intuition.   
The proponent of OL may not think that this is a problem.  After all, she may just insist 
that while this particular objective list conflicts with intuition in the case of Sally, not all 
objective lists do; and the right one, the proponent could insist, accords with intuition.  We just 
have to find it.  Well, at least two items on the previous list seem intrinsically beneficial to Sally: 
achievement and pleasure.  So let us leave them on the list.  This time around, I shall drop 
friendship.  And in addition to knowledge, I shall add critical thinking, which is being devoid of 
cognitive errors and the errors of instrumental rationality. 
During her brainwashing Sally receives much achievement and pleasure.  She has a 
moderate amount of knowledge about the Bible and how to influence people.  However, she has 
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a dearth of critical thinking: she is victim to many logical fallacies and emotional ploys.  A 
month or two after leaving the brainwashing, Sally does not have much achievement or pleasure.  
She does have more knowledge and critical thinking; it is just that her gain in these two items 
falls short of the lost achievement and pleasure.  Several years after the brainwashing, however, 
while Sally experiences less achievement and pleasure, she has significantly more knowledge 
and critical thinking; so much so that her gain in these two items outweighs her lost achievement 
and pleasure.  This particular objective list, then, deems Sally best off years after the 
brainwashing, in accordance with intuition. 
This objective list also deems Molly better off not being brainwashed, too.  Sure, she 
most intensely desires her own happiness and thus wants to continue the brainwashing.  
Nevertheless, this objective list deems brainwashing bad for Molly since it violates her critical 
capacities.  Years after the brainwashing, although Molly has less pleasure, she successfully 
exercises her critical capacities to a much greater extent.  Thus, this objective list deems her 
better off years after the brainwashing, in accordance with intuition. 
5.5.3 Support for OL 
 Unlike all of the above theories of welfare except HHW, this particular objective list 
accords with the intuition that happiness is intrinsically good for the happy.  According to it, 
happiness is a constituent of well-being.  Thus, every episode of happiness makes you better off.  
But unlike HHW, this objective list does not deem that happiness is the only constituent of well-
being; rather, it also maintains that achievement and critical thinking constitute well-being, too.  
Further, unlike all of the above theories of welfare except DSW, this particular objective list 
accords with the intuition that satisfied desires are intrinsically good for us.  According to this 
objective list, getting what you want is another constituent of well-being.  So while it implies that 
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every satisfied desire makes you better off, this objective list, unlike DSW, does not maintain 
that satisfied desires are the only things that make you better off.  This objective list also takes a 
lesson from the above theories of welfare by implying that exercising your critical capacities free 
of error is intrinsically good for you. 
While this particular objective list accords with intuition in the cases of Sally and Molly 
and has considerable strengths, objective list theories of welfare face the following two 
criticisms.  I do not find the first to be convincing but the second I do. 
5.5.4 Criticisms against OL 
Objection 1: OL violates the internalism constraint 
Objective lists fail to respect the internalism constraint, which basically maintains that for 
φ to be intrinsically good for you, you must be motivated to want φ, at least under ideal 
conditions.83  Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare accord with this constraint: if you desire 
something, you are by definition motivated to want that thing.  If this constraint is correct, 
something cannot be good for you without your say-so.  This may seem rather plausible: it is 
your welfare we are talking about, after all.  And who else but you is in the position to know 
whether φ makes you better off. 
Remember, OL maintains that φ may be good for you independent of any motivations 
that you may have.  Think about what this implies.  Suppose that your life contains the goods 
listed on the above objective list.  The thing is: you are repulsed by these parts of your life.  
According to OL, though, your life is going well for you, in fact, very well for you.  It is no 
surprise, then, that without the internalism constraint critics accuse OL of being paternalistic, of 
                                                
83 See Rosati (1996: 298) for a full explication and defense of the internalism constraint. 
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restricting your liberty against your will for your supposed good.  Internalism gives you the 
authority to determine what is good for you.  I do not find this criticism convincing, however. 
I think that the internalism constraint is implausible.  Think back to brainwashed Sally.  
She is motivated to do only one thing: promote the interests of Dianne.  And if Sally pursues her 
motivations, she seems to be pursuing her own peril: she seems better off acting against her 
motivations by leaving the brainwashing than she seems acting in accordance with her 
motivations.  Sally’s motivations are the product of, amongst other things, misinformation and a 
failure to exercise her critical capacities.  The particular objective list we discussed that accords 
with intuition in the case of Sally does not make Sally’s well-being subject to the whims of 
anything like typical motivations are subject to.  While OL may alienate you from your current 
desires, wants, projects, and so on, it may—depending on the particular objective list—prevent 
your good from consisting in the satisfaction of motivations that you would abandon based on 
fuller information and rationality.  In a sense, a given objective list may permit us to better get at 
Sally’s deeper self, the self not susceptible to misinformation and cognitive errors.  
While I do not think that the internalism constraint offers a good criticism of OL, I think 
that the following objection does. 
Objection 2: OL needs an explanation 
This theory of welfare is different from the others that we have discussed.  Consider 
hedonism.  If asked to create a list of items that are prudentially valuable, the hedonist may come 
up with the following: achievement, enjoyable experiences, and knowledge.  But if asked what 
makes the items on her list good for us, the hedonist would say that it is their being pleasurable.  
This is because the hedonist insists that pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good for us. 
Thus understood hedonism is not merely an enumeration of prudentially valuable goods; rather, 
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it is an explanation for why those goods are prudentially valuable.84  That is, hedonism is not 
merely a list of the sources or components of well-being; rather, it is an account of the nature of 
well-being.  This is as it should be.  A theory of welfare is not only an enumeration; it is also an 
explanation for why those items are prudentially valuable.  The OL, however, is just that: a list 
of items that purport to be good for you.  We need not only a list, but an explanation.  In failing 
to provide an explanation, OL theories fail to even be theories of welfare, properly speaking; or 
so it is argued.85 
Proponents of OL have a response in waiting for this.  They maintain that, despite the 
name, OL is not merely a list of purported prudential goods; it is also an explanation for why 
those goods are good for you.86  Unlike hedonism, which maintains that only one thing is 
intrinsically good for you, OL maintains that multiple things are intrinsically good for you.  
Suppose a proponent of OL maintains that autonomy, knowledge, and pleasure are the only 
things that are intrinsically prudentially valuable.  If this is right, φ makes you better off to the 
extent it brings you autonomy, knowledge, or pleasure.  The theory just adds autonomy and 
knowledge in addition to pleasure.  That is, according to OL, there is not only one thing that is 
good for us; rather, several things are intrinsically good for us.  
I think that this response misses the thrust of the criticism.  A simple enumeration of 
purported prudential goods does not seem to be as theoretically unified as a theory that purports 
that there is only one thing that is good for us.  The proper response a proponent of OL should 
give, in my eyes, is as follows.  While one may prefer a theory with just one item for its 
                                                
84 Crisp makes the same distinction (2006: 622-623). 
 
85 Sumner makes a similar argument (1996), as does Valerius (2008). 
 
86 Arneson, for one OL theorist, argues in this manner (1999: 9-10). 
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theoretical unity, a proponent of OL could maintain that her theory better accommodates our 
commonsense beliefs about prudential value.  And we would rather have a theory that 
accommodates our intuitions but is not theoretically unified than one that fails to accommodate 
our intuitions but is theoretically unified.   
Notice that this final response leaves OL susceptible to a theory that accommodates 
intuition well as it does that also is theoretically unified.  This is where I think that the criticism 
holds true.  Take any two theories of welfare, A and B; if they accord with intuition as well as 
each other and do not have any internal inconsistencies but A is more theoretically unified than 
B, A is the more plausible theory.  All of the above theories claim to be not only a list of 
prudential goods but an explanation for why those items are good for you; but each fails to 
accord with intuition as well as this particular objective list does or it is susceptible to criticisms 
that this objective list is not.  Thus, while this particular objective list may not be as theoretically 
unified, it seems more plausible.  If there were, however, a theory that accommodates intuition as 
well as this objective list that is theoretically unified, well, that theory would be more plausible 
than this objective list.  I think that I have found such a theory.  I shall explicate it in the next and 
final chapter.  
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Chapter 6: What Welfare Is 
 In this chapter I introduce my own theory of welfare, show its strengths, and then defend 
it from criticism.   
6.1 Capacity-fulfillment theory of welfare (CFW) 
6.1.1 The essence of CFW 
I shall first formulate CFW as the position that the essence of welfare is the fulfillment of 
your capacities: you are well off to the extent that you fulfill your capacities, worse off to the 
extent that you fail to do so.  The idea of capacity-fulfillment, of course, requires some 
explication.  I shall first discuss what a capacity is, next what fulfillment is. 
Capacities are best understood as powers or abilities.  You have the power to bench-press 
50 pounds; you have the ability to add two and two together.  We never just possess a capacity, 
simpliciter; rather, we possess a capacity for φ.  That is, capacities are relational.  They are also 
numerous: we have capacities for many things.  I could be writing my dissertation right now, or I 
could be playing a video game; I have the capacity for either.  We do not, however, possess 
capacities for that which it is impossible for us to do.  While I may wish that I could run at the 
speed of light, that is something I cannot do and, hence, do not possess the capacity for.  But you 
can possess a capacity for φ without occurrently exercising φ.  For instance, when you fall 
asleep, you are not, generally speaking, exercising your rational capacities.  Yet you still posses 
your capacity for rationality: you are just not occurrently being rational.  Now that I have said a 
few things about what a capacity is, let us discuss fulfillment. 
I understand fulfillment as follows: φ fulfills a capacity c of S’s only if by performing φ 
she exercises c.  My idea of fulfillment, unlike Haybron’s, then, entails neither authenticity nor 
enjoyment: you may fulfill a capacity of yours even if you get no enjoyment from doing so and 
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even if you exercise the capacity inauthentically.  You may also fulfill a capacity without being 
aware that you are doing so.  Say you are an avid fan of The New York Times crossword puzzle.  
Every morning the first thing that you do after getting out of bed is turn the stove on in order to 
heat up your tea kettle.  As you wait for the water to boil, you open up the Times on your iPad 
and start the daily crossword puzzle.  While completing the puzzle, you exercise numerous 
capacities, including your capacity to complete the Times puzzle.  As you are completing the 
puzzle it is not as if you are thinking, ‘Boy, I really enjoy exercising my capacity to complete the 
Times crossword puzzle’.  No, you need not be aware that you are exercising a capacity in order 
to exercise that capacity; just by completing the Times crossword puzzle you are exercising your 
capacity for doing so.   
But clearly not all capacities are created equal: if we suppose that fulfilling a capacity 
makes you better off, fulfilling some capacities seem to make you better off than fulfilling 
others.  For example, not only do you possess the capacity to complete the Times crossword, you 
also possess the capacity to count blades of grass.  Other things equal, it seems better for you to 
complete the crossword than count blades of grass.   
I can accommodate this concern in several ways.  First, I could take a page from the 
desire-satisfactionist’s playbook and maintain that S is well off, at least in part, to the extent that 
she fulfills the capacities that a fully informed and fully rational S would want the actual S to 
fulfill.  There is an obvious problem for this formulation, however.  Remember, full-information 
DSW failed to accord with intuition in the case of Molly.  A fully informed and fully rational 
Molly would want brainwashed Molly to be maximally happy.  So long as a fully idealized 
Molly values happiness above all else, she would commit no cognitive errors nor errors of 
instrumental rationality in wanting actual Molly to be as happy as she can be.  Likewise, a fully 
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informed and fully rational Molly would want actual Molly to fulfill the capacities necessary for 
her maximal happiness; if being maximally happy requires her to be brainwashed, then so be it.   
So, it does not appear that the idea of full information helps me differentiate between 
capacities that are better for Sally to fulfill than others.  I could take a page from the 
perfectionist’s playbook, maintaining that fulfilling capacities that Sally naturally possesses is 
better for her than fulfilling capacities that she does not naturally possess.  If I go this route, how 
do I define ‘nature’?  I argued above that Aristotle is wrong to define ‘nature’ in terms of 
distinctiveness and that Hurka is wrong to define it in terms of essence.  If my arguments are 
successful, these two notions are of no help.  We could, however, just drop the species 
requirement and instead focus on the individual, as Haybron does.  Thus construed, your 
essential capacities are not those essential to you qua human being but those essential to you qua 
individual self.  So your essential capacities would be those that you possess in virtue of being 
you.  This, too, is problematic, however: there seems to be some possible world where you exist 
without the capacity for affection.  So the idea of essential capacities qua human being or qua 
individual does not seem to aid us.  There is something that does, however, help us distinguish 
between those capacities that seem relevant for our welfare from those that do not: basic 
capacities.    
6.1.2 Basic capacities 
In order to explicate what a basic capacity is, I think it is useful to refer back to DSW.  
First note that desire-satisfactionists distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental desires: only 
the former, they maintain, contribute to welfare.  Suppose that you desire both to drink an 
expensive bottle of wine with your friends and that you desire to impress your friends; but you 
only desire to drink the wine in order to impress your friends.  A desire-satisfactionist about 
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welfare will say that only the desire to impress your friends if fulfilled increases your welfare: 
your desire to drink the wine is merely an instrumental desire; it has no prudential value for its 
own sake. 
I make a similar move with CFW.  In exercising some capacities you are exercising 
others.  And it is only the fulfillment of basic capacities that constitutes your welfare.87  A basic 
capacity is a capacity not explained by any other capacity; a non-basic capacity is a capacity that 
is explained by some other (basic) capacity.  Your capacity to complete the Times crossword 
puzzle is not a basic capacity, since it may be explained by other (basic) capacities.  So, what are 
the basic capacities?  As Shidan Lotfi sees it, there are four: affection, agency, cognition, and 
conation.88  
Affection consists, foremost, of feeling pleasure (positive affect) and pain (negative 
affect).  We also possess the capacity to feel emotions, though it seems to be the case that 
“[e]very emotion is associated with pleasantness or unpleasantness” (Lotfi: 68).  Agency consists 
of forming intentions and carrying those intentions out.  While other animals may intend to do 
things, only humans, Lotfi tells us, can form “complex goals and pursue long-term plans” (Lotfi: 
70).  Cognitive capacities are those that you use to perceive and represent the world.  Hearing, 
tasting, feeling, and so on are sense capacities that enable us to perceive and represent the world.  
We also have the ability to reason.  The direction of fit is of world to mind in the sense that you 
                                                
87 Lotfi (2011) also relies on the idea of basic capacities.  But Lotfi does not merely rely on basic capacities; he 
relies on basic essential capacities.  According to Lotfi, the capacities that are relevant for our welfare are not only 
basic, they are essential, too.  For the reasons explicated above, however, essential capacities seem problematic.  
Rather than rely on essential basic capacities, I just rely on basic capacities.  And as Lotfi notes, he borrows his 
distinction between basic and non-basic capacities from Kit Fine and Michael Gorman, who distinguish between 
basic and non-basic essential properties.  Lotfi takes Fine’s and Gorman’s distinction between properties and applies 
it to capacities.  According to Fine, “An essential property of an object is a constitutive part of the essence of that 
object if it is not had in virtue of being a consequence of some more basic essential properties of the object; and 
otherwise it is a consequential part of the essence.” (1995: 57)   According to Gorman, “F is essential to x just in 
case F is (i) a characteristic of x and (ii) not explained by any other characteristic of x. By contrast, F is accidental to 
x just in case F is (i) a characteristic of x and (ii) explained by some other characteristic of x” (2005: 284). 
 
88 Again, strictly speaking, Lotfi maintains that there are four basic essential capacities. 
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fit your mind or beliefs to the world.  We exercise our conative capacities when we desire.  The 
direction of fit is the opposite of cognition, namely: mind to world in the sense that you fit the 
world to your mind or desires.  When you desire something, you want to make the world a 
certain way.  There are multiple levels of desire.  You may desire that you obtain a tenure-track 
position next year.  You may also desire to have the desire to obtain a tenure-track position next 
year.  The former desire is a first-order desire whereas the latter is a second-order desire.   
I think that Lotfi errs by distinguishing between agency and conation.  As I see it, 
intending is a form of wanting, that is, desiring.  Perhaps intending is a more intense form of 
desiring; but this is a difference in degree, not in kind.  If your desire for φ involves long-term 
plans and complex goals but your desire for ψ does not, your desire for φ will likely be more 
intense than your desire for ψ.  So while satisfying your desire for φ will, other things being 
equal, make you better off than satisfying your desire for ψ, this is because it is a more intense 
desire, and not because of intending having intrinsic prudential value.  The carrying out of one’s 
intentions I would call ‘volition’, a part of conation.   
If this is right, there are just three basic mental capacities: affection, cognition, and 
conation.  The idea that we possess three basic mental capacities has a rich pedigree.  Plato 
divided the human psyche (soul) into three parts: epithumia (appetite), logos (reason), and 
thumos (passion).89  Kant described the human mind as consisting of the capacities to desire, 
feel, and know.90  The fact that the likes of Plato and Kant seemed to have thought that we 
                                                
89 See Republic, especially Books 4, 8, and 9, and Phaedrus. 
 
90 See Critique of the Power of Judgment and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. 
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possess three basic capacities lends the idea some initial plausibility.91  But I wonder whether 
these three are all the basic capacities that we possess. 
Let us think back to Sally.  Throughout much of her life she has treated her body 
reasonably well, working out three to four times a week.  One of her favorite exercises at the 
gym is the benchpress.  I want to determine the basic capacities that she is exercising while 
benching.  She wants to keep her body in good shape both because she wants to be a good 
steward of her body and because she just likes the way feeling in shape feels.  While she is 
benching she feels pain; but she also takes pleasure in the strengthening of her muscles.  Thus 
far, she is exercising two basic capacities: affection and conation.  How do we explain her 
physical exertion, though?  She not only feels some pain and pleasure; nor does she just fulfill 
some of her desires; no, she is also moving her body.  Hurka seems right to include a physical 
dimension to his theory of welfare.  I would like to import it.  So, as I see it, there are four basic 
capacities: affection, cognition, conation, and locomotion. 
Now, we do not only need a distinction between a basic capacity and a non-basic one.  
Otherwise, what makes fulfilling your capacity for pleasure better for you than fulfilling your 
capacity for pain?  Surely, it is better for you to be happy, other things equal, than unhappy; yet 
in both states you would be fulfilling a basic capacity: affection.   
I think that successfully fulfilling your basic capacities is good for you.  You successfully 
fulfill your basic capacities when they are functioning properly.92  You successfully fulfill your 
                                                
91 Lotfi makes the same point (62-63). 
 
92 See Lotfi and Simon Keller for other theories of welfare that rely on the notion of success.  Lotfi maintains that 
you are well off to the extent that you successfully fulfill your basic capacities (76-85).  Keller maintains that you 
are well off to extent that you are successful, where to be successful is “to have attitudes that do well according to 
the standards they constitutively set for themselves” (674).  There are four such attitudes according to Keller: 
beliefs, goals, evaluative attitudes, and pleasure (666-674).   
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affective capacities whenever you experience pleasant feelings or pleasant emotions.  Unlike 
SFW, then, CFW explains why happiness, not unhappiness, constitutes affective fulfillment.  
Think of normal functioning human beings.  Do they prefer pleasure to pain or pain to pleasure?  
Clearly, they prefer pleasure to pain.  There is no need to adopt psychological hedonism, which 
implies something like the idea that we are only motivated to intentionally pursue acts that bring 
us more pleasure than pain.  Rather, all that we need to say is that, generally speaking, 
psychologically healthy individuals pursue what they think will bring more pleasure than pain.  
If someone seeks pain over pleasure, we typically think that she is suffering from some sort of 
affective, psychological, or affective-psychological disorder.  
You successfully fulfill your cognitive capacities to the extent that you represent the 
world accurately, free from error.  This involves accurate sense perception, that is, accurate 
feeling, hearing, seeing, smelling, and tasting.  Successfully fulfilling your cognitive capacities 
also entails reasoning free from error, emotional ploys, fallacies, and errors of instrumental 
rationality.  It also consists of having knowledge.  Suppose you believe that Socrates was the 
teacher of Plato, but you do not know: you heard a friend of yours mention this once; but this 
friend of yours has a reputation of frequently being wrong.  While this true belief alone 
represents the world accurately and thus, according to CFW, increases your welfare, knowing 
that Socrates was the teacher of Plato is a more successful use of your cognitive capacities and 
thus, according to CFW, increases your welfare more. 
While I agree with Hurka’s PW that knowledge is intrinsically good for us, I do not, 
however, agree that one piece of knowledge is more intrinsically prudentially valuable than 
another.  No matter how general any two bits of knowledge are in comparison to each other, they 
seem equally intrinsically prudentially valuable.  Of course I admit that some bits of knowledge 
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increase your welfare more than others.  Bits of knowledge that you take pleasure in or enable 
you to satisfy a desire are more prudentially valuable than those that do not.  Note, though, that 
the increased prudential value here is instrumental, not intrinsic: there is nothing about some 
knowledge itself that makes it more prudentially valuable; it is the pleasure or satisfied desire 
that you have in addition to the knowledge that makes one bit of knowledge more prudentially 
valuable than the other.  That said, of course bits of knowledge that enables us to gain more 
knowledge are, other things equal, more instrumentally valuable than those that do not, too. 
Refer back to Hurka, who says “It is better to know a fundamental law of the universe 
than the number of redheads in Beiseker, Alberta, or the workings of a friend’s personality than 
the exact length of his forearm”.  I do not think that knowing a fundamental law of the universe 
is by itself better for S than knowing the number of redheads in Beiseker.  Sure, there may be 
some beliefs that it is better for S to know than others.  But this is not in virtue of some quality—
like generality—that some beliefs possess.  Rather, it is a result of some beliefs enabling S to 
fulfill her capacities better than others.  So while knowing a more complex belief may contribute 
to your welfare more than a less complex one, we need not rely on Hurka’s generality to get it.   
My theory of welfare also differs from Hurka’s PW in that it is neutral in regards to what 
constitutes knowledge.  Hurka’s PW, remember, entails an internalistic understanding of 
knowledge where S knows p if and only if p is true, S believes p, and S is justified in believing p.  
Justification, here, is an internal manner: S is justified in believing p only if her evidence for 
believing p makes p’s truth probable.  While Hurka’s analysis of knowledge may be correct, 
there are notorious problems with knowledge conceived in the aforementioned manner.93  Rather 
than get bogged down in adjudicating between internalism and externalism about knowledge, I 
remain neutral.  CFW, then, makes a similar move in regards to knowledge as HH makes in 
                                                
93 See Gettier (1963) and Goldman (1976), amongst others. 
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regards to pleasure.  As HH maintains that pleasure constitutes happiness without committing 
itself to a particular understanding of pleasure, CFW maintains that welfare is in part constituted 
by knowledge without committing itself to a particular understanding of knowledge.  Just take 
whatever theory of knowledge you find most plausible; having more of that, CFW maintains, is 
good for you, less of it, bad for you. 
I do, however, agree with Hurka that capacity-fulfillment is best thought of as 
dispositional.  Think of two individuals who are both unconscious, say, sleeping.  The only 
difference between the two is that the first is disposed to have more justified true beliefs, act free 
from rational errors, experience more pleasure, and have more desires satisfied than the second.  
The first seems better off than the second even though they are not occurrently acting free from 
rational errors, and so on.  
Since your conative capacities consist of both desiring and volition, you successfully 
fulfill your conative capacities by getting what you want.  I think satisfaction, here, should be 
understood objectively: successful desire-satisfaction occurs when you desire φ and φ.  When we 
measure the extent to which a satisfied desire contributes to your welfare we must take into 
account the desire’s intensity or strength and its duration.  The more intensely and the longer you 
desire φ, the more satisfying your desire contributes to your welfare. 
What is it to successfully exercise your locomotive capacities?  As Hurka indicates, it is 
to be physically healthy, having your bodily systems “function in an efficient, unrestricted way” 
(Hurka 1993: 38).  There is some intuitive support for this.  Think of two individuals S and T.  S 
does not take care of himself.  His diet consists of lots of red meat, foods high in trans fat, and 
sweets.  And he never exercises; he spends the time he could be exercising in front of his TV, 
munching on his potato chips.  T is the opposite: his diet not only consists of healthy foods like 
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fish, nuts, and greens, he exercises about an hour a day.  Now, both S and T roughly get the same 
amount of pleasure and both satisfy roughly the same number of desires.  And as strange as it 
may sound, they are about as rational as each other.  Even though they share about the same 
amount of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, and rationality, T seems better off than S.   
The notion of successful capacity-fulfillment, here, accords well with our intuitions on 
well-being.  Let us think about what it means to be affectively well off.  Clearly, we tend to think 
that it means something like feeling good as opposed to feeling bad.  What is it to be cognitively 
well off?  It seems to mean something like being free from cognitive errors and having, in 
general, a preponderance of knowledge.  To be conatively well off seems to consist of getting 
what you want.  And to be physically well off seems to just consist of being healthy. 
If CFW is right, you are just well off to the extent that you are well off in all four basic 
capacities.  Happiness, satisfied desires, successful use of your reasoning or sense-perception, 
and good bodily health all intrinsically make you better off.   Yet φ need not be pleasurable, need 
not be a satisfied desire, need not be a successful use of your cognitive capacities, nor successful 
use of your locomotive capacities in order for it to by itself make you better off; φ only needs to 
be one of those things for it to by itself make you better off.  In order to be living a life that is 
good for you, you just need to be well off.  In order to be well off, according to CFW, you need 
to have a positive overall amount of capacity-fulfillment.  CFW is, then, aggregative.  You are 
well off to the extent that you have a positive overall amount of capacity-fulfillment.  
Now that I have finished explicating CFW, it is time to see whether it accords with 
intuition in the case of Sally. 
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6.1.3 CFW and brainwashed Sally 
Sally exercises her affective capacities successfully while being brainwashed.  
Remember, never has she felt so spiritually uplifted, so alive with power, so at ease with people, 
so confident of the truth of her convictions, and just so fulfilled.  Not only does she feel great: 
Sally also takes pleasure in feeling so great.  Indeed, she feels so pleasant and takes so much 
pleasure in feeling pleasant that Sally has a higher surplus of pleasure than pain, in fact, the 
highest surplus she has ever had over a similar duration.  Sally’s feeling happy is a successful use 
of her affective capacities.  Because she has so much happiness, CFW deems her affectively well 
off brainwashed. 
She also exercises her conative capacities successfully while brainwashed.  Many of her 
intense desires go fulfilled, few go unfulfilled.  Indeed, so many more desires of hers go fulfilled 
than unfulfilled that she has more fulfilled desires over the duration of her life while she is 
brainwashed than any other similarly long duration.  Sally’s getting what she wants is a 
successful use of her conative capacities.  Because she has so many satisfied desires, then, CFW 
deems her conatively well off brainwashed, too. 
Although Sally exercises her affective and conative capacities successfully while being 
brainwashed, she fails to exercise her cognitive capacities well.  Indeed, she fails to represent the 
world well at all.  Sure, her sense perception works fine; but Sally commits a plethora of 
cognitive errors.  Remember, Sally has many true beliefs while she is being brainwashed; this is 
why truth-adjusted attitudinal hedonism fails to deem her worse off than years after the 
brainwashing.  The problem with Sally is not that she does not have true beliefs but that she does 
not successfully employ her critical capacities while forming her beliefs.  Dianne is only able to 
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get Sally to change her beliefs by manipulating Sally to reason poorly.94  Her dependence on 
Dianne reduces her to a child-like state, leaving her rational capacities go unfulfilled.  Thus, 
while CFW deems Sally affectively and conatively well off brainwashed, it does not deem her 
cognitively well off.   
A month or two after the brainwashing Sally is now exercising her rational capacities in 
ways she was not while being brainwashed.  Although she exercises her rational capacities more 
successfully, she often feels lousy and goes without getting much of what she intensely desires.  
Thus, while CFW deems her cognitively better off than when she was brainwashed, CFW deems 
her significantly affectively and conatively worse off.  Indeed, while the successful exercise of 
her cognitive capacities makes her better off, according to CFW, her failure to exercise her 
affective and conative capacities leaves her with less overall capacity-fulfillment than she had 
while brainwashed.  According to CFW, then, Sally is worse off a month or two after the 
intervention than she was while brainwashed.  Thus far, then, CFW accords with intuition.  
Several years after the brainwashing Sally is in a much better state, according to CFW.  
Not only does she exercise her rational capacities to the best she ever has, she is also 
predominately happy and satisfies many of her intense desires.  It is just that Sally is not as 
happy nor satisfies as many of her desires as she did while brainwashed.  Years after her 
brainwashing Sally has a large increase in capacity-fulfillment of her cognition and slight losses 
in her affection and conation as compared to when she was being brainwashed.  This leaves her 
with more overall capacity-fulfillment than she had than while being brainwashed.  Of the three 
periods, then, CFW deems Sally best off years after the brainwashing, in accordance with 
intuition. 
                                                
94 Keller’s welfare as success is susceptible to this criticism: according to it, Sally is better off brainwashed than 
years after she leaves it since she has more true beliefs, fulfilled goals, true evaluative attitudes, and pleasure.   
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I contend that the problem with Sally is that she achieves her happiness at the cost of her 
rationality.  While Sally is exceedingly affectively well off, she is not at all cognitively well off. 
She would be better off if she fulfilled more of her rational capacities.  And if fulfilling more of 
her rational capacities requires her to leave some of her affective and conative capacities 
unfulfilled, so be it, so long as the result is a net increase in Sally’s overall capacity-fulfillment.   
Think of Mary, a supremely intelligent mathematician.  She reasons thoroughly well and 
is very well informed.  It is just that she is also thoroughly unhappy.  Her problem is the opposite 
of Sally’s: Mary achieves her mathematical prowess at the cost of her emotional health.  While 
Mary is exceedingly cognitively well off, she is not at all affectively well off.  She is better off 
fulfilling more of her affective capacities.  Since fulfilling her rational capacities to the extent 
that she does prevents her from fulfilling her affective capacities, she is better off fulfilling fewer 
of her cognitive capacities, thus enabling her to fulfill her affective ones.  This leaves Mary with 
more overall capacity-fulfillment. 
While it is good that CFW accords with intuition in the case of Sally, several other 
theories discussed above did, as well: full-information DSW, sufficiently modified authentic 
LSW, Hurka’s PW, and some objective lists.  Full-information DSW, however, failed to accord 
with intuition in the case of Molly.  What is CFW’s verdict?  Well, a fully informed and fully 
rational Molly, according to CFW, would be better off leaving the cult.  Even though Molly 
desires her happiness above all else, CFW maintains that she is better off with the most overall 
successful capacity-fulfillment, not necessarily the most successful affective-fulfillment.  And 
because she better successfully fulfills all four of her basic capacities outside the cult than within, 
CFW deems Molly better off years after the brainwashing, in accordance with intuition. 
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Now that I have explained why CFW accords with the cases of Sally and Molly, I shall 
explicate the strengths that CFW has over its rivals. 
6.1.4 Strengths of CFW 
 1. CFW does not rely on an authenticity condition. 
Unlike LSW and SFW, CFW does not require the messy notion of authenticity; so CFW 
does not get into trouble trying to provide an account of it.  Sumner and Haybron both 
acknowledge that happiness that arises from brainwashing is less prudentially valuable than 
happiness that does not arise from brainwashing.  Yet they have difficulty constructing an 
authenticity condition that deems brainwashed happiness prudentially defective.  CFW has no 
such difficulty, since it implies that Sally’s being manipulated by Dianne’s emotional ploys and 
fallacies by itself harms Sally.  In fact Sumner’s LSW and Haybron’s SFW are only able to deem 
brainwashing bad for those undergoing it if they maintain that reasoning free from error 
constitutes authenticity.  CFW maintains not only that reasoning free from error is good for you, 
it also has an explanation for why it is good for you: reasoning from error is a part of 
successfully exercising your cognitive capacities; and since cognition is a basic capacity, 
successfully exercising it makes you better off.   
2. CFW grants that enjoying φ is good for you but also that you need not enjoy φ for it to 
be good for you. 
 
Unlike DSW, LSW, SFW, or PW, CFW also grants the apparent intrinsic prudential 
value of happiness.  Whenever you experience happiness, you also experience pleasure (since 
happiness essentially is pleasure); and whenever you experience pleasure you exercise your 
affective capacities or your conative capacities (or both).  While CFW permits any episode of 
pleasure to make you better off (in proportion to the intensity and duration of the pleasure), CFW 
does not go too far, like HHW and SFW, in making enjoyment a necessary condition for well-
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being: according to CFW, the fulfillment of your basic capacities is good for you even if you 
receive no pleasure from fulfilling them.  Someone who is successful and knowledgeable but 
who does not enjoy his success or knowledge is, all else equal, better off than someone without 
that success and knowledge; but CFW maintains that he is better off yet taking pleasure from her 
success and knowledge.  Thus, CFW takes the best from hedonism (about welfare) since it 
implies that pleasure is good for you, that any episode of pleasure you experience makes you pro 
tanto better off.  Yet CFW leaves out the bad from hedonism since it implies that things besides 
pleasure are good for you.   
3. Like LSW, CFW has affective and cognitive dimensions to our welfare. 
While happiness seems to merely be an affective matter, welfare seems to have both 
affective and cognitive dimensions.  Welfare not only seems to consist of feeling fulfilled but 
also being fulfilled.  LSW accords well with this.  CFW is similar to LSW in that it includes both 
a cognitive and an affective dimension to welfare.  Where authentic LSW maintains that one 
needs to be both cognitively and affectively satisfied to be well off, CFW maintains that one is 
well off to the extent one exercises her affective, cognitive, conative, and locomotive capacities 
successfully.  Where LSW measures cognitive satisfaction in terms of how well you think your 
life meets your expectations, the latter measures cognitive well-being, at least in part, in terms of 
how informed and rational you are.    
4. CFW has the benefits of full-information DSW without the cost. 
CFW is not susceptible to the criticisms that full-information DSW is susceptible to.  It 
takes the best—full-information DSW’s emphasis on information and rationality—and leaves out 
the troublesome part—the reliance on desire-satisfaction as a necessary condition for welfare.  A 
fully informed and fully rational Molly values happiness above all else and therefore wants 
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brainwashed Molly to continue her brainwashing.  This does not seem to be in her best interest, 
however: Molly seems better off years after the brainwashing, where she fulfills not only her 
affective and conative capacities, but her cognitive ones, too.  Generally speaking, the more fully 
informed and rational someone becomes, the more likely she will know what is good for her.  
That said, being in such a state does not make someone infallible: one may still desire something 
that is not in her best interest.  This accords well with CFW since it implies that becoming more 
fully informed and rational increases one’s welfare.   
5. CFW grants that satisfied desires by themselves benefit us. 
CFW also accords with the intuition that satisfied desires by themselves are good for you.  
Take Seneca.  He seems better off after delivering a rousing oration to the Senate even though he 
feels no emotional states.  As I originally described it, Seneca enjoyed the fact that his desire to 
give a rousing oration was satisfied.  Suppose this time that we take out the pleasure; that is, 
suppose that Seneca gets no pleasure from satisfying his desire.  He still seems better off after 
giving the oration since an intense desire of his has been satisfied: sure, he would be better off 
still if he also received pleasure from doing so; but the satisfied desire alone seems to make him 
better off.  And CFW accords with this.  It just does not go too far, like DSW, in deeming desire-
satisfaction a necessary component of welfare. 
6. CFW does not rely on the questionable idea of human essence. 
CFW, unlike PW, does not rely on essential or distinct properties; so it does not run into 
trouble distinguishing humans from non-humans.   
7. CFW accords with intuition as well as OL; plus, it is theoretically unified. 
My theory is also an improvement over the objective list containing pleasure, satisfied 
desires, knowledge, and reasoning well, since CFW accords with the world as well as this list of 
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goods and it has greater theoretical unity.  As we discussed, OL faces criticisms for supposedly 
being an enumerative, not an explanatory, theory of welfare.  CFW, unlike OL, does not just 
provide a list of prudential goods; rather, it provides a unifying explanation for why the goods it 
deems intrinsically prudentially valuable are intrinsically prudentially valuable.  If CFW is 
correct, accurate sense perception, knowledge, rationality, pleasure, satisfied desires, and 
physical health are all intrinsically good for us.  This is because each is the result of successfully 
fulfilling our basic capacities.  Since CFW accords with the world as well as the aforementioned 
objective list, its greater theoretical unity makes it a more plausible theory of welfare. 
Now that I have explicated CFW’s strengths, I will attempt to defend it from criticism. 
6.1.5 Defending CFW from criticism 
1. Non-prudential desires criticism 
DSW seems susceptible to the non-prudential desires criticism.  Simply put, some 
satisfied desires do not seem to make us better off, even pro tanto.  Refer back to the stranger on 
the subway that you spot in a cast.  You desire of that person that he be free of that cast, that he 
be healed.  Your desire is satisfied a week later when the person has a successful surgery, is 
healed, and hence no longer has need of the cast.  It is clear that he seems better off without the 
cast.  But how are you made any better off by his cast now removed?  You do not even know 
about it.   
While CFW does imply that any satisfied desire you have makes you pro tanto better off, 
the extent to which a particular satisfied desire makes you better off depends on the intensity and 
duration of the desire.  So when you get things that you barely want, your welfare barely 
increases.  Your desire for the person on the subway to be healed is not a very intense one, nor is 
it a long one; after all, you forget about it shortly after you get off the subway.  So while 
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according to CFW the fact that the person is healed does make you better off, the extent to which 
it makes you better off is mitigated by how weak and short lasting the desire is.  If your desire is 
only brief and fleeting, the satisfaction of it only has a brief and fleeting impact on your well-
being.  
Think of a related case involving Mary the mathematician discussed above in section 
6.1.3.  She never ceases trying to solve mathematical problems.  Suppose that she does so 
because she believes that the axioms of logic and math are necessarily true.  If it turns out the 
axioms of logic and math are merely contingently true, her life’s work will be based on a lie.  
She intensely desires that the axioms be necessarily true; suppose that they are but that she does 
not know it.  Like you on the subway, she desires something and it obtains without her realizing 
it.  The difference is that an intense desire of hers has been fulfilled.  In this case, I doubt that we 
are pretheoretically inclined to deem her no better off as a result of he desire being satisfied. 
2. Trivial knowledge 
CFW may be criticized for implying that all information you know makes you better off. 
Suppose that there are 50,000 words in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.  Suppose further that 
you know this.  By itself it seems that knowing how many words are in a book is rather trivial 
knowledge, knowledge that by itself has no relevance for your well-being.  Yet if CFW is 
correct, you are better off in virtue of this piece of knowledge.  At best, it seems that this 
knowledge is instrumentally good for you.  Say that your knowledge of Nietzsche enables you to 
impress a cute girl at a bar who you later marry.  Lucky for you, marrying her is really good for 
you.  Knowing how many words there are in the Birth, then, was instrumentally good for you.  
But by itself, it seems trivial. 
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While CFW does imply that any bit of knowledge you possess makes you better off, 
certain bits of knowledge are better for us to possess than others: knowledge that enables you to 
successfully fulfill other basic capacities makes you better off than knowledge that does not.  So 
knowledge that brings you pleasure or enables you to satisfy your desires is better for you, 
instrumentally, than knowledge that does not.  That said, any true belief that you possess that is 
justified or based on a reliable causal mechanism (depending on your theory of knowledge), 
according to CFW, is just as intrinsically good for you as any other.  I realize that this is 
counterintuitive; but I hope that the numerous strengths I described above outweigh this 
criticism.   
Now, there may be a theory of welfare that accords with our commonsense beliefs as well 
as CFW but is not susceptible to the above trivial knowledge criticism.  I am not aware of such a 
theory, however.  One could argue that I have already discussed such a theory: the objective list 
with happiness, satisfied desires, and not being susceptible to emotional ploys and logical 
fallacies.  But this is mistaken.  While CFW is susceptible to the trivial knowledge criticism and 
this objective list is not, there is a type of case that CFW accords with intuition on that this 
objective list fails to accord with intuition on.   
Think back to Ted and Bruce described in section 4.5.1.1.  While both are equally 
blissfully happy businessmen, Ted’s wife is cheating on him and he does not know it, whereas 
Bruce’s wife is loyal; Ted’s happiness is based on a lie, whereas Bruce’s is not.  Suppose that 
Bruce’s belief that his wife is faithful is both justified and causally related to a reliable 
mechanism.  And suppose that Ted’s false belief that his wife is not the result of an emotional 
ploy or logical fallacy.  Where Bruce, then, knows that his wife his loyal, Ted does not.  
Although they have equal amounts of happiness and success, and although they are equally 
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immune to erroneous reasoning, other things equal, Bruce seems better off than Ted.  CFW 
deems Bruce better off than Ted because he has more knowledge than Ted, whereas the objective 
list that merely contains happiness, success, and immunity to emotional ploys and fallacies 
deems them equally well off.   
The objective list that contains happiness, success, immunity to emotional ploys and 
fallacies, and knowledge does accord with intuition in this case.  In fact, this objective list 
accords with our commonsense beliefs as well as CFW.  The thing is: CFW is more plausible 
because it has an explanation for why the items it deems intrinsically good for us are good for us 
and this objective list lacks such an explanation  
3. Harmful knowledge 
CFW implies that knowledge is good for us, but clearly some knowledge is bad for us. 
Think about David, a 60 year-old man who has thus far lived a pretty happy and satisfying life.  
Unfortunately, he is having trouble with his vision lately.  So he goes to see his eye doctor.  The 
optometrist can find nothing wrong; so he recommends that David see his doctor.  David’s 
physician runs a battery of tests, including x-raying David’s brain.  He finds a mass.  After 
getting it tested, they learn that it is a stage four malignant tumor.  David becomes severely 
depressed once he learns this: he stops talking to others, loses his energy and vitality, and so on.  
A few weeks later he dies in the same state.  Clearly, it seems that the knowledge made David 
worse off: it would have been better for him had he just not known about the cancer; he was 
going to die anyway.  He might as well enjoy his last days in ignorance.  CFW, however, implies 
that this knowledge is good for David.  Hence, CFW seems wrong. 
I have a ready response to this criticism.  The proponent of CFW would say that David’s 
knowledge of his tumor makes him instrumentally worse off: while the knowledge by itself 
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benefits him, according to CFW, that benefit is outweighed by the harm the knowledge does him 
in virtue of preventing him from successfully fulfilling affective and conative capacities that he 
would have otherwise fulfilled.  A similar point can be made in the case of Sally: according to 
CFW, although brainwashed Sally’s pleasure was intrinsically good for her, it was instrumentally 
bad for her since it prevented her from fulfilling her rational capacities successfully. 
4. Accurate sense perception? 
CFW maintains that successful use of your cognitive capacities constitutes a part of your 
welfare.  And it also maintains that having accurate sense perception constitutes a part of 
successful cognition.  This means that accurate sense perception is intrinsically good for you, 
which may seem rather implausible.  Surely, one could argue, having accurate sense perception 
is at best instrumentally good for you.  Take the capacities to hear and see.  While these seem 
like important capacities to those who possess them, they seem valuable for us insofar as they 
enable us to, say, receive pleasure or satisfy our desires; by themselves these capacities do not 
seem valuable for us.   
I am not so sure that intuition is clear on this one, however.  Take Luke, who a few 
months ago went off to war.  Unfortunately for him, he returns from the war with severe damage 
to his eyes, causing him to be blind.  Luke’s injury does seem instrumentally bad for him in the 
sense that (at least at first) he will no longer be able to do many of the things he once did.  I think 
that we are pretheoretically inclined to say that Luke’s injury itself harms him.  Suppose that 
several years after returning home a new sort of surgery is performed on Luke that returns his 
sight.  While being able to see again brings Luke much pleasure and desire-satisfaction, which 
seem beneficial to him in their own right, regaining the ability to see itself seems to benefit him, 
too. 
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Conclusion 
 I introduced this dissertation by discussing Sally, who seems happy, the happiest she has 
even been.  The thing is: she is a member of a destructive cult being brainwashed to only pursue 
its ends.  While Sally seems better off brainwashed than she does a month or two after she leaves 
the cult, Sally seems better off several years later, when she is thinking critically for herself 
again.   
 In chapter one I discussed some preliminary matters about happiness.  I am looking for 
what it is that all and only people who are happy have in common.  Happiness is different from 
welfare in that the concept of happiness is not value-laden like the concept of welfare.  I would 
like to explicate the essence of what it is to be occurrently happy at a moment.  I also discussed 
five commonsense examples of happiness: brainwashed Sally, Mary the mother, Glenda the 
graduate student, Seneca, and Andrew the swine.   
 In chapter two I explicated and then criticized three theories of happiness: DSH, LSH and 
EH.  According to DSH, you are happy to the extent that your desires are satisfied.  ‘Satisfied’ 
can be understood objective or subjectively.  Understood objectively DSH seems implausible.  
Happiness is a psychological or mental state; if objective DSH is correct, however, you are made 
happier without any change to your mental states.  And while subjective DSH accords with 
intuition in four of the five cases, it does not accord with intuition in the case of Glenda.  Her 
intense desires remain just as unsatisfied after she takes the medication as before taking it; yet 
her mood dramatically changes: she goes from feeling lousy and depressed to feeling good and 
optimistic.  With the mood-altering medication she is able to sleep at night and is much less 
irritable to others.  Hence, we are pretheoretically inclined to judge that she is happier after 
taking the medication.  DSH fails to accord with intuition here.  While the happy may have more 
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of their desires satisfied than not, satisfied desires do not seem to constitute happiness: it seems 
possible for you to be happy even though your most intense desires go unsatisfied—as in the 
case of Glenda.  And it seems possible for you to be unhappy even though your most intense 
desires go satisfied, as in the case of Daniel.  Furthermore, subjective DSH has the strange effect 
that whenever you desire to be unhappy, you are the opposite of what you believe you are.  
Desire-satisfaction, understood objectively or subjectively, then, does not appear to be the 
essence of happiness. 
According to LSH, you are happy to the extent that you are affectively and cognitively 
satisfied with your life.  ‘Satisfied’ may be understood in two different ways here, too: actually 
or hypothetically.  Actual satisfaction is clearly too strong: one can be happy without occurrently 
reflecting about one’s life.  While hypothetical LSH accords with intuition in two of the cases, it 
fails to accord with intuition in three of the others, the case of Andrew in particular.  While 
Andrew may enjoy disgusting things, he clearly seems happy.  Yet if he were to reflect about the 
extent to which his life has lived up to his expectations, he would be dissatisfied.  Hypothetical 
LSH thus deems him unhappy.  It seems possible for one to be happy without being happy about 
her life.  Thus, life-satisfaction, understood actually or hypothetically, does not appear to be the 
essence of happiness.   
According to EH, you are happy to the extent that you have positive central affective 
states and positive mood propensities.  While EH accords with intuition in four of the five cases, 
it fails to accord with intuition in the case of Seneca.  He enjoys the state of affairs that includes 
his successful oration.  Even though he fails to have any emotions or moods, Seneca clearly 
seems happy.  Hence, positive emotions and mood propensities, contra EH, do not seem 
necessary for happiness.  Mood propensities, in particular, seem unnecessary and insufficient for 
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happiness since actual moods, not mere propensities for moods, affect our happiness.  Happiness 
also need not be central; it can be shallow and fleeting.  Moreover, pleasure is what distinguishes 
positive emotional states from negative ones, making pleasure the more fundamental constituent 
of happiness. 
 In chapter three I explicated and then defended my own theory of happiness: HH.  
According to it, you are happy to the extent that you experience pleasure.  HH differs from other 
hedonistic theories of happiness by remaining neutral about the nature of pleasure.  Unlike the 
previous three theories of happiness, HH accords with intuition in all five cases.  It also 
withstands the criticisms of Haybron.  I contend that it is the most plausible theory of happiness. 
 In chapter four I explored the relationship between happiness and welfare.  It seems 
obvious that happiness is good for you, that it is at least pro tanto beneficial to the happy.  After 
explicating the nature of brainwashing, I used the case of Sally to show that happiness does not 
seem to be the essence of welfare: Sally seems better off not brainwashed even though she is 
happy.  One could modify hedonism about happiness and welfare such that welfare is 
determined, at least in part, by authentic happiness.  I provided two accounts of authentic HH: 
truth-adjusted attitudinal hedonism about happiness and desert-adjusted attitudinal hedonism 
about happiness.  But they both fail to accord with intuition in the case of Sally, making them 
superfluous.  Happiness—whether authentic or not, then, does not seem to constitute welfare. 
 In chapter five I first explicated and criticized five theories of welfare: DSW, LSW, 
SFW, PW, and OL.  According to DSW, you are well off to the extent that your desires are 
satisfied.  Satisfied desires do seem to be good for us: they seem at least pro tanto benficial.  
Some desires, however, seem better for us to fulfill than others (independent of their intensity 
and duration).  Even though Sally satisfies more intense desires brainwashed than not, she seems 
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better off, contra DSW, satisfying the desires she has years after the brainwashing.  If we 
transform DSW into full-information DSW, the position that Sally is well off to the extent that 
she satisfies the desires that a fully idealized Sally would want her to want, it deems Sally better 
off years after her brainwashing, in accordance with intuition.  Yet, this modification fails to 
accord with intuition in the case of Molly.  I also discussed some additional problems with DSW 
and full-information DSW, the most important is that they only permit happiness to benefit you 
only if you desire it; whereas the benefit happiness brings us does not appear dependent on you 
desiring it.   
 According to LSW, you are well off to the extent that you are satisfied with your life to 
date.  It does not accord with intuition in the case of Sally: because Sally has more life-
satisfaction while being brainwashed than she does years after the brainwashing, LSW deems her 
better off brainwashed.  Now, LSW can be modified to authentic LSW to accord with intuition in 
the case of Sally; but it can only do so by identifying authenticity as something like reasoning 
well, free from error.  Hence, while LSW can be modified to accord with intuition in the cases of 
Sally and Molly, it only does so by becoming more like my own theory of welfare.  Further, 
neither component of life-satisfaction appears to be intrinsically beneficial to us: any benefit that 
affective satisfaction brings you seems to stem from its pleasure, not affective satisfaction as 
such; and any benefit that cognitive satisfaction seems to come from getting what you want, not 
cognitive satisfaction as such.  Moreover, LSW fails to accord with the intuition that happiness is 
intrinsically good for the happy.  
According to SFW, you are well off to the extent you authentically enjoy fulfilling the 
rational and affective sides of your thicker self.  SFW does not accord with intuition in the case 
of Sally because it deems her better off just a month after she leaves her brainwashing when she 
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is downright miserable than she is while brainwashed.  In order to accord with intuition here, 
SFW seems to require a mechanism that can rank-order Sally’s different thicker selves, deeming 
it better for her to fulfill the self she has years after the brainwashing than the self she has while 
brainwashed.  The best mechanism to rank-order Sally’s selves seem to be something like my 
idea of basic capacities.  If we make this move, however, we no longer have a self-fulfillment 
theory of welfare but a capacity-fulfillment theory.  Moreover, contra SFW, it appears that φ may 
make you better off without you exercising φ authentically or without you enjoying φ.  Further, 
SFW’s internalism requirement seems implausible: in order for φ to make you better off, it does 
not seem as though φ needs to fulfill S’s projects, commitments, values, beliefs, and self-
conception or affective self.   
According to PW, you are well off to the extent that you perfect the nature of your 
species.  ‘Nature’ can be understood either as what is distinctive of your species or as what is 
essential to it.  Either way, however, essence is an implausible determinant of welfare: it either 
leaves us with a too restrictive definition of human being or it is susceptible to the wrong 
properties objection.  Now, PW could be modified such that no longer points to a thing’s nature.  
Instead, it could just list the goods that are intrinsically prudentially valuable.  This is nothing 
more than an objective list, however. 
According to OL, you are well off to the extent that your life contains the goods on the 
objective list.  While the objective list that includes happiness, satisfied desires, knowledge, and 
reasoning well accords with intuition in the cases of Sally and Molly, it would be a more 
plausible theory of welfare if it were more theoretically unified.  If a theory of welfare can be 
found that accords with the world as well as the aforementioned objective list while being more 
theoretically unified, that theory is more plausible.  I contend that CFW is that theory.  
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This brings us to chapter six, where I introduce CFW, the theory that maintains you are 
well off to the extent that you successfully exercise your basic capacities.  Not only does it 
accord with intuition in the cases of Sally and Molly, it is not susceptible to the criticisms that 
the above theories of welfare are susceptible to.  That said, CFW does have two counterintuitive 
implications.  It implies that any satisfied desire of your makes you better off and that any bit of 
knowledge you have makes you better off.  I thus acknowledge that there are some tradeoffs with 
CFW; I just think that in the end I provide sufficient evidence for deeming CFW the most 
plausible of the welfare theories here discussed. 
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